> On 24 Jul 2019, at 20:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, July 24, 2019 at 1:24:37 PM UTC-5, telmo wrote: > > > On Wed, Jul 24, 2019, at 18:08, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Wednesday, July 24, 2019 at 8:18:09 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote: >> >> Brent argues that the consciousness problem will be solved by building AIs >> that behave in such a way as to convince us they are conscious. My point is >> that our relation to an AI tells us nothing about consciousness. >> >> Telmo. >> >> >> If the cognitivist (information-processing) AI approach to consciousness is >> right, then consciousness can be realized on any mechanism that performs >> (conventional) information processing. >> >> The alternative is "not all materials are equal" and that (self-aware) >> consciousness can be realized only in mechanisms made of a particular type >> of materials (e.g. biomaterials). > > A third possibility is that materials are things within consciousness, i.e. > consciousness is more fundamental than matter. > > Telmo. > > > > But then that goes back to my "materials science argument for matter": matter > (as demonstrated in the summer Materials Camp for high school students) shows > it does things beyond what consciousness on its own can imagine.
But that is the case of all the G* minus G phenomenologies. Matter has to be beyond any particular consciousness. It is an open question for the universal consciousness (the consciousness of the unprogrammed universal programs). Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f055bd21-352e-4b4f-a6c1-c40cfb472123%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f055bd21-352e-4b4f-a6c1-c40cfb472123%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F8B6DFB7-BDA6-4099-BFB3-D11F5C73A11C%40ulb.ac.be.
