On Saturday, August 24, 2019 at 11:14:46 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 01:15:38PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via > Everything > > List wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish < > > [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > > > > > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then > pigs > > and wings > > > > > can't > > > > > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are > no > > minds that > > > > > might be > > > > > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical > things, > > and > > > > > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to > exist for > > minds > > > > > to exist. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? > > > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK > with the > > > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then > the > > > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of > physical > > > > things. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. > Do you > > mean > > > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would > deny that > > > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if > the > > brain > > > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it > isn't > > > disembodied. > > > > > > Brent > > > > > > > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment > could > > be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) > > scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) > > exists in any fundamental sense. > > > > > > Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, power, > etc to > > the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. > > > > Neither the brain, nor the vat is a body. The body is actually > simulated by the evil daemon, and doesn't exist ontologically. Hence > disembodied. > > Now Brent makes good arguments (and I echo simular arguments in my > book) that a body must exist phenomenally (ie exist as an experience > of the mind), but nowhere does there appear to be a requirement for > the body to exist ontologically (in the same reality as the brain and > the vat in this example). > > This is all different from John Clark's argument that something must > exist to breathe fire into all the computations. He calls that > something "matter", and strongly disavows the ability of arithmetic to > do this. Bruno Marchal claims the opposite - that arithmetic, or in > fact any abstract system capable of universal computation, is > sufficient for the job. To be quite frank, I'm a fence sitter in this > debate, as I've yet to see any physically realisable experiment that > can settle the matter. > > >
"settle the matter" :) What is weird though is the number of people who think that there are "minds" that are some sort of non-material entities. To call them "patterns" is just the Platonism of reifying abstractions. It is no different from theology or supernaturalism. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/da066294-4e7d-487e-8842-abe3cc8ea312%40googlegroups.com.
