> On 13 May 2019, at 23:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 13. May 2019, at 05:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] 
>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> 
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] 
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] 
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] 
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] 
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>> From: Jason Resch <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] 
>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] 
>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] 
>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to 
>>>> prove: all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
>>>> 
>>>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and 
>>>> mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
>>>> 
>>>> Jason
>>>> 
>>>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
>>>> 
>>>> There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were none, 
>>>> what evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is false? 
>>>> (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, among 
>>>> mathematicians,
>>> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most 
>>> mathematicians are                                       nominalists! (And 
>>> I had this from a professional mathematician!)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> That's an anecdote, not data.
>>>  
>>>  The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.
>>> 
>>> It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires some 
>>> justification or reason, given that it would overturn a predominate theory 
>>> in a field.
>>> 
>>> No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that this view 
>>> has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, not a progressive 
>>> theory.
>> 
>> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
>> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
>> certain to exist.
> 
> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von 
> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
> interpret, they mainly make models.


That idea is just typical after the closure of Plato’s Academy, and the 
stealing of theology by the Sate.

Science can study the how and the why. To claim that the why is not amenable to 
science is a trick to keep the statu quo in metaphysics/theology. It is pure 
argument per authority. It is not valid.




> By a model is meant a  mathematical construct which, with the addition of 
> certain verbal  interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The 
> justification of  such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that 
> it is  expected to work."  I see two approaches to this, one (of which I have 
> been the main advocated on this list) might be called "the engineering 
> approach"  while the other is the philosophical approach.  The philosophical 
> approach either takes consciousness as fundamental and incorrigible (like 
> Cosmin) or tries to equate it with something within a theory based on 
> something else (like Bruno).  One thing both approaches seem to rely on is 
> that there can be no p-zombies,

No. Mechanism assumes only that *I* will not become a zombie when I get the 
artificial digital brain, and then the reasoning implies that those emulated in 
arithmetic cannot be zombie too.


> i.e. intelligent behavior is a sure sign of consciousness, as JKC is won't to 
> point out.  Given that the engineering approach gave us Turing, LISP,

That comes, in your term, in the philosophical approach, when trying the solve 
paradoxes in the foundation of mathematics. The discovery of the universal 
digital machine comes from the intersection of mathematics and philosophy (like 
CT is itself in that intersection). It shows also that with some hypothesis, 
like Digital Mechanism, a part of philosophy becomes approachable by 
mathematics and can be done with the scientific attitude. 



> Deep Blue, Watson, and AlphaGo...while the philosophical approach "predicts" 
> various things we've know for a century or more and various contradictory 
> things about the future (as Bohr said, "Prediction is hard, especially about 
> the future.") my money is on the engineering approach.


Computer science illustrates that the philosophical approach is close to the 
engineering approach. It is not a coincidence that I work in an engineering 
department. They knew that I found QM by pure reasoning, and it helps them to 
take seriously some philosophical aspect of QM, like the violation of Bell’s 
inequality. There too, the goal was philosophical (Deutsch attempts to provide 
experimental clues for the “many-worlds”), and the results is a possible new 
type of computer, not violating CT, but violating complexity-formulation of 
variant of CT, that is, the existence of a universal machine which can not only 
simulate all machines, but can do this in polynomial time. 

The separation of theology and science, has lead also to the separation of 
philosophy and science, and to the modern absurd relativism, which is dangerous 
(Imo). The separation of human science from exact science has not only made 
human science inexact, and exact science inhuman, but above all it has made 
human science inhuman, and exact science inexact.

Science is neutral in metaphysics and theology, especially when doing theology 
or metaphysics. We can only propose theories, but some people here talk like if 
they knew. That is as much pseudo-science than pseudo-religion.

Bruno



> 
> Brent   
> 
>> 
>>>  
>>> I await your reason, argument, or evidence.
>>> 
>>> Arithmetical realism is part of platonism, if not the whole of it. And 
>>> arithmetical realism is manifestly false -- numbers are not things.
>> 
>> What are “things”? You just use lack of rigor and pretend you have an 
>> argument.
>> 
>> Telmo.
>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>> what is your alternative?)
>>> Nominalism.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not 
>>> only to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
>>> 
>>> What has arithmetical truth got to do with it?
>>> 
>>> The independence of arithmetical truth is Platonism.  With it you get all 
>>> the consequences of that infinite truth:
>>> The truth that 9 is composite implies the existence of its factor 3.
>>> The truth of the Nth state of the machine during the execution of a Kth 
>>> program implies the existence of the execution trace of program K, etc.
>>> 
>>> You are making the usual mistake of taking the existential quantifier over 
>>> a domain as an ontological statement.
>>>  
>>> Numbers are just names, not existing things.
>>> 
>>> Again, where is your evidence?  I gave you mine in support of Platonism.
>>> 
>>> You gave no viable evidence for platonism.
>>>  
>>>   If you have no evidence contrary to Platonism you should at least remain 
>>> undecided/agnostic/humble on the matter.
>>> 
>>> Why? Platonism rests on a confusion. I reject that confusion, and hence 
>>> platonism. What replaces it at the simplest level is nominalism -- numbers 
>>> are names, not things.
>>>  
>>> 
>>>> and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our 
>>>> experience.
>>>> 
>>>> So you believe an AI that was functionally equivalent to you would be a 
>>>> philosophical zombie?
>>> Not at all. That does not follow.
>>> 
>>> If it doesn't follow then the functionally equivalent AI would be 
>>> conscious. Therefore mechanism.  What am I missing?
>>> 
>>> The fact that mechanism does not follow from the possibility of AI.
>>> 
>>> Correct, it doesn't. But it does follow from the consciousness of AI, for 
>>> if AI is not conscious, then you get philosophical zombies. (as I stated 
>>> above).
>>> 
>>> I do not accept your argument. I have rejected your basic theory, so I 
>>> thereby reject all its consequences. If the AI is functionally equivalent 
>>> to a brain, then AI is conscious as the brain is conscious -- consciousness 
>>> is a function of the brain.
>>>  
>>>> (Mechanism is the leading theory of mind among philosophers of mind,
>>> Maybe for some philosophers of mind. But there are many other 
>>> possibilities, most of which are more convincing.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> what is your alternative?)
>>> Why should I have an alternative? I can know that a theory does not work 
>>> without providing a theory that does work.
>>> 
>>> Above you said there are other possibilities which are more convincing. 
>>> What are they and why are they more convincing?
>>> 
>>> I do not have to provide a final theory.
>>> 
>>> No one is asking you two. You said there are alternatives which are more 
>>> convincing. I am just curious what you were referring to.
>>> 
>>> Mind is what brains do.
>>>  
>>> Anything else would be more convincing than mechanism, entailing, as it 
>>> does, arithmetical realism.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Mechanism does not entail arithmetical realism. They are two separate 
>>> assumptions.
>>> 
>>> OK, then you develop mechanism and all its consequences without assuming 
>>> arithmetical realism at some point.
>>> 
>>> Bruce 
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