On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:51 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 7 May 2019, at 01:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:02 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea >> that you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you wouldn't >> not be able to tell the difference? >> >> >>> I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a >>> finitely describable TM. >>> >> >> If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you mean >> mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind. >> > > That is the claim that is in dispute; Goedel and Turing find it unproven > at best. > > >> And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a person, >>> physics says it will be entangled with the environment and effectively >>> random at a low level. Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is >>> not TM emulable. >>> >> >> Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints of the >> apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is subjective, not >> objective). >> > > That is idea stems from a confusion in your (Bruno's) definition of first > person and third person views. In Bruno's person-duplication thought > experiments, there is a distinction between 1p and 3p that makes sense in > that context. But this does not carry over to QM, where there is no > viewpoint that sees fully unitary quantum evolution. Bruno seeks to avoid > this fact this by defining a first person-plural (1pp) point of view. But > that is just another name for what is normally considered the third person > perspective. > > > That is impossible. The first person plural is when two persons enter the > annihilation box. They will share the indeterminacy, but that indeterminacy > is still 1p. The “3p” see only two guys being duplicated. > In your duplication experiments, but not in QM; no one 'sees' the quantum superposition continuing after a measurement has been made. > The mechanist definition of the first person plural correspond to the > quantum notion of entanglement, or what I describe often as the contagion > of superposition, due to the linearity of the tensor product. > That is totally meaningless; your 1pp has nothing to do with entanglement. > The unitary quantum evolution explains why the observer feels like there > as been a reduction, but also make them impossible to occur in the 3p > global picture. > The 3p notion coming from classical person duplication experiments does not apply to QM. 3p in QM is simply what can be objectively agreed on by independent observers -- the common sense grammatical notion of the third person. > Changing the name does not change the substance..... The randomness of QM > is third person and objective. > > > Then you introduce a collapse, and QM is simply false globally. All the > attempts to make sense of this have led to difficulties. So your assertion > seems to be wishful thinking. > There is no necessity for collapse. It is just that there is no external observer who can see fully unitary evolution. > Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to > prove: all computations are realised in all models of arithmetic. > But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream. Bruce > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQG5Ok2%2B6e2WWaV_qP1mjG23dGxCG097CzYXjWtruyemw%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
