On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:59 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > > On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only >>>> suspect it). >>>> >>>> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly >>>> visible behaviors). >>>> >>>> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed >>>> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior. Therefore a >>>> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's >>>> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic >>>> the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have >>>> ever met. >>>> >>>> Do you dispute any of the above? >>>> >>>> >>>> It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary >>>> program. >>>> >>> >>> >>> You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes >>> of the thought experiment). >>> >>> >>> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful. >>> >> >> >> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we >> know it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could >> convince you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness? >> >> >> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as >> intelligent as some stranger. But note that it would have to be >> interactive. So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not >> finitely describable. >> > > Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point? > > I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given > that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer. > > > This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly. > http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf His point is > that human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary > and unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs. > He calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a > memory and doesn't overwrite it. Of course you can say that whatever the > environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is > potentially inifinite. > > Brent > This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made when they pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing emulable -- it involves intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic, presumable coming from an uncodable environment. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
