> On 25 Aug 2019, at 07:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 2:14 PM Russell Standish <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 01:15:38PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish <[email protected] > > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything > > List wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish < > > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > > > > > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs > > and wings > > > > > can't > > > > > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no > > minds that > > > > > might be > > > > > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical > > things, > > and > > > > > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist > > for > > minds > > > > > to exist. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? > > > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with > > the > > > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the > > > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical > > > > things. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. Do > > you > > mean > > > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would deny > > that > > > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if the > > brain > > > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it isn't > > > disembodied. > > > > > > Brent > > > > > > > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment could > > be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) > > scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) > > exists in any fundamental sense. > > > > > > Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, power, etc > > to > > the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. > > > > Neither the brain, nor the vat is a body. The body is actually > simulated by the evil daemon, and doesn't exist ontologically. Hence > disembodied. > > That is a very narrow definition of a "body". A body is the corporeal thing > that, in this instance, "supports" the mind. So the vat and its surrounds > are every much a body as the skull and its attachments are in the case of the > physical human body. > > Now Brent makes good arguments (and I echo simular arguments in my > book) that a body must exist phenomenally (ie exist as an experience > of the mind), but nowhere does there appear to be a requirement for > the body to exist ontologically (in the same reality as the brain and > the vat in this example). > > I agree with Brent's point. On the other hand, if you are talking about a > mind (and its associated body) existing entirely in a virtual reality, then > we have to consider what is the physical 'computer' that instantiates that > virtual reality.
All piece of matter are but maps on our relative accessible computations/history (computation seen from inside, a notion made precise with the modal logic G*, which I like to call machine’s theology, for obvious (greek) reason. A Universal machine cannot exist without a physical reality, because it implies it from its first person view. That physical reality is a consequence of the logic of the machine’s observable ([]p & <>t (& p)). > > This is all different from John Clark's argument that something must > exist to breathe fire into all the computations. He calls that > something "matter", and strongly disavows the ability of arithmetic to > do this. > > I am with John here. Talk of a "disembodied" mind (or calculation). is just > so much hot air. I ask for evidence of such things, and none has been > provided to date. "Minds" (or calculations) are the consequence of physical > operations. That is revisionism. The notion of computation has been discovered by mathematicians working on the foundation of mathematics, as a way to avoid some paradoxes. You confuse “physical implementation of a computation” with “computation”. That is like confusing a function and a set representation a function. It is a common error. But when doing metaphysics, that error becomes important to avoid. A mathematical object is different from all its representations through any other mathematical objects. Bruno > > Bruce > > Bruno Marchal claims the opposite - that arithmetic, or in > fact any abstract system capable of universal computation, is > sufficient for the job. To be quite frank, I'm a fence sitter in this > debate, as I've yet to see any physically realisable experiment that > can settle the matter. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQdoDaKLhF1HMqvM7cbybqUAdaA0Vp0xyVznT95n2YHnw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQdoDaKLhF1HMqvM7cbybqUAdaA0Vp0xyVznT95n2YHnw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FF9FED51-A1DB-4DF0-9D31-11563E7D4F27%40ulb.ac.be.
