On Tuesday, February 19, 2019 at 11:39:21 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 15 Feb 2019, at 20:43, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 12:01:26 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 15 Feb 2019, at 16:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 5:35:02 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 15 Feb 2019, at 08:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:40:32 PM UTC-6, cdemorsella wrote: >>> >>>> Two fascinating (and very different) approaches are presented to derive >>>> Quantim Mechanics main practical tool (e.g. Born's rule). Wonder what some >>>> of the physicists on here think about this research? >>>> >>>> I find the argument that no laws is the fundamental law... and that the >>>> universe and its laws are emergent guided by subtle mathematical >>>> statistical phenomena, at the same time both alluring and annoying.... it >>>> is somehow unsatisfactory.... like being served a quite empty plate with >>>> nice garnish for dinner. >>>> >>>> One example of emergence from chaotic conditions is how traffic jams >>>> (aka density waves) can emerge from chaotic initial conditions, becoming >>>> self re-enforcing within local domains of influence... for those unlucky >>>> to >>>> be stuck in them. Density wave emergence is seen across scale, for example >>>> the spiral arms of galaxies can be explained as giant gravitational pile >>>> ups with some fundamentally similar parallels to say a rush hour traffic >>>> jam, except on vastly different scales of course and due to other >>>> different >>>> factors, in the galactic case the emergent effects of a vast number of >>>> gravitational inter-actions as stars migrate through these arms on their >>>> grand voyages around the galactic core. >>>> >>>> This paired with the corollary argument that any attempt to discover a >>>> fundamental law seems doomed to the infinite regression of then needing to >>>> explain what this foundation itself rests upon.... leading to the "it's >>>> turtles all the way down" hall of mirrors carnival house... head-banger. >>>> >>>> Perhaps, as Wheeler argued, the world is a self-synthesizing system, >>>> and the seeming order we observe, is emergent... a law without law. >>>> >>>> Here is the link to the article: >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-born-rule-has-been-derived-from-simple-physical-principles-20190213/ >>>> >>>> >>> >>> One can (sort of) write all "physics" in a couple of equations: the >>> Einstein Field Equation (EFE) and the Standard Model Equation (SME): >>> >>> EFE: >>> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/EinsteinLeiden4.jpg/620px-EinsteinLeiden4.jpg >>> + >>> SME: >>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png >>> >>> What caused *this particular arrangement* of expressions in these to be >>> the "law" of our universe I suppose can be "explained" by it's being one of >>> any number of possible arrangements. >>> >>> >>> >>> The tiny (sigma_1) arithmetical reality contains all “combinations” of >>> all programs, and your explanation is a bit like digital physics, where the >>> physical universe would be one special universal number, say U. That is >>> possible, but this can explain the origin of the physical laws, in a >>> coherent way with respect to the mind-body problem (the hard problem of >>> consciousness) only in presence of an explanation of why that program U is >>> winning, that is how such U can “multiply” you so much in the relative way >>> that the laws of physics get stabilised. Arithmetical self-reference >>> explains consciousness “easily”, but at the price of forcing us to derive >>> the physical laws from any universal machinery. >>> The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among others, it is >>> the projective border of the universal mind, which is just the mind of the >>> universal machine. It is a complex many-dreams structure, and its quantum >>> aspects explain why negative amplitude of probability can play a role in >>> making the aberrant histories relatively rare, despite them being also in >>> that sigma_1 arithmetic. >>> >>> With mechanism, the idea that there is anything more than the sigma_1 >>> arithmetical truth is absolutely undecidable. The sigma_1 truth emulates >>> the sigma_n believers for all n, and beyond. If the physics which is in the >>> head of the universal numbers departs too much from what we see, it will be >>> time to suspect that there is indeed something more. But not only there are >>> no evidence for that, but there are strong evidence for the completeness of >>> the sigma_1 truth with respect to the metaphysical questions. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >> Whatever brand of scientist - physicist, chemist, biologist, even >> psychologist - it seems that they see any theory of whatever is within >> their domain is to be composed of a finite number of sentences (e.g. >> equations, for physicists). >> >> >> Yes, like a brain use a finite number of molecules, and mechanism >> eventually only assumes the finite number 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …, which >> actually will be used to code the finite things we are interested in. >> >> But the meaning of those things are formalised by infinite structure, >> like the model (N, +, x), or like hide that a computable function associate >> any number to a number. The understanding of “red” should make you able to >> recognise *all* red things. With mechanism, such meaning are captured by >> nameable, and non nameable, number relations. >> >> All theories assumes such potential, phenomenological, infinities. The >> concept of understanding is itself infinite, and more or less well captured >> by the comprehension axiom in set theories, or the abstraction Operation in >> Lambda calculus. Compute science is concerned by the behaviour of finite >> entities confronted to finite or infinite entities. