> On 31 May 2019, at 23:06, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/31/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Friday, May 31, 2019 at 5:25:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 30 May 2019, at 14:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, May 30, 2019 at 5:18:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> You told me that consciousness is material. Please extract it from the bug, >>> and send me 5g of pure consciousness extract. >>> >>> I have few doubt that insect and arthropodes have some first person >>> (conscious) experience, so if consciousness is material, you should succeed >>> in extracting it from the bug. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> I'm not a dualist, so there is no X is material and Y is immaterial (like >>> ghosts) that make up nature. >> >> But a game of bridge is something immaterial, not be confused with its >> implementation. I don’t believe in ghost, but I believe in a tun or >> immaterial things. Using fictionalism to dismiss the existence of immaterial >> thing, like numbers, will make eventually the whole physical reality, and >> mathematical reality into fiction, making the term devoid of meaning. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> A game a bridge - I suppose as something literally defined with words and >> symbols in a book on bridge - can be seen as some sort of algorithm or >> (dynamic) mathematical structure even. There are probably fictional board >> games in fantasy literature - like Game of Thrones - which could be taken >> and tuned into games people could play. >> >> But these are not immaterial from the fictionalist standpoint, just as one >> can take the fictional Sherlock Homes in a Arthur Conan Doyle text and make >> a stage play to "realize" the characters. >> >> >> You don't like fictionalism, and you won't like this either, but it is an >> interesting alternative. >> >> ttp://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/Preprints/szabo-math_in_physical-v2.pdf >> >> If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything >> supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there >> are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical >> facts of the world. The aim of this paper is to clarify what >> logical/mathematical facts actually are and how these facts can be >> accommodated in a purely physical ontology > > Interesting explication of the materialist view of mathematics. I notice > that he didn't directly consider Goedel's idea that arithmetic has true > propositions that can't be proven. I can see that he could create a > hierarchy of formal systems in which the natural numbers would be another > formal system which the semantics of PA refer to. But are the natural > numbers a formal system...or do they have to be formalized in order to serve > as a model?
By Gödel’s 1930 theorem (the completeness theorem, not the incompleteness theorem): all consistant theories have a model, in fact all essentially undecidable theories (like RA; PA, ZF, …) have an infinity of non-isomorphic models. Two equivalent version of the completeness theorem (for first order theories) are: A theory is consistent iff it has a model. A theory proves a proposition p iff p is true in all the models of the theory. By incompleteness, no (enough rich, essentially undecidable) theories can define its own model, or its one semantic (the model of a theory is the same as a semantic of a theory). The fact that, for all effective theory there are true proposition in the (standard) model of arithmetic that is not provable in that theory is not really an idea by Gödel, but a theorem in mathematics, by Gödel. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> >> >> No matter how one obscures things, to see things as some being material and >> some being immaterial is dualism. There is no way to wiggle out of that. >> >> @philipthrift >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6478ac38-9796-4511-950a-e042885613af%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6478ac38-9796-4511-950a-e042885613af%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a6538239-fabf-6853-a868-d5bac6f98211%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a6538239-fabf-6853-a868-d5bac6f98211%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B3682E83-AB7E-494D-9311-865359370AA5%40ulb.ac.be.
