On Mon, May 13, 2019, at 22:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> On 13. May 2019, at 05:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett >>>>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> From: *Jason Resch* <[email protected]> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett >>>>>>>>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact >>>>>>>>>>>> to prove: all computations are realised in all models of >>>>>>>>>>>> arithmetic. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and >>>>>>>>>>> mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You sound certain. What is your evidence? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Jason >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were >>>>>>>> none, what evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is >>>>>>>> false? (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, >>>>>>>> among mathematicians, >>>>>>> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most >>>>>>> mathematicians are nominalists! (And I had this from a professional >>>>>>> mathematician!)
>>>>>> >>>>>> That's an anecdote, not data. >>>>> >>>>> The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads. >>>> >>>> It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires some >>>> justification or reason, given that it would overturn a predominate theory >>>> in a field. >>> >>> No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that this view >>> has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, not a progressive >>> theory. >> >> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible >> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be >> certain to exist. > > I think this misunderstands what science does. In the words of John von > Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to > interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical > construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, > describes observed phenomena. I agree with you and von Neumann on this, and this is precisely why I used the words "account for" instead of "explain". I literally mean that consciousness does not fit the physicalist models, it appears as magic or supernatural. To be precise, and avoid empty authoritative proclamations, I make clear what I mean: 1) Darwinian evolution is a theory (a brilliant theory, possibly my favorite scientific theory of all times) that accounts for biological complexification. Under physicalism, it fails to account for consciousness. There is simply no reason for the "lights to be on". A functionally equivalent p-zombie does the trick. 2) So maybe it's a spandrel. But again we have the magic step, because spandrels must arise from something. What are the first principles? 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. My body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that mass. What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There is no accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense. It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he is not able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism fails. It goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible with Platonism. I am pointing out a direct observation of mine that, thus far, is not compatible with physicalism. Telmo. > The justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely > that it is expected to work." I see two approaches to this, one (of which I > have been the main advocated on this list) might be called "the engineering > approach" while the other is the philosophical approach. The philosophical > approach either takes consciousness as fundamental and incorrigible (like > Cosmin) or tries to equate it with something within a theory based on > something else (like Bruno). One thing both approaches seem to rely on is > that there can be no p-zombies, i.e. intelligent behavior is a sure sign of > consciousness, as JKC is won't to point out. Given that the engineering > approach gave us Turing, LISP, Deep Blue, Watson, and AlphaGo...while the > philosophical approach "predicts" various things we've know for a century or > more and various contradictory things about the future (as Bohr said, > "Prediction is hard, especially about the future.") my money is on the > engineering approach. > > Brent > > >> >>> >>>> I await your reason, argument, or evidence. >>> >>> Arithmetical realism is part of platonism, if not the whole of it. And >>> arithmetical realism is manifestly false -- numbers are not things. >> >> What are “things”? You just use lack of rigor and pretend you have an >> argument. >> >> Telmo. >> >>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> what is your alternative?) >>>>>>> Nominalism. >>>>>> >>>>>> Incompleteness disproves nominalism. Arithmetical truth was proven not >>>>>> only to be not human defined, but to be not human definable. >>>>> >>>>> What has arithmetical truth got to do with it? >>>> >>>> The independence of arithmetical truth *is* Platonism. With it you get all >>>> the consequences of that infinite truth: >>>> * The truth that 9 is composite implies the existence of its factor 3. >>>> * The truth of the Nth state of the machine during the execution of a Kth >>>> program implies the existence of the execution trace of program K, etc. >>> >>> You are making the usual mistake of taking the existential quantifier over >>> a domain as an ontological statement. >>> >>>>> Numbers are just names, not existing things. >>>> >>>> Again, where is your evidence? I gave you mine in support of Platonism. >>> >>> You gave no viable evidence for platonism. >>> >>>> If you have no evidence contrary to Platonism you should at least remain >>>> undecided/agnostic/humble on the matter. >>> >>> Why? Platonism rests on a confusion. I reject that confusion, and hence >>> platonism. What replaces it at the simplest level is nominalism -- numbers >>> are names, not things. >>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our >>>>>>>>> experience. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So you believe an AI that was functionally equivalent to you would be >>>>>>>> a philosophical zombie? >>>>>>> Not at all. That does not follow. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If it doesn't follow then the functionally equivalent AI would be >>>>>> conscious. Therefore mechanism. What am I missing? >>>>> >>>>> The fact that mechanism does not follow from the possibility of AI. >>>> >>>> Correct, it doesn't. But it does follow from the consciousness of AI, for >>>> if AI is not conscious, then you get philosophical zombies. (as I stated >>>> above). >>> >>> I do not accept your argument. I have rejected your basic theory, so I >>> thereby reject all its consequences. If the AI is functionally equivalent >>> to a brain, then AI is conscious as the brain is conscious -- consciousness >>> is a function of the brain. >>> >>>>>>>> (Mechanism is the leading theory of mind among philosophers of mind, >>>>>>> Maybe for some philosophers of mind. But there are many other >>>>>>> possibilities, most of which are more convincing. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> what is your alternative?) >>>>>>> Why should I have an alternative? I can know that a theory does not >>>>>>> work without providing a theory that does work. >>>>>> Above you said there are other possibilities which are more convincing. >>>>>> What are they and why are they more convincing? >>>>> >>>>> I do not have to provide a final theory. >>>> >>>> No one is asking you two. You said there are alternatives which are more >>>> convincing. I am just curious what you were referring to. >>> >>> Mind is what brains do. >>> >>>>> Anything else would be more convincing than mechanism, entailing, as it >>>>> does, arithmetical realism. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Mechanism does not entail arithmetical realism. They are two separate >>>> assumptions. >>> >>> OK, then you develop mechanism and all its consequences without assuming >>> arithmetical realism at some point. >>> >>> Bruce >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRv36OcWKzxcGZ6XkbU-i%3DP5xMLpw5MRuuW%2BtRb0t0pyg%40mail.gmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRv36OcWKzxcGZ6XkbU-i%3DP5xMLpw5MRuuW%2BtRb0t0pyg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/18E4487F-8333-4874-AFC5-7B17601BE9CE%40telmomenezes.net >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/18E4487F-8333-4874-AFC5-7B17601BE9CE%40telmomenezes.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3e9c341b-7a4f-430a-5178-61ada2dddc2c%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3e9c341b-7a4f-430a-5178-61ada2dddc2c%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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