> On 31 May 2019, at 23:45, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, May 31, 2019 at 4:06:31 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/31/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, May 31, 2019 at 5:25:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 May 2019, at 14:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, May 30, 2019 at 5:18:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> You told me that consciousness is material. Please extract it from the bug, 
>>> and send me 5g of pure consciousness extract. 
>>> 
>>> I have few doubt that insect and arthropodes have some first person 
>>> (conscious) experience, so if consciousness is material, you should succeed 
>>> in extracting it from the bug.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I'm not a dualist, so there is no X is material and Y is immaterial (like 
>>> ghosts) that make up nature.
>> 
>> But a game of bridge is something immaterial, not be confused with its 
>> implementation. I don’t believe in ghost, but I believe in a tun or 
>> immaterial things. Using fictionalism to dismiss the existence of immaterial 
>> thing, like numbers, will make eventually the whole physical reality, and 
>> mathematical reality into fiction, making the term devoid of meaning.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> A game a bridge - I suppose as something literally defined with words and 
>> symbols in a book on bridge - can be seen as some sort of algorithm or 
>> (dynamic) mathematical structure even. There are probably fictional board 
>> games in fantasy literature - like Game of Thrones - which could be taken 
>> and tuned into games people could play.
>> 
>> But these are not immaterial from the fictionalist standpoint, just as one 
>> can take the fictional Sherlock Homes in a Arthur Conan Doyle text and make 
>> a stage play to "realize" the characters.
>> 
>> 
>> You don't like fictionalism, and you won't like this either, but it is an 
>> interesting alternative.
>> 
>> ttp://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/Preprints/szabo-math_in_physical-v2.pdf 
>> <http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/Preprints/szabo-math_in_physical-v2.pdf>
>> 
>> If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything 
>> supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there 
>> are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical 
>> facts of the world. The aim of this paper is to clarify what 
>> logical/mathematical facts actually are and how these facts can be 
>> accommodated in a purely physical ontology
> 
> Interesting explication of the materialist view of mathematics.  I notice 
> that he didn't directly consider Goedel's idea that arithmetic has true 
> propositions that can't be proven.  I can see that he could create a 
> hierarchy of  formal systems in which the natural numbers would be another 
> formal system which the semantics of PA refer to.  But are the natural 
> numbers a formal system...or do they have to be formalized in order to serve 
> as a model?
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> One way I can see to proceed materially is to assume that physical ITTMs can 
> be produced
> 
>     Infinite-Time Turing Machines
>     Joel David Hamkins, Andy Lewis
>     https://arxiv.org/abs/math/9808093 <https://arxiv.org/abs/math/9808093>
> 
> or something like that where literally infinite-in-length proofs can be 
> "written".
> 
> 
> Or better, some sort of Löbian Theorem Prover which does complete in finite 
> time with finite resources.
> 
> Parametric Bounded Löb’s Theorem and RobustCooperation of Bounded Agents
> Andrew Critch
> https://intelligence.org/files/ParametricBoundedLobsTheorem.pdf
> 
> Löb’s theorem and Gödel’s theorem make predictions about the behavior of
> self-reflective systems with unbounded computational resources with which to
> write and evaluate proofs. However, in the real world, self-reflective systems
> will have limited memory and processing speed, so in this paper we introduce
> an effective version of Löb’s theorem theorem which is applicable given such
> bounded resources. These results have powerful implications for the game
> theory of bounded agents who are able to write proofs about themselves and
> one another, including the capacity to out-perform classical Nash equilibria.


Interesting. Löb’s result are even more fundamental for the … fundamental 
studies, but I don’t claim it is only its main application.

Bruno 



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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