> On 31 Jul 2019, at 16:32, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 11:31 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >> definitions can't compute, not even official definitions. Only physical > >> machines can compute. and yet about every third word in your posts about > >> the nature of computing is "definition", "theory" or "proof" even though > >> none of those things can compute. > > > But I did try to explain you that you are confusing “definition”, “theory”” > > or “proof”, which are syntactical finite object with what they represent > > (in the intended model). > > It would not matter even if I did confuse them because "the intended model" > can't compute any better than “definition”, “theory”” or “proof” can.
In what sense a “model” would not compute? In what sense the model of arithmetic would compute less than a physical universe. Both are example of some reality making all propositions describing a computation true. You beg the question by assuming that the physical reality is primitive, or “more real” than the arithmetical reality, but we need the second to define what is a machine. > Only a Physical Turing Machine can make a calculation that is NOT a > metaphysical phantom calculation and can actually *do* things, like mine > Bitcoins. In serious theology you need to not invoke your metaphysical assumption. > > > To sum up, “2+2=4” does not compute, but the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 is true, > > True? Without computation "2+2=4 is true" would not be a fact That is a bit ridiculous. The arithmetical truth has been discovered and studied since Pythagorus (of before), but the notion of computation is a recent discoveries, and the fact that 2+2=4 is independent of the notion of computation (beside the fact that it will entails the existence of computations). > and it would be neither true or false, it would be meaningless gibberish; and > only a Physical Turing Machine can make a calculation. The use of gibberish shows that you are still confusing a true fact (the fact that the sum of two with two is four) and an expression of that fact, like “2+2=4”. > > >> Models can't compute. > > > It provides the meaning of “compute”, > > Turing Machines give meaning to "compute" and they can do something FAR more > profound than give a definition, they can provide an example. No, more, no less than anything denoted by a syntactical term in a Turing-complete theory. You remind me that you have not answer my question in your comments. > > > > The standard model of Arithmetic implements all computations, in the > > precise (and purely mathematical) sense of implementation. > > And ANY purely mathematical implementation of computation can only produce > phantom metaphysical calculations that are worthless because they can *do" > precisely NOTHING. If the “phantom” computation, that is, the person supported by some arithmetical computation, are not conscious, you need to explain the role of your primitive-ontological matter in consciousness. I don’t think you can succeed, because either that matter role is ... 1) ...not Turing emulable, and in that case you have to abandon Computationalisme, or 2) … is Turing emulable, but then that role is emulated in the arithmetical reality, and the “phantom computation” is conscious. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3B5C456C-3C30-4DC0-8979-55F16AB25E89%40ulb.ac.be.
