On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 11:31 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> definitions can't compute, not even official definitions. Only physical >> machines can compute. and yet about every third word in your posts about >> the nature of computing is "definition", "theory" or "proof" even though >> none of those things can compute. > > > *> But I did try to explain you that you are confusing “definition”, > “theory”” or “proof”, which are syntactical finite object with what they > represent (in the intended model).* > It would not matter even if I did confuse them because "the intended model" can't compute any better than “definition”, “theory”” or “proof” can. Only a Physical Turing Machine can make a calculation that is NOT a metaphysical phantom calculation and can actually *do* things, like mine Bitcoins. *> To sum up, “2+2=4” does not compute, but the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 is > true,* > True? Without computation "2+2=4 is true" would not be a fact and it would be neither true or false, it would be meaningless gibberish; and only a Physical Turing Machine can make a calculation. > >> Models can't compute. > > *> It provides the meaning of “compute”,* > Turing Machines give meaning to "compute" and they can do something FAR more profound than give a definition, they can provide an example. >> Arithmetic, elementary or otherwise, can't compute. > > > *The Arithmetical reality (the one that logician often represents by an > infinite structured set in (intuitive or formal) set theory) cannot > compute, nor can a physical universe,* > Then I guess NOTHING can compute, but then it's hard to figure out how INTEL became a multi bullion dollar company by figuring out how to get the element silicon to compute. > *for one simple reason. We can’t give inputs or output. By definition.* > I have no idea what, if anything, you mean by that and it's not worth trying to figure out because definitions can't compute. *> But those type of realities can still dovetail on all computations. > Computer science is somehow 0-dimensional. * > And the bafflegab continues. >> But a Physical Turing Machines can *do* arithmetic, and nobody has ever >> found anything else that can. > > > *> Nobody has found a non physical machine to emulate a physical machine, > indeed, we cannot make energy from natural numbers alone.* > So at last you agree to something I've been saying for years, physics can do things mathematics can't. > *But with the mechanist hypothesis, a computation* [...] > A hypothesis can't compute. > *> It is just that I have shown that you cannot possiblyI try only to > show that you are using two assumptions which, when taken together, leads > to a contradiction. Those are the assumption of Digital Mechanism, and the > assumption of physicalism/materialism.* > John Clark will now make another assumption, John Clark assumes the above is related to Bruno's notorious "proof", the one with a personal pronoun duplicating machine, and wall to wall personal pronouns, and not a single clear referent in the entire thing, and the bizarre assumption that accurately predicting the future has something to do with the sense of self. >> Except for yourself any conclusion you make about the consciousness or >> lack of consciousness of ANYTHING is based on an assumption, and it's an >> assumption that has zero evidence in favor of it and zero evidence against >> it. And there is zero chance of that situation ever changing. That's >> why, in dramatic contrast to intelligence theories, consciousness theories >> are so easy to come up with, and it's why they are so completely useless. > > > *> I only assume Mechanism. The YD + CT. CT assumes* [...] > You consistently ignore IHA. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv35K71EFYsDQSCwW9Zv%3DWvodBnMDnqKfFkFGaTwa_%2BnPg%40mail.gmail.com.
