Yes, exactly. There's something it is like to be a thermostat. What is it like? As a basic homeostatic model, with a single recursive element - the dynamics are enough to create an ongoing stream of awareness of the state of a single bit of information.
On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 1:30 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote: > It appears to me that every system that has a function will have a > cybernetic description, i.e. one that only mentions functional > relationships but not the matter. I can imagine such a description of my > thermostat: There's an element that changes with temperature and makes a > connection below a certain temperature that energizes a source of > heat...and so on. Right? > > Brent > > On 5/4/2019 8:26 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: > > The cybernetic description of a system is a description of a system's > relationships, both internally in terms of the system's organization - how > its components relate to each other functionally, and externally in terms > of a system's functional relationship to its environment. A cybernetic > description explicitly leaves out the materiality of the components - it's > only about the relations. Therefore cybernetics is exclusively about > information - the way a system creates/updates information about its > environment, and how that information is processed as a function of the > system's organization as a whole. > > What I'm saying is that for any system that has a cybernetic description > (which can cover a very broad range of systems), there it is something it > is like to be that system, which is to say a system that processes > information in one form or another. A lot of this comes from the site > Principia > Cybernetica <http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/DEFAULT.html> which is a pretty > expansive treatment of cybernetics. > > On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 2:55 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 5/4/2019 6:30 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> What I'm suggesting draws on both functionalism and identity theory. It's >> functional in the sense that the constitutive aspect of cybernetics is >> entirely functional. >> >> >> So what is the function that makes a system "cybernetic" and is that >> sufficient to make it conscious? >> >> Brent >> >> There is nothing in a cybernetic description beyond the functional >> relationships between the parts of that system. It draws on identity theory >> in the sense that I'm claiming that consciousness *is* cybernetic >> dynamics. What I'm adding is the same move that panpsychism makes - that >> there is something it is like to be any cybernetic system, and this >> includes many more things than brains, and crucially, does not depend on a >> specific substrate. >> >> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> I must assume you have already studied (hopefully over many years) in >>> philosophy the difference between >>> >>> *functionalism*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ >>> >>> and >>> >>> *identity theory*: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ >>> >>> A short way of expressing identity theory over functionalism is >>> >>> *A simulation is not a synthesis.* >>> >>> >>> *Experiential materialism* is a variant of identity theory in which >>> >>> • psychical properties, as well as physical ones, are attributed to >>> matter, which is the only basic substance >>> >>> so that >>> >>> • the material composition of the brain has both physical and psychical >>> aspects. >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 7:38:46 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>> Maybe you could tell me what specific criticism you have rather than >>>> quoting a wikipedia article. >>>> >>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't believe in the "*functional* equivalence" principle >>>>> >>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) >>>>> >>>>> as it does not capture the nature of what is needed for consciousness >>>>> (as many critics - some listed there - have pointed out). >>>>> >>>>> If I had to pick something vs. "cybernetic dynamics" it would be >>>>> "neurochemical dynamics". That seems closer to me. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> @philipthrift >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 5:31:56 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Then you're missing the point of the alternative I've been offering. >>>>>> It's not about the *matter itself*, it's about the cybernetic >>>>>> dynamics implemented in the matter. So I would predict that you could >>>>>> replace your brain neuron by neuron with functional equivalents and your >>>>>> consciousness wouldn't change, so long as the cybernetics were unchanged. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019, 6:08 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Well we know *some* matter has a psychical aspect: *human brains*. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Unless one is a consciousness denier. >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a psychic >>>>>>>> aspect is subject to the problems I described earlier. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical >>>>>>>> psychology" >>>>>>>> <https://www.google.com/search?q=theoretical+psychology> but >>>>>>>> there's a lot there. How much of it is interesting, I don't know. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical psychology will >>>>>>>> take on more legitimacy and importance. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from >>>>>>>>> micropsychism to cosmophychism: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ >>>>>>>>> cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of course. >>>>>>>>> But consciousness science in general really isn't yet either. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> One would think there would be a group of theoretical >>>>>>>>> psychologists - there is theoretical physics, chemistry, and biology, >>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>> theoretical psychology is in a much weirder state - who would be >>>>>>>>> involved. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for >>>>>>>>>> Cosmin: what does it buy you in terms of explanations or predictions? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't tell >>>>>>>>>> me anything about consciousness itself. For example, what would it >>>>>>>>>> mean for >>>>>>>>>> my fingernails to be conscious? Does my fingernail consciousness >>>>>>>>>> factor in >>>>>>>>>> somehow to my own experience of consciousness? If so, how? What >>>>>>>>>> about all >>>>>>>>>> the other parts of my body, about individual cells? Does the >>>>>>>>>> bacteria >>>>>>>>>> living in my body contribute its consciousness somehow? It quickly >>>>>>>>>> runs >>>>>>>>>> aground on the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do - there's no >>>>>>>>>> principled way to talk about it that elucidates relationships between >>>>>>>>>> brains, bodies, and minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain the >>>>>>>>>> effect >>>>>>>>>> of drugs on consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's ideas, >>>>>>>>>> it's all >>>>>>>>>> just post-hoc rationalization. Panpsychism is the philosophical >>>>>>>>>> equivalent >>>>>>>>>> of throwing your hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's all >>>>>>>>>> conscious >>>>>>>>>> somehow!" >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from the >>>>>>>>>> cybernetic organization of a system, that what the system >>>>>>>>>> experiences, as a >>>>>>>>>> whole, is identified with the informational-dynamics captured by that >>>>>>>>>> organization. This yields explanations for the character of a given >>>>>>>>>> system's consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Terren >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right now made >>>>>>>>>>> of metal) of matter. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The two sides of the coin (of matter) are *physical *and >>>>>>>>>>> *psychical*: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with >>>>>>>>>>> diacritics dasia and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol of >>>>>>>>>>> matter, φ >>>>>>>>>>> (phi) for physical, + ψ (psi) for psychical, then >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ὕ = φ + ψ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (i.e., the combination of *physical* and *psychical* properties >>>>>>>>>>> is a more complete view of what matter is). The physical is the >>>>>>>>>>> (quantitative) behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is >>>>>>>>>>> formulated in >>>>>>>>>>> mathematical language in current physics, for example – whereas the >>>>>>>>>>> psychical is the (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, at >>>>>>>>>>> various >>>>>>>>>>> levels, from brains on down. There is no reason in principle for >>>>>>>>>>> only φ to >>>>>>>>>>> the considered by science and for ψ to be ignored by science. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you don't get >>>>>>>>>>>> one without the other. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:00 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material] >>>>>>>>>>>>> computation" then does that mean there is realm for (A) >>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness and >>>>>>>>>>>>> one for (B) physical [or material] computation? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? >>>>>>>>>>>>> Or does B invade A? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> @philipthrift >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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