> On 14 May 2019, at 01:27, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 9:19 AM Telmo Menezes <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2019, at 22:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>> 
>>> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
>>> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
>>> certain to exist.
>> 
>> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von 
>> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
>> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical 
>> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, 
>> describes observed phenomena.
> 
> I agree with you and von Neumann on this, and this is precisely why I used 
> the words "account for" instead of "explain". I literally mean that 
> consciousness does not fit the physicalist models, it appears as magic or 
> supernatural. To be precise, and avoid empty authoritative proclamations, I 
> make clear what I mean:
> 
> 1) Darwinian evolution is a theory (a brilliant theory, possibly my favorite 
> scientific theory of all times) that accounts for biological 
> complexification. Under physicalism, it fails to account for consciousness. 
> There is simply no reason for the "lights to be on". A functionally 
> equivalent p-zombie does the trick.
> 
> 2) So maybe it's a spandrel. But again we have the magic step, because 
> spandrels must arise from something. What are the first principles?
> 
> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. My 
> body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that mass. 
> What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There is no 
> accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.
> 
> It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he is not 
> able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism fails. It 
> goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible with Platonism. 
> I am pointing out a direct observation of mine that, thus far, is not 
> compatible with physicalism.
> 
> Telmo.
> 
> You are too quick. You have not shown that consciousness is incompatible with 
> physicalism.

Consciousness is only incompatible with physicalism + mechanism. It is nice, 
because the canonical theory of consciousness given by the machine itself 
explains consciousness (as best as logically possible), and explain 
constructively the appearance of matter, so that we can evaluate and test the 
theory by comparing with nature.



> Just give Brent's engineering approach some time to work.

Read my papers. Physicalism and Mechanism cannot work together at all. You have 
to abandon Mechanism to save physicalism. But the evidences favours much more 
mechanism than physicalism (which seems to be only an habit of thought).



> Platonism has not accounted for the physical universe

That is plain false. Mechanism explains entirely, qualitatively and 
qualitatively, where the belief in a physical universe comes from, where 
physicalism has to make an ontological commitment, which we try to always avoid 
when doing science. Only Mechanism explain why we believe in a physical 
universe, why that belief is correct, despite that physical universe is no more 
an ontological thing.



> -- Bruno keeps saying that this is just "a work in progress”.

Yes, but the whole propositional theories have already been found. Some 
comparison have already been done, and physicalism is already refuted (when 
assuming mechanism), and tested plausibly false by the experiments, notably 
those already done in quantum mechanics.



> So the same for consciousness.

Non computationalist theory of consciousness are up to now too much fuzzy to be 
tested. Such things do not  yet exist, and even if Mechanism is refuted, you 
will need the computationalist theory of mind (Mechanism) to develop a genuine 
non computationalist theory. 
Like the understanding of the infinite requires some understanding of the 
finite, the non-computable requires the understanding of the computable. Note 
that the universal machine are only partial computable.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
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