> On 31 May 2019, at 15:37, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, May 31, 2019 at 5:25:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 30 May 2019, at 14:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, May 30, 2019 at 5:18:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> You told me that consciousness is material. Please extract it from the bug, >> and send me 5g of pure consciousness extract. >> >> I have few doubt that insect and arthropodes have some first person >> (conscious) experience, so if consciousness is material, you should succeed >> in extracting it from the bug. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> I'm not a dualist, so there is no X is material and Y is immaterial (like >> ghosts) that make up nature. > > But a game of bridge is something immaterial, not be confused with its > implementation. I don’t believe in ghost, but I believe in a tun or > immaterial things. Using fictionalism to dismiss the existence of immaterial > thing, like numbers, will make eventually the whole physical reality, and > mathematical reality into fiction, making the term devoid of meaning. > > Bruno > > > > A game a bridge - I suppose as something literally defined with words and > symbols in a book on bridge - can be seen as some sort of algorithm or > (dynamic) mathematical structure even. There are probably fictional board > games in fantasy literature - like Game of Thrones - which could be taken and > tuned into games people could play.
OK. And all games, like all programs, are played (run) in arithmetic. > > But these are not immaterial from the fictionalist standpoint, just as one > can take the fictional Sherlock Homes in a Arthur Conan Doyle text and make a > stage play to "realize" the characters. Yes, but that makes not them real. Sherlock Holmes is fictional by definition. > > > You don't like fictionalism, and you won't like this either, but it is an > interesting alternative. > > ttp://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/Preprints/szabo-math_in_physical-v2.pdf > > If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything > supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are > logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts > of the world. Assuming there is an ontological world, which is precisely what I have never found any evidence for. > The aim of this paper is to clarify what logical/mathematical facts actually > are and how these facts can be accommodated in a purely physical ontology That is logically impossible when we assume mechanism. > > > > No matter how one obscures things, to see things as some being material and > some being immaterial is dualism. There is no way to wiggle out of that. Yes, if one believe in things like an ontological Matter, dualism is unavoidable, and that is per se already a good reason to doubt that an ontological material reality make any sense. But with mechanism, we need to assume arithmetic (just to recover Turing’s definition of computation), and then it can be shown that we cannot add any more axioms (that what we need to have digital universal machine), all the rest has to be deduced from arithmetic/computer-science, at the machine’s phenomenological level. It works, until now. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6478ac38-9796-4511-950a-e042885613af%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6478ac38-9796-4511-950a-e042885613af%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ECD3E889-9FE1-4B46-A9A0-22A93F2826BA%40ulb.ac.be.
