On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:28:10 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > ... > > By assuming the existence of (primary) Matter, you lose the possibility to > explain it, and you loss the mean to use the mechanist theory of mind, > without providing a conceptually clear non-mechanist theory of mind. > > Bruno > > > If a mathematical/logical theory can explain *experience* (the catchall for consciousness, selfness, qualia, etc.) then that is that and we an all go home.
(If we didn't have experience, then we wouldn't be worrying about in the first place!) But if it can't, then it is something itself needs a home, and that home is matter, (Unless experiences are ghosts from an immaterial realm.) @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e1382d4b-263f-46bc-99bd-38c4015c9691%40googlegroups.com.
