On Thursday, July 25, 2019 at 12:43:27 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 25 Jul 2019, at 13:27, Telmo Menezes <[email protected] 
> <javascript:>> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On Thu, Jul 25, 2019, at 11:06, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> 
> >>> On 24 Jul 2019, at 20:31, Telmo Menezes <[email protected] 
> <javascript:>> wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019, at 17:41, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote: 
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>> On 7/23/2019 11:52 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019, at 17:33, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote: 
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> On 7/23/2019 4:50 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
> >>>>>>> Hi Brent, 
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> On Fri, Jul 19, 2019, at 22:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote: 
> >>>>>>>> On 7/19/2019 4:49 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
> >>>>>>>>> I share their perplexity. The idea of immaterialism is natural 
> (and 
> >>>>>>>>> arises thousands of years ago), because the only thing that we 
> cannot 
> >>>>>>>>> doubt (as Descartes pointed out) -- our consciousness -- is 
> >>>>>>>>> immaterial. There is not scientific instrument that can detect 
> >>>>>>>>> consciousness. 
> >>>>>>>> That's not really true. Of course doctors assess patients as 
> conscious, 
> >>>>>>>> unconscious, in coma, or brain dead every day.  The myth that 
> >>>>>>>> consciousness is a mystery is part hubris (we are too special to 
> be 
> >>>>>>>> understood) and part an exaggerated demand for understanding. 
> There's no 
> >>>>>>>> scientific instrument that can detect the wave function of an 
> electron 
> >>>>>>>> either.  But with the electron we're happy to have an effective 
> theory 
> >>>>>>>> that tells us when the detector will click or not. Mystery 
> mongering 
> >>>>>>>> about consciousness makes us demand something more that mere 
> measurement 
> >>>>>>>> and prediction, something that doesn't exist for any theory. 
> >>>>>>> I understand your point that we can always make additional demands 
> for explanation, and that any scientific theory cannot be expected to do 
> more than what successful scientific theories do, which is to correctly 
> predict phenomena. 
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> My main point is this, and I think it goes to the core of our 
> disagreement: 
> >>>>>>> No scientific theory predicts consciousness! 
> >>>>>> What would it mean to predict consciousness.  When we predict 
> electrons 
> >>>>>> what we mean it we predict the observable effects of electrons. 
> >>>>> Right, so what are the observable effects of consciousness? All I 
> can see in neuroscience are predictions about the observable effects of 
> (wet) computations. Neuroscience is not capable of pointing to a behavior 
> and saying: ah! consciousness! see, this couldn't happen without 
> consciousness. 
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> If you rob physicists of electrons, suddenly many of their models 
> will have holes in them, they will no longer be valid. If you rob 
> neuroscientists of consciousness, everything works the same. 
> >>>> I'm not sure that's true.  ISTM that some of the experiments by 
> >>>> cognitive neuroscientists include conscious thoughts and judgements 
> as 
> >>>> elements of their theory. 
> >>> 
> >>> They try, but they can't measure. 
> >>> 
> >>> - Alexa, are you conscious? 
> >>> - Of course! 
> >>> 
> >>> Err… 
> >> 
> >> Most neuroscientists believes in Matter, and, sometimes even 
> >> explicitly, like the ASSC, do not address the mind-body problem. 
> >> 
> >> When they have some understanding of the problem, they eliminate 
> >> consciousness and person, which is the logical thing to do for people 
> >> believing in both matter and mechanism: consciousness does not exists. 
> > 
> > I have met a few neuroscientists, and this is also my impression. I have 
> also met researchers who were trying to become neuroscientists, but 
> eventually were discouraged by the lack of philosophical rigor in the 
> field. The former become well-known, the latter disappear into other 
> endeavors. I will not get into more details to protect identities. This 
> sort of dynamic creates a false impression of consensus in some scientific 
> fields, especially with the lay people who are interested in science, and 
> helps make scientists with non-aligned positions seem crazy. 
>
>
> I know. That lasts since 1500 years. 
>
> Separating religion from science is like saying that you have the right to 
> believe in any BS, which is exactly what the exploiters of fears needs. 
>
> Some scientists (to be sure very few, but some are influent and nobody 
> knows why) consider that doubting physicalism is just an heresy. 
>
> They don’t argued, and unlike John Clark and Bruce Kellet, they only 
> ignore. It is the lie by Omission. 
> The lie by omission is what Barr did when “summarising” the Mueller report 
> (to give another example). 
>
> The book by Patrick Dehornoy “Théorie des Ensembles” has the merit to 
> point how the Bourbarki (the French mathematicians with many heads) imposed 
> somehow their misconception on sets to some generation of mathematicians. 
> Just the field of mathematical logic is not well seen in both mathematician 
> circle and philosophical circle. At the social level, we are still at the 
> primal level where people dispute territories, instead to collaborate on 
> extracting and sharing what grows there. 
>
> Theology has to come back to reason. Reason + the universal machine => 
> modesty, and essentially undecidable theories. 
>
> Presented roughly, 
>  - Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem says that about the numbers (and 
> digital machines)  we just understand about nothing. 
> - Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem is that the (sound) machine’s 
> themselves understand “quickly” that they understand about nothing about 
> the numbers. 
>
> Judson Webb is right, Gödel’s incompleteness protect Mechanism. It makes 
> the Church-Turing thesis consistent with Cantor-Kleene's diagonalisation. 
> The “negative theology” of the universal machine (that is Solovay’s 
> results, and G and G* and the intensional variants) makes the universal 
> like a baby god, and if we can understand this, in the long run that makes 
> terrible children. 
>
> Unfortunately, the current option seems to perpetuate the old technics of 
> insults, violence, and lies, in the fundamental domains (and then in the 
> rentable domains as well). 
>
> The problem is always with the dogma. The inability to doubt might be a 
> form of symptôme of insanity, like the pretence of selconsistency by the 
> machine makes her  inconsistent. 
>
> We have just to transform the Renaissance, and let Theology comes back 
> where it is born, in science, through science, that is trough doubts and 
> dialogs/arguments. 
> Only the liars fear the truth. 
>
> That will take some time. Meanwhile if we could stop the lies on 
> medications, that would already help a lot. 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>


Actually, from the *Stawsonian materialist view*, *most neuroscientists do 
not believe in matter*, or rather, they believe in a facade of matter 
absent experientiality.

Feyerabend talked of science and religion, but as science has been turned 
into a religion, with scientists claiming that their theoretical entities 
are godlike in their reality (their "truth"), and thus other competing 
theoretical entities are like other gods that should be banned.

 @philipthrift

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