> On 3 Mar 2019, at 16:46, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 8:54:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 Mar 2019, at 15:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 6:52:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 5:58:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 1 Mar 2019, at 19:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Reading all the above in the context of 
>>>> 
>>>> Naturalness and Emergence
>>>> David Wallace
>>>> February 20, 2019
>>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15757/1/naturalness_emergence.pdf 
>>>> <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15757/1/naturalness_emergence.pdf>
>>>> 
>>>> leads to the conclusion that our current language(s) of physics is(are) 
>>>> most likely wrong.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> A proposition can be wrong. I am not sure what you or Wallace would mean by 
>>> a language being wrong. Perhaps Wallace meant that our metaphysics (most of 
>>> the time the materialist one) is wrong, which makes more sense. Perhaps he 
>>> does not dare to say so. It is not well seen in some circles.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> By 'language' in the above paper he means 'mathematical language' and he 
>>> means precisely the language in which QFT an GR are actually written in 
>>> (seen when you look at them on paper or on a screen): Sentences are made of 
>>> mathematical symbols and variables, but the basics begin with a selection 
>>> of sentences (axioms) from which a theory is made.
>> 
>> OK. Thanks. That makes more sense.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> So he is really saying the axioms are likely wrong, and even new primitives 
>>> (mathematical symbols) may have to be invented.
>> 
>> Of course, I don’t think so. It is phenomenologically true, but for the 
>> ontology, i.e. the minimal amount of things which needs to be assumed, s, 0, 
>> + and x are enough (added to logic). In fact, S and K, with “(“ and “)”, 
>> plus “=“ are enough, even without logic. (I always assume Mechanism, by 
>> default, to be sure).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" possibility): 
>> Suppose in pi (which is computable, so has a program (a spigot one, in fact) 
>> that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that stream of digits is the 
>> Standard Model Equation
>> 
>>     (say written in LaTeX/Math [ Unicode ] but rendered here)
>>      
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png 
>> <https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png>
>> 
>> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>> 
>> - pt
>> 
>> 
>> Apropos Dilbert cartoon:
>> 
>>             https://dilbert.com/strip/2019-03-03 
>> <https://dilbert.com/strip/2019-03-03>
> 
> 
> Poor Dilbert will have an infinite task to fail its simulated creature. He 
> will have to revise its limit an infinity of times. If the simulation is 
> “physically correct”, there is no sense to localise the mind of the creature 
> in the simulation, as its supervene on infinity of computations. If the 
> simulation is physically incorrect, the creature will see it, by comparing 
> the arithmetic physics with their observation, unless Dilbert intervenes each 
> time to make them dumb.
> 
> We can experimentally test if the empirical world is fundamental or not, and 
> the results obtained today is that it is very plausibly only a symptom of a 
> deeper, and simpler, non material reality. That’s why we have to come back to 
> Plato, and take distance from Aristotle, at least if we are willing to bet 
> the brain is a (material/natural) digitalizable machine.
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Paralleling the Donald Rumsfeld quote:
> 
> You go to do science [ or engineering ] with the matter you have, not the 
> matter you might want to have. 

Einstein said that he needed just a pen and a bit of papers. 

With mechanism, pen and papers is offered freely by the generous arithmetical 
reality, in the limits of infinitely many first person experiences. 

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
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