On Saturday, July 20, 2019 at 2:58:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 19 Jul 2019, at 14:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:28:10 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> ... >> >> By assuming the existence of (primary) Matter, you lose the possibility >> to explain it, and you loss the mean to use the mechanist theory of mind, >> without providing a conceptually clear non-mechanist theory of mind. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > If a mathematical/logical theory can explain *experience* (the catchall > for consciousness, selfness, qualia, etc.) then that is that and we an all > go home. > > > The experience is explained in the CTM. It is a semantical fixed point. It > explains why machine will introduce a word to describe a truth that they > know but cannot prove to others or even define in any 3p way. > > > > > > (If we didn't have experience, then we wouldn't be worrying about in the > first place!) > > But if it can't, then it is something itself needs a home, and that home > is matter, > > > But the whole point is that it can. Machines have already a quite rich > theory of consciousness, and even God when taken in the original large > sense (not in the fairy tales sense which is con artistry). > > Bruno > > > > (Unless experiences are ghosts from an immaterial realm.) > > The "machinist" approach to (theory of) consciousness is the one taken at MIRI and CSAIL/MIT, with higher-order (modal) programming language theory, theorem provers, and fixed-point (monadic) semantics.
I think it's ultimately incomplete. @philiptrhift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ab46777f-d052-4d52-b723-16745d728641%40googlegroups.com.
