> On 7 Sep 2019, at 14:04, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 11:43 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > The point is that the size of the universe, or even its existence is > > relevant to say that beyond some point a number is no more physical > > divisible by some instantiation of a physical computers, but that is > > irrelevant with the validity of Euclid’s argument that there are infinitely > > many primes. > > Being wrong could not be more relevant. Euclid said if n is prime then n+1 > can ALWAYS be divided by 2,
Euclid did say that? Then he was wrong, of course. I guess you are thinking to the odd primes. Then Euclid’s proof is based on the fact that if n is primes, there will be a prime in between n and n!+1 (n excluded and n!+1 included). I am not sure to which statement you are alluding in Euclid. > but if the computational capacity of the universe is finite (and I'm not > saying it is I'm saying if) then n+1 can NOT always be divided by 2 and > Euclid was flat out wrong. You cannot invoke your personal ontological commitment in a domain which does not assume it. You make the error similar to say that group theory is wrong because (N, +) is not a group. What you say is that we cannot divide all numbers through the use of a physical machine in a finite physical universe. I am OK with this, but that is irrelevant in arithmetic, where Euclid is correct. > > > Unless you assume that there is a physical primary universe > > And to think you were just talking about irrelevance! To hell with this > "primary" crap, I don't know if the matter I see around me is primary or not > but I know numbers can't be because numbers can't change. Numbers can change all the time. It is just that the change are relative to each universal number, which is enough to explain the *appearance* of the physical change. Just the successor function can change any number, indeed, in its successor. Also, if you make change fundamental, you speculate that QM, SR and GR are false too. “Primary” means, as I said often: “in need to be assumed”. Which is what you do to say that not all odd numbers + 1 are divisible by 2, making you confuse the mathematical reality with the physical reality, which is basically Aristotle Metaphysics. > > > of some sort, in which case Mechanism becomes inconsistent > > Assuming you like existence more than non-existence (and if you don't that's > fine, there is no disputing matters of taste) please explain why saying "yes" > to the digital doctor is inconsistent with ANYTHING. “Saying “yes” to the doctor is an abbreviation of the assumption that we survive with an artificial brain when it is copied at some level. It is inconsistent, obviously, with the assumption that we die, whatever level of description we choose. It is inconsistent with the assumption that we are infinite machine (of some kind, though). And it is inconstant with the idea that a God, or a reality, or an ontology, or a material universe, or whatever, could select a computation in the arithmetical reality, and make it more real, or being only the one making that computation supporting consciousness. Indeed, if it does, then we are no more Turing emulable, or that whatever is tiring emulable, but then, it is Turing emulated in arithmetic already, and we have to take it into account in the computation-measure problem. > > > May be in physics, although String theory provides an amazing > > counter-intuitive-exemple, by using the zeta-regularisation, > > String theory is not a theory, perhaps someday That is enough for the validity of my point. > it will be but right now it is just a groping toward a theory, in fact it's > not even science because it explains nothing we didn't already know and makes > no predictions. And if the number of primes is finite but HUGE then whatever > mathematicians say about their distribution will still be approximately true > and if there is a connection between the primes and physics then the > prediction they make about the physical world will also be approximately > true. And Science doesn't deal in absolute truth it just hopes to find a > theory that is less wrong than the previous theory. Yes. > > > > I prefer to simply not assume a physical universe. > > That's nice but I don't care what you assume You betray yourself here. If you don’t care of what I assume, you could not understand what I say. > and the physical universe probably cares even less. So you assume a physical universe? I do not. In science, we do not make ontological commitment, especially in context where we see the problem such ontological commitment can lead.. > I say "probably" because I'm not even sure what you mean by "physical > universe", but I'll tell you what I mean by it, everything that obeys > physical law. I am OK with that definition, although “physical law” is not defined. But it is easy to define it: a physical laws is a law predicting the measurement results of a sharable experiment/experience. With Mechanism (YD + CT), it is a theorem that the mind-body problem enforces the derivation of such “physical laws” by a statistics on all computation going through our state, and that is amenable to mathematics and experimental investigations, and up to now, it fits both with the sharable observation, and the person pov. Physicalism does not work for the personal pov once we assume Mechanism (in the cognitive science). > > > Eventually such notions does not fit consistently with mechanism. > > It does if "mechanism" still means saying "yes" to the digital doctor, It means that indeed. Good. I add CT just to make clear that I use “digital” in the sense of the Church-Turing thesis. OK. > but that's what it mente a week ago and definitions in Brunospeak rarely last > as long as a week. You seem just to lie, here. You will not find a post by me where I use “mechanism” in a different sense; not here, not in my papers. > > > You have not yet explain how a physical universe can make a material > > computation more real. > > Yes I have! Computation by its very nature involves change and Integers can't > change, but physical things can. That is why all the “John Clark” already say in the arithmetical reality. Are they zombie? Then explain why you think so. > > > With mechanism, we do understand how the physical makes a computation > > relatively more probable. That physicalness is no more primary though. > > I don't understand why you keep harping on that. The primacy or non-primacy > of matter is completely unrelated to the fact that computation needs change > and matter can change but integers can't. > > >>Can Davis’ book or Gödel’s 1931 paper make a calculation? > > >>This question is beyond ridiculous. > > I couldn't agree more, so stop referring me to books and papers whenever I > say computers made of matter can make calculations but ASCII sequences can't, > not even when the sequences are printed in books and papers. I prefer to those books because they gave detailed explanation of things that no-one is doubting here, and I want to bore people re-expaling this in detail for the nth time. You are not using the standard definition of computation. May I say that your notion of computation is pure Clarkspeak ... > > >>>The successor function, which sends n on n+1 [...] > >> Stop right there! Sends? How does the function "send" anything anywhere, > >> how exactly does it *do* that? I will answer in your way: how could an physical equation or a book in physics change anything? Look, as long as you confuse everyone on computation, I prefer to not help you in that task. I will wait for argument, especially that the academic entry is a bit heavy this year. Bruno > Does the function need energy to *do" it? Is it instantaneous or does it take > time? And after the function turns 5 into 6 does that mean the integer 5 no > longer exists? And what happened to the old #6 after the new guy moved in? > > > That is elementary mathematics, or you are playing with the words. > > Playing with words, that's your standard goto argument whenever I've backed > you into a logical corner because you can't think of anything better to say. > Every one of those questions are perfectly valid and you need to answer them > all if you wish to defend your theory. Good luck with that. > > > And, no, computations, even physical does not require energy, except for > > the read and the write. Only erasing information requires energy, and we > > can compute without ever erasing information. > > And your "computation" requires no energy because you have not erased > information, or written information, or read information, or done anything at > all. > > > A LISP interpreter is a computer, in the sense of a universal “Turing” > > machine. > > It pains me that I have to spell this out but a computer needs to be able to > compute, and by itself a LISP interpreter can't compute, by itself it can't > *do* anything, it never changes, it just sits there. > > > You can run it on *any* universal system. > > Sure, but ALL universal systems require matter that obeys the laws of physics. > > >> The definition of "Mechanism" in English is "a system of parts working > >> together in a machine", but that's not what it means in Brunospeak, last > >> week it meant "saying yes to the digital doctor”, > > >It has always meant that. > > Then stop babbling that if matter is not "primary" then Mechanism is untrue > because regardless of if it's primary or not there is no logical reason for > me to say anything other than "yes" to the digital doctor given that I > personally like existence more than nonexistence. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv29_P7HETbUcsvLy0bAxp6RpsHVcTtdjc_yQVNL6gRfPA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv29_P7HETbUcsvLy0bAxp6RpsHVcTtdjc_yQVNL6gRfPA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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