> On 28 Jul 2019, at 18:12, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 5:37 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >> Then there is at least one thing that a Turing Machine can do that Lambda > >> Calculus or Turing quintuplets can not do, and there is no doubt about it. > >> So stop pretending that Turing quintuplets are more profound than Turing > >> Machines, the oposite is true. > > > A Turing machine is a set of quintuplets. > > No it is not.
It is the official definition. It is an abstract rendering of a human computer. > A set of quintuplets is an attempt to explain the workings of a Physical > Turing Machine in mathematical language, it can't calculate. The abstract and mathematical Turing machine modelled a human computer, that is why it looks more physical. But the Turing machine is one among many mathematical definition of computability and computable function. It can be (and has been) proved equivalent with Church’s formalism, and Kleene’s one, etc. Trivially, it cannot calculate physically, but as you know, I do not assume the physical, nor can I. But it can emulate and be emulated by any universal machinery, including some subset of the physical laws (if that exists). > And thermodynamic equations can not produce work either, you need a diesel > engine for that. Explanations are very nice but explanations can't calculate > or do work. But physical machines can. In a physical world, but we cannot assume this when doing metaphysics with the scientific method. We better have to assume as least as possible, and given that arithmetical Turing machine can also compute …. > > > A head + a tape might implements physically a Turing machine, but the > > result is a particular case of Turing machine: > > I don't know what you mean by "a particular case of Turing machine”, I was alluding to a physical implementation of one particular set of quintuplets, male a universal one. The key notion that I use often is that once you have a Church-Turing complete formalism, you can enumerate all digital computable function (from N to N, say). The phi_i (and their domain the w_i). I will do a little glossary once I have more time. > there are 64 one state Turing Machines and 20,736 possible two state Turing > Machines and in general there are [4(N+1)]^2N different N state Turing > Machines, so the number of machines increases exponentially with states and > there is at least one machine for every problem that can be calculated. You > could build a 3 symbol Turing Machine if you wanted to, or a 4 or 5 or 6 > ......, but there would be little point in doing so other than engineering > considerations because the logical operation can be reduced to a 2 symbol > machine. And you could replace the paper tape with something made of silicon, > but the logical operation of every computer ever made can always be reduced > to a physical 2 symbol Turing Machine with N states. > > >> So let me see if I've got this straight. If I believe in theology X then > >> I'll need about half a ton of expensive hardware and many megawatt hours > >> of electricity to mine even a few Bitcoins that I can use to buy stuff; > >> but if I convert to "theology" Y then I can mine Bitcoins with no hardware > >> at all and won't need one single watt of electricity. > > > That would be like a program/subject exploiting the infinite computations > > emulating it below its substitution level. Yes we do that, necessarliyly > > so, in arithmetic and provably in the Mechanist theory). It looks weird, > > but is not weirder than Quantum physics > > That would explain why I'm not super mega ultra rich, I believe in theology > X, but unlike me you believe in theology Y, unlike me you believe that > calculations can be made without matter or energy, For the simple reason that the notion of computation has been defined mathematically, without any physical assumption. The standard model of Arithmetic implements all computations, in the precise (and purely mathematical) sense of implementation. > so why aren't you a Bitcoin billionaire? In fact why aren't you a God? > Because phantom metaphysical calculations are not nearly as good as real > calculations made with Physical Turing Machines. You assume “physical” = “primitively real”. I do not (and indeed I show that this is logically impossible once we assume Digital Mechanism). You can’t refute a theory by adding hypothesis to that theory, especially by adding a metaphysical axiom. > > > >> The first problem is you don't know what the word "assumption" means in > >> English. > > > I don’t see an argument. Nor even an example, or any clues to suggest this. > > I maintain that is something works it works and if something doesn't work it > doesn't work, I would hardly contest this. > and I further maintain that is not an assumption that is a fact. Even tautological. But that does not make a Turing machine physical, nor even does it make a physical universe to appear. > And making a calculation without matter that obeys the laws of physics does > not work. The version of John Clark, implemented at the relevant level in arithmetic, will say the same thing, yet are clearly wrong. How could you know if you are not one of them, or all of them. How could a “physical universe” makes a computation more real than another? That’s seems to me rather magic, and a kind of magic explicitly forbidden by the Digital Mechanist Hypothesis. > > > God is define by [...] > > Bruno, I already know the meaning of all common English words and have no > desire to study Brunospeak because even if I learned it today it mutates so > fast my knowledge would be out of date by tomorrow. > > > Unlike Bruce’s materialism, your materialist position is inconsistent, as > > you defend Mechanism together with materialism, but then you have to > > explain how matter makes some computation real, > > No I do not have ti do anything. If scientists could explain every > observation they'd be out of a job. And one of my observations is that only > calculations made with a physical Turing Machine are able to *do* things, Relatively to us, but that happens in arithmetic too. How could someone know the difference (without testing the material modes)? > another observation is that phantom metaphysical calculations are not worth a > bucket of warm spit. But arithmetical computation are neither phantom, nor metaphysical, they are relatively enacted in virtue of true number relation, independently on any system of notion that we can used to describe them. You need only to believe in 2+2=4 and similar. > Three cheers for inductive reasoning! Once we talk about some reality, we can’t avoid them, and that is why I have worked hard to show that Digital Mechanism is empirically refutable. That cannot be used to say if the empirical reality has a purely empirical origin or a purely mathematical one. Then using mechanism, the computations define an internal many-histories interpretation of the (sigma_1, partial computable) arithmetical reality. But to explain this it is important to understand well the difference between a model of a theory and the theory itself. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0QS39RcpZF96WySFDic%2BDAAUnEt8g5X_F8c1-EhiO2VQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0QS39RcpZF96WySFDic%2BDAAUnEt8g5X_F8c1-EhiO2VQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CE92B56D-955D-43BE-BF9B-353C30A38140%40ulb.ac.be.
