On Friday, May 31, 2019 at 4:06:31 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/31/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 31, 2019 at 5:25:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 May 2019, at 14:32, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, May 30, 2019 at 5:18:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You told me that consciousness is material. Please extract it from the
>>> bug, and send me 5g of pure consciousness extract.
>>>
>>> I have few doubt that insect and arthropodes have some first person
>>> (conscious) experience, so if consciousness is material, you should succeed
>>> in extracting it from the bug.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> I'm not a dualist, so there is no *X* is material and *Y* is immaterial
>> (like ghosts) that make up nature.
>>
>>
>> But a game of bridge is something immaterial, not be confused with its
>> implementation. I don’t believe in ghost, but I believe in a tun or
>> immaterial things. Using fictionalism to dismiss the existence of
>> immaterial thing, like numbers, will make eventually the whole physical
>> reality, and mathematical reality into fiction, making the term devoid of
>> meaning.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> A game a bridge - I suppose as something literally defined with words and
> symbols in a book on bridge - can be seen as some sort of algorithm or
> (dynamic) mathematical structure even. There are probably fictional board
> games in fantasy literature - like Game of Thrones - which could be taken
> and tuned into games people could play.
>
> But these are not immaterial from the fictionalist standpoint, just as one
> can take the fictional Sherlock Homes in a Arthur Conan Doyle text and make
> a stage play to "realize" the characters.
>
>
> You don't like fictionalism, and you won't like this either, but it is an
> interesting alternative.
>
> ttp://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/Preprints/szabo-math_in_physical-v2.pdf
>
> If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything
> supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there
> are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical
> facts of the world. The aim of this paper is to clarify what
> logical/mathematical facts actually are and how these facts can be
> accommodated in a purely physical ontology
>
>
> Interesting explication of the materialist view of mathematics. I notice
> that he didn't directly consider Goedel's idea that arithmetic has true
> propositions that can't be proven. I can see that he could create a
> hierarchy of formal systems in which the natural numbers would be another
> formal system which the semantics of PA refer to. But are the natural
> numbers a formal system...or do they have to be formalized in order to
> serve as a model?
>
> Brent
>
>
One way I can see to proceed materially is to assume that physical ITTMs
can be produced
I*nfinite-Time Turing Machines*
Joel David Hamkins, Andy Lewis
https://arxiv.org/abs/math/9808093
or something like that where literally infinite-in-length proofs can be
"written".
Or better, some sort of Löbian Theorem Prover which does complete in finite
time with finite resources.
*Parametric Bounded Löb’s Theorem and RobustCooperation of Bounded Agents*
Andrew Critch
https://intelligence.org/files/ParametricBoundedLobsTheorem.pdf
Löb’s theorem and Gödel’s theorem make predictions about the behavior of
self-reflective systems with unbounded computational resources with which to
write and evaluate proofs. However, in the real world, self-reflective
systems
will have limited memory and processing speed, so in this paper we introduce
an effective version of Löb’s theorem theorem which is applicable given such
bounded resources. These results have powerful implications for the game
theory of bounded agents who are able to write proofs about themselves and
one another, including the capacity to out-perform classical Nash
equilibria.
@philipthrift
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e8676a27-a2b2-45a3-a3d6-5cbc6fc5b3e7%40googlegroups.com.
