> On 13 May 2019, at 04:52, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com 
> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
> <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
> From: Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com 
>> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com 
>> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com 
>> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to prove: 
>> all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
>> 
>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism 
>> is manifestly a pipe dream.
>> 
>> 
>> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
>> 
>> There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were none, what 
>> evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is false? 
>> (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, among 
>> mathematicians,
> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most 
> mathematicians are nominalists! (And I had this from a professional 
> mathematician!)
> 
> 
> That's an anecdote, not data.
>  
>  The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.
> 
> 
>> what is your alternative?)
> Nominalism.
> 
> 
> Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not only 
> to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
> 
> What has arithmetical truth got to do with it? Numbers are just names, not 
> existing things.


Mathematical logic distinguish well the name of a thing and the thing itself. 
You confuse “0” and 0.

Also, when you say that something does not exist, you might give us your 
metaphysical axioms. Taken literarily, what you say is like saying that the 
equation x - 4 = 0 has no solution.





>  
> 
>> and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our experience.
>> 
>> So you believe an AI that was functionally equivalent to you would be a 
>> philosophical zombie?
> Not at all. That does not follow.
> 
> If it doesn't follow then the functionally equivalent AI would be conscious. 
> Therefore mechanism.  What am I missing?
> 
> The fact that mechanism does not follow from the possibility of AI.

That is right. Digital Mechanism is a stringer axiom than the strong AI thesis. 
Logically.

So you believe that a digital copy would not be a zombie, but would not be 
“you”?




>  
>> (Mechanism is the leading theory of mind among philosophers of mind,
> Maybe for some philosophers of mind. But there are many other possibilities, 
> most of which are more convincing.
> 
> 
>> what is your alternative?)
> Why should I have an alternative? I can know that a theory does not work 
> without providing a theory that does work.
> 
> 
> Above you said there are other possibilities which are more convincing. What 
> are they and why are they more convincing?
> 
> I do not have to provide a final theory. Anything else would be more 
> convincing than mechanism, entailing, as it does, arithmetical realism.

Mechanism assumes CT, which makes no sense at all without (sigma-1) 
arithmetical realism.

QM, with all current Hamiltonian/Lagrangian known today, implies Digital 
Mechanism. The theory of evolution requires digital mechanism (formed later by 
the discovery of the digital genetic code). 

Then QM confirms also Mechanism, and it is the only theory which explain both 
first person experience, and how it relates to matter and a possibly very 
simple reality.

Physicalism failed on consciousness since long, up to the point that the 
materialist philosopher of mind which are a bit serious, like Dennett, feel 
obliged to make consciousness disappearing.

If the logic S4Grz1, or Z1* or X1* depart from nature, then we would have some 
evidence that mechanism is false, but that is not (yet) the case.

You assume a physical realism, which is not a problem, but then you assume also 
that the physical realm is the fundamental realm, which is OK with your 
non-mechanism.

The problem is only for those who want an ontological physical realm, and 
mechanism.

Now, the evidences abound for Digital Mechanism, and there is just not one 
evidence for primitive matter. There is only the Aristotelian axiom that matter 
is primitive matter, made into state religion for a long time in our history.

When doing metaphysics or theology with the scientific method, we cannot begin 
by an ontological commitment. We must start with equations on which everyone 
(interested) agree, and study the consequence of harder axioms so that we can 
test the consequences.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce 
> 
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