> On 2 Aug 2019, at 15:48, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 2:26 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >> To win a debate with you over the nature of computation I am not required > >> to say anything about consciousness, > > > But you are the one saying that the “phantom computation” is not conscious. > > No I am NOT the one saying that! I'm the one saying bringing up consciousness > in a discussion about computation is a waste of time and will not help anyone > better understand how the world works because there is only one thing in the > universe any of us can know with absolute certainty to be conscious. I'm the > one saying a Physical Turing Machine can make a calculation that has a > property that your phantom airy fairy "calculation" made by a textbook > sitting on a shelf does not have,
But a computation is anything but something you could find in a textbook. You cannot find the arithmetical reality in textbook, or on a shelves. And the notion of consciousness is important to understand the proof that physicalism is not compatible with mechanism. Then you are the one assuming some primitive physical universe, to give sense to your notion of physical computation. Yet, a physical computation is a computation realised by some physical object, but that does not made per se a computation into a physical notion. > the ability to *do* things that are observable; for example buy Bitcoins. But using observable as a criterion of “reality” is equivalent with assuming Aristotle materialist ontology. That is not part of the computationalist assumption, and eventually, you can understand that such an hypothesis is incompatible with Mechanism. That is why I say we have to come back to Plato, that is, to the period when people did not take an ontological (primitive) physical reality for granted. > > >> I mean it's not as if you've ever said anything enlightening about it. > > > > You evade the question > > I'll repeat what I said in my last post, because you have not stated "the > question" it sounds to me like you don't remember or have never known what > "the question" is, so it's not surprising you are unsatisfied with my answer > to "the question". > > > you can't succeed, because either that matter role is ... > > 1) ...not Turing emulable, > > We know for a fact a Turing Machine made of matter Turing machine are not made of matter. > that obeys the laws of physics can emulate a Turing Machine made of matter > that obeys the laws of physics. And we know for a fact that a Turing Machine > made of matter that obeys the laws of physics is the only type of Turing > Machine anybody has ever observed that can actually *do* something. Yes, but matter does not need to be primitive for that. The people in arithmetic get the same experience as us when knocking a virtual “arithmetical” table, and argue correctly that they need to build physical machine if they want to interact with them, and of course, we know here that such matter is not primitive, and the same argument applies to us when we assume digital mechanism. > > > and in that case you have to abandon Computationalisme, > > If a Physical Turing Machine can produce a mind then there is no reason > another Physical Turing Machine could not emulate the machine that is > producing the mind. But in that case, unless you put some magic in the notion of digital, the same emulation in arithmetic will produces the same effects. > > > 2) … is Turing emulable, but then that role * is* emulated in the > > arithmetical reality, > > NO! Arithmetical reality wouldn't even exist if matter that obeys the laws of > physics didn't have the ability to make calculations if it's organized in the > general sort of way Turing described. Assuming Aristotle theology. But then you need too abandon mechanism. And you need to explain what is the role of the physical in consciousness or, if you prefer, in a computation (but that would directly contradict Church’s thesis). All the universal system, physical or arithmetical (or whatever) computes the exact same class of partial functions from N to N. > > > and the “phantom computation” is conscious. > > Bringing up consciousness in a discussion about pretty much anything leads to > nowhere. > > > you come back with the knocking table argument, > > No, instead I think I'll come back with a quote from YOU, one of the very few > I agree with completely: > > "Nobody has found a non physical machine to emulate a physical machine, > indeed, we cannot make energy from natural numbers alone". > > So even you admit that there is at least one thing that physics can do that > pure mathematics can NOT. Assuming a physical primitive reality, which I do not. I am agnostic as long as there is no evidences for it. I explain in detail how we can test such evidences. Bruno > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1SGcG_Gib2_bMdxM7EKzioJd-5wkwDYN0ycO8TF6E3cQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1SGcG_Gib2_bMdxM7EKzioJd-5wkwDYN0ycO8TF6E3cQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8D5484A6-4177-443C-AD60-C30FEB9AFCA3%40ulb.ac.be.
