On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 8:00:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 6 May 2019, at 10:10, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > Is there a calculus of experience? > > > Yes, the logic of the first person knowledge ([]p &p), which is given by a > very precise modal logic, known as S4Grz1. That is more the logic of the > experienceable, and for the “immediate experience" it is given by the logic > of the 5th mode of self-reference ([]p & <>t & p). > > The axioms and how to use them is given in my paper. I can say more is > asked. > > Bruno > > > Whether that suffices for a calculus of experience
cf. http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness A *model of consciousness <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Consciousness>* is a theoretical description that relates *brain <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Brain>* properties of consciousness <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Consciousness> (e.g., fast irregular electrical activity, widespread brain <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Brain> activation) to *phenomenal* properties of consciousness (e.g., qualia <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Qualia>, a first-person-perspective, the unity of a conscious scene). Because of the diverse nature of these properties (Seth et al. 2005), useful models can be either mathematical/logical or verbal/conceptual. I suppose can be proposed in the scheme of theories compared with all the others. But there may not be a "theory" in the conventions sense at all. High-level conceptual models can provide insights into the processes implemented by the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Consciousness>, without necessarily specifying the mechanisms themselves. Several such models propose variations of the notion that consciousness arises from brain-based simulation of organism-environment interactions. These models illuminate in particular two fundamental aspects of phenomenology: the attribution of conscious experience to an experiencing ‘self’, and the first-person perspective that structures each conscious scene. ,,, Because consciousness is a rich biological phenomenon, it is likely that a satisfactory scientific theory of consciousness will require the specification of detailed mechanistic models. The models of consciousness surveyed in this article vary in terms of their level of abstraction as well as in the aspects of phenomenal experience that they are proposed to explain. At present, however, no single model of consciousness appears sufficient to account fully for the multidimensional properties of conscious experience. Moreover, although some of these models have gained prominence, none has yet been accepted as definitive, or even as a foundation upon which to build a definitive model. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/93822182-96e9-47e1-91b7-d8ac0cf3843a%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
