> On 16 Jul 2019, at 15:51, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 7:24 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > >>As I said in my previous post, it's easy to translate Turing's idea into > >>mathematics that is just as abstract as Church's lambda calculus and just > >>as incapable of actually *doing* anything; however unlike Church Turing can > >>do more than that, Turing's idea can also be incorporated into physics and > >>then and only then can you *do" something with the calculation . A "Lambda > >>Machine" is just as fictitious as a "Löbian machine", but Turing Machines > >>are real, I'm using one right now. > > > Do is ambiguous, > > Nothing ambiguous about it. If INTEL wishes calculations to *do* something, > like make money for example, then only matter can *do* those calculations. > > > and a Truing machine is as much mathematical than a lambda expression. > > A Turing Machine is compatible with both pure mathematics and pure physics, > but Lambda Calculus is compatible only with pure mathematics.
Why? The so called LISP machine implements combinators and lambda expression as much in a physical way that a von Neumann machine can emulate a Turing machine. The Turing machine formalism is recursively isomorphic to the lambda expressions. They are both mathematical, and can implement each others. And they can both be implemented in subset of physical laws, in direct ways. > > > Imagine that you are in a video game. In that game you have to build a city > > and *do* many things, like collecting taxes, [...] In that case you can see > > that although you need to do work, and manipulate some apparent matter to > > do apparent money, it does not need to exist. > > Bitcoins exist. > > > Unless … you tell me that we need some matter to make that happening > > I am telling you that matter is needed to make that happen, in this case the > matter in the microprocessor of the computer that is running the video game > that is using Bitcoins as money. But why? Why to make that assumption, which introduce a metaphysical concepts for which there is no evidences at all, which comes from an extraordinary extrapolation, which makes the mind-body problem unsolvable (or at least unsolved), and for which there has never been any evidence? > > > > accompany by genuine consciousness, > > Consciousness? What the hell does that have to do with the price of eggs? You are the one saying that we need matter for a computation to happen (and I infer “to support genuine consciousness”). If not, then it is even more weird why you want for matter, given that the computation are realised in arithmetic, so that relatively to any universal number, all computations happens. Without consciousness, there is no definition of the Indexical Digital Mechanist hypothesis. There is still CT, but “yes doctor” does no more make sense, nor first person view, etc. > > > or doing some work to earn money, which is of course virtual by > > construction here. > > Money is whatever fungible thing that people in a society agree has worth. In > general people have not agreed that money used in a video game has worth > unless it happens to be Bitcoins, Ethereum, Ripple or some other well known > Cryptocurrency. But Bitcoin mining software printed in a book can generate no > money (if it could Bitcoin would suffer a rather serious inflation problem) > it must be incorporated into a computer made of matter before that software > can *do* anything. > > > Now, the whole video game is executed through pure number relation > > Incorrect. The whole video game is executed through voltage differences in > the microprocessor. You can implement it, but it is an mathematical fact, even an arithmetical facts that Fortran interpret the video game in arithmetic, as well as a program simulating the Milky Way, at the level of strings, itself emulating the voltage difference in some micro-processor itself emulating that video game. And with the indexical mechanist hypothesis, I don’t see how the arithmetical simulation would be less conscious than the emulation in some physical reality. We just don’t know a priori if such a physical reality exists or even make sense (eventually we will know it does not make sense). > We can use the language of mathematics to help us understand how those > voltage differences effect each other, and we can if we wish interpret those > voltage differences as numbers. In your theory which assumes a physical universe. But then the reasoning will show that you need infinitely many informations to “attach” your consciousness to that physical universe, and you can no more say “yes” to the digitalist doctor, without invoking magic in the mind, which would be a coming back to substantial dualism, and, needless to say, abandoning Digital Mechanism. > > > Church would not have claimed that his lambda calculus defined all > > computable functions > > That's why Godel thought Turing's work was superior to Church's and even > Church admitted that: > > "Computability by a Turing machine has the advantage of making the > identification with effectiveness in the ordinary (not explicitly defined) > sense evident immediately.” But that concerns only the pedagogy. Now, in metaphysics, the Turing formalism seems to be misleading, because we can see that *some* physicalist can get the wrong idea that a computation is a physical notion, which both Turing and Church would disagree with. > > >> A Turing Machine can do Lambda Calculus but Lambda Calculus can't even add > >> 2+2 without the help of a Turing Machine. > > > See the combinator thread for a precise disproof of this. > > Ah yes, that legendary Ad hominem. Boring. > post of yours that plugs all the holes in your theory and proves that > everything I've said is wrong, the post that you've been talking about for > the better part of a decade, the post that NOBODY HAS EVER SEEN. I just said that I have proven that the giving of the lambda expressions [x][y]x (which does the same job as K) and [x][y][z]xz(yz) (which does the same job as S) are Turing universal, and thus can emulate all Turing machines. > > > You assume that there is an irreducible (and of course Turing universal) > > material reality. > > See my precise disproof of this in my own legendary post. > > >> Sure, As I said, a Turing Machine can do Lambda Calculus and a Von Neumann > >> computer is a Turing Machine, > > > Strictly speaking, no. A von Neumann computer is better seen as a boolean > > graph, > > BULLSHIT! The logical operation of every computer ever made can be reduced to > a Turing Machine. True but irrelevant. Actually it makes my point, but usually, thanks to our physical laws (and transistors) the boolean operation will be used to simulate a Turing machines. A Turing machine is the given of a set of quadruplets, which is more complex than a logical gate. > > > with a delay and splitting instructions. By the complier theorem, they are > > recursively isomorphic, with the Turing formalism, but as much than with > > lambda expression, post production system, Conway’s game of life, > > The first program I ever wrote was an implementation of Conway’s game of life > and I debugged it and ran it on a Turing Machine. Give the quadruplets. > > >>but without that Turing Machine the Lambda Calculus will *do* precisely > nothing. > > > They do exactly the same computations, > > Without a Turing Machine Lambda Calculus can't *do* diddly-squat, it's just a > sequence of ASCII characters printed in a book doing no calculations or > anything else except gather dust. Even Alonzo Church admitted that but you > cannot. A Turing machine is a set of quadruplet, that you represent usually by a sequence of ASCII characters. There is no difference with a lambda expression at all. >> >>Bruno I can honestly say if you've mentioned a "second God" before I do >> >>not recall it. And please don't tell me what that is because I've given >> >>up, I just can't keep up with the changing meaning of "Aristotle theology” > >Just find one post where I would have said something different about > >Aristotle theology, > > Ironically to rebut my accusation that you keep changing the meaning of > "Aristotle theology" you introduced the concept of "Aristotle's second God"; > I've never heard anybody mention that before, but I admit you know more about > Greek silly ideas than I do. The first God is Aristotle first mover. It is deism more than theism, in fact. But Aristotle main fundamental contribution in theology, which is still alive today and is the base of the current theological paradigm is his idea that there is a primary (irreducible to anything else) material reality. That is what I call Aristotelian theology, and that is what you are using above to make people thinking that a physical material universe is need to make computation happening. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1Vj4yOCUzQQ28WfJUZLxcWKA9zSb_CZL6eWGBc__B%3DUw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1Vj4yOCUzQQ28WfJUZLxcWKA9zSb_CZL6eWGBc__B%3DUw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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