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> To have a theory that is composed of an infinite number of sentences is >> sort of outside of their way of thinking. >> >> >> All theories contains an infinite set of sentences. Classical >> propositional logic contains as theorem “p -> p”, >> “p -> (p -> p)”, “p -> (p -> (p -> p)), etc. Elementary arithmetic >> contains infinite propositions: 1+1= 2, 2+2=4, 4+4=8, 8+8=16, etc. That is >> why we use variables to say generalities, like Ax(x=x), that is, for all x >> it is the case that x = x. Or we use scheme of axioms. >> No need to put any ontology on this, with mechanism we need only 0, s(0), >> … >> Mechanism explains, using only the laws of addition and multiplication >> (and succession) how finite numbers get able to hallucinate other numbers, >> and why some sheaves of hallucination can become persistent and associated >> to deep and complex lawful histories. >> >> I might disagree with you, everyone’s theory is infinite, but what you >> are perhaps saying is that at any moment of time, we consult only finite >> part of those theories, to figure out some reality we bet on. But that is >> not unlike the Turing machine, which consulte only finite portion of its >> tape, and asks only a finite number of query to some Oracle. >> >> F=ma assumes already many infinite theories. Infinite theories are far >> simpler to use than finite theories, due especially to the abundance of >> very similar types of things, like photons, electro, water molecules, but >> also numbers, functions, relations, space, etc. >> >> Digital Mechanism is a finitisme, not an ultrafinitism, to be clear. It >> also an indexical, it concerns your willingness to say yes to a digitalist >> doctor, or yes to a digital teleportation experience. I just show that in >> that case the mind-body problem reduce to a body illusion problem in >> arithmetic. It is more a problem asked in a theory of consciousness than in >> physics. Here the theory of consciousness is basically the whole theology >> of the universal machine, or the one common to all sound consistent >> extension of a little one like PA. PA assumes induction, which we can put >> already in the phenomenology. From the putself, we assume only RA(*). >> >> Bruno >> >> RA = Robinson’s Arithmetic (often called Q): >> >> 1) 0 ≠ s(x) >> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) >> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) >> 4) x+0 = x >> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) >> 6) x*0=0 >> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x >> >> An even cuter TOE is (without logic!): >> >> 1) If A = B and A = C, then B = C >> 2) If A = B then AC = BC >> 3) If A = B then CA = CB >> 4) KAB = A >> 5) SABC = AC(BC) >> >> Both are finite theories, or can be easily viewed as shemes of >> proposition.. The second theory is purely equational. We cannot prove that >> SK = KI in that theory, but that is not needed in the ontology, where they >> are indeed different. >> >> >> Both theories emulate all Löbian machines, which you can define by any >> machine believing one of those axioms, + logic, + corresponding axioms of >> induction. They are the machines we can interview on the theology, and the >> key proper theological proposition, well they can communicate them only >> conditionally to the computationalist hypothesis (of course), and some >> “dangerous” self-soundness implicit assumption. It is here that there is a >> theological trap (consistent in claiming that G* would necessarily apply to >> us). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> > I was really talking about every theory considered has a *finite > specification*. In Robinson Arithmetic (*RA*) above there are only 7 > sentences listed. Of course an infinite number of sentences can can be > produced from these via rules of the specification. > > One can have the axioms of True Arithmetic (*TA*): > > A sentence S is an axiom of *TA* if S is evaluates to be true over the > natural numbers. > > That would be an "infinite" theory. > > > Or better: an infinite “theory”. In the frame of Mechanism, I prefer to > consider such necessary infinite, and not recursively enumerable “theory” > as kind of model, instead of theory. I consider that a theory has to be > effective. Its theorems has to be recursively enumerable, its axioms has to > be recursive. > The set of all true sentences of any Turing-complete theory is not > recursively enumerable, and is better to be seen as a type of > model/semantics. > > Initially I identify words, numbers, machines, finitely presentable thing, > code, software/hardware, as opposed to meaning, infinities, models, > realities, … > > Nuances are then brown au fur et à mesure. > > > > > > > (Consider a theory of physics that just accumulated all sentences S that > passed an experiment.) > > > That is more like facts, than theorems or potential beliefs of a person. > > > > > > But also what I am talking about are theories with *non-quantitative > domains* (are not numerical at all, but are experiential). > > > The experiential (qualitative) domain is obtained from the relation > between (fixed point) semantics, but the one I used are intensional fixed > point (like in the second recursion theorem) than extensional or > denotational one. In particular the modes with “& p” is their definition > provide the logic of first person experience, which have a form of > knowledge which are not definable, indubitable, not provable, etc. >
This doesn't hold even as a general theoretical explanation of experience, except for people that need certainty of some self-imposed solipsism or consistent negative mental state. This is a form of joy eliminativism. "Not definable" is way too strong: Everybody shares experiences and the knowledge arising from them. Take dancing, similar to music, which is more of a first/second/third person experience which is definable: entities moving their bodies for joy, whether alone or shared, whether with music or without. And it can be doubted: for example if Bruno proposes to teach somebody how to dance with Bp & p, everybody is right to refuse to pay him as a dance instructor. And this is provable when they see Bruno dance: there is considerable certainty in the assertion that many students would refuse him as a dance instructor upon seeing his moves. With the exception of course of making a copy of Bruno, who would definitely find refuge in this bloodless, lifeless metaphysics and be the first in line for a lesson, with a notepad, taking everything extremely literally, which is all well and good, but evidently misses the point of dancing almost entirely. So nope, not even of use on its own terms as a general account of experience. Sexuality, altered states, cooking, laughter, discourse of various types etc. would be other areas in which this alleged account that Bruno tries to pass on as experience, fails to the nth degree. And the metaphysics it points towards is just as bleak. The old Shaw cliché quote comes to mind: *“This is the true joy in life, being used for a purpose recognized by yourself as a mighty one. Being a force of nature instead of a feverish, selfish little clod of ailments and grievances, complaining that the world will not devote itself to making you happy. I am of the opinion that my life belongs to the whole community and as long as I live, it is my privilege to do for it what I can. I want to be thoroughly used up when I die, for the harder I work, the more I live. I rejoice in life for its own sake. Life is no brief candle to me. It is a sort of splendid torch which I have got hold of for the moment and I want to make it burn as brightly as possible before handing it on to future generations.”* Shaw metaphysics from this quote is more solid, clear, and fun than quasi-solipsism of intuitionist make. That said, I have no problems with numbers having qualities and relations to form other qualities. Music is full of that. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
