> On 26 Aug 2019, at 02:05, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:30 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> On 25 Aug 2019, at 07:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 2:14 PM Russell Standish <[email protected] 
>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> This is all different from John Clark's argument that something must
>> exist to breathe fire into all the computations. He calls that
>> something "matter", and strongly disavows the ability of arithmetic to
>> do this.
>> 
>> I am with John here. Talk of a "disembodied" mind (or calculation). is just 
>> so much hot air. I ask for evidence of such things, and none has been 
>> provided to date. "Minds" (or calculations) are the consequence of physical 
>> operations.
> 
> That is revisionism. The notion of computation has been discovered by 
> mathematicians working on the foundation of mathematics, as a way to avoid 
> some paradoxes. You confuse “physical implementation of a computation” with 
> “computation”.
> 
> You confuse the formal definition of a "computation" with the physical object 
> that performs the operations necessary to do the calculation.

You did that. In fact you are doing that right now, as you seem to want to 
interpret the computation by its physical representation.

And my definition of computation is usually informal, but yes, with Church 
thesis it is the same notion, and it has been shown to be an arithmetical 
notion, or a finite-set theoretical notion. No axiom in physics needs to be 
assumed, but you need to believe in 2+2=4 & Co.




> 
>  
> That is like confusing a function and a set representation a function. It is 
> a common error. But when doing metaphysics, that error becomes important to 
> avoid. A mathematical object is different from all its representations 
> through any other mathematical objects.
> 
> "A mathematical structure is a relation between propositions defined by some 
> rules of deduction.”

That is false. That confuses a theory and a model of that theory. That confuses 
the notion of a "Model satisfying a proposition", with the notion of a "a 
theory proving a proposition". 
Those things are related, but very different. For complete theories,  T proves 
p iff p is true in *all* models of the theory. T is consistent if it has at 
least one model. 

The problem is that most people ignore basically all of mathematical logics. I 
use the term “reality” because logicians and physicists use “model” in quite 
opposite sense. In logic the Model is the reality, like in Art, where the naked 
subject is the real thing and the painting is the approximation/theory.




> as Brent says. It may be isomorphic to other mathematical objects, but that 
> does not give it independent existence.

We need only the independent existence of the digital machine, and realism can 
be limited to sigma_1 and pi_1 sentences, that is halting and non halting 
statement about machines. All physical theories assumes much more, and 
sometimes they assumes things which appears to be incompatible with Mechanism, 
like primary matter.

Your problem is methodological. You talk like if you knew the truth, which is 
an handicap when trying to come back to reason in this field (where there is a 
tradition of wishful thinking).

Bruno






> 
> Bruce
> 
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