> On 8 Sep 2019, at 22:14, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 8, 2019 at 8:21 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be 
> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote
> >> if the computational capacity of the universe is finite (and I'm not 
> >> saying it is I'm saying if) then n+1 can NOT always be divided by 2 and 
> >> Euclid was flat out wrong.
> > You cannot invoke your personal ontological commitment in a domain which 
> > does not assume it.
> To hell with personal ontological commitments, the only thing I'm "invoking" 
> is the idea that if something can't be done then something can't be done. And 
> the great thing about tautologies is that all of them are always 100% true.

It is your argument that “Change cannot appear without some ontological 
commitment in some fundamental primarily physical time” which was challenged. 

> > Numbers can change all the time.
> So you keep saying, and yet you can't answer the simplest questions 
> concerning that. If 7 changes to 8 does that mean the number 7 no longer 
> exists?

Indeed, locally, in the relative way. When a diophantine polynomial simulates a 
register machine in the arithmetical reality, and add 1 to a register 
containing 7, 7 is no more in that register, but 8 is.

What you miss is that the arithmetical reality is Turing universal. It is easy 
to structure a Model M (a Reality) satisfying the Peano axiom into a 
combinatory algebra.

 ab = c

Is defined by

M satisfied "phi_a(b) = c”. 

 which can be translated 

 "phi_a(b) = c” can be put in the pure arithmetical language using Kleene’s 
predicate, if you have read my post on this.

> Are there now two integer 8's and how can one be distinguished from the other?
> > “Primary” means, as I said often: “in need to be assumed”.
> So you think mathematics needs to be assumed while I think physics needs to 
> be assumed.

I need to assume elementary arithmetic. I cannot assume the axiom of infinity.

But we can explain why in elementary arithmetic we will get creature which 
believes and exploit efficiently the axiom of infinity, to make sense of their 
phenomenological reality.

More simply, I assume only K and S, and Kxy = x, Sxyz = xz(yz) (and a few 
identity rules).

The wave, the collapse, the quanta and the qualia are explained coherently in 
that theory.

*Assuming* a physical reality needs a non Mechanist theory of mind. Which you 
could understand if you were able to asses the step 3 of the Universal 
Dovetailer Argument.

> That could be an interesting debate but it's irrelevant if we're talking 
> about computation or intelagent behavior or consciousness.

Because you stop at step 3, only.

> After both you and me have made our assumptions then we both need to work out 
> the consequences of those assumptions, so eventually we'll both come to 
> physics, and then chemistry, and then biology, and then humans making 
> physical Turing Machines.  Regardless of if we start with numbers or the 
> quark gluon plasma of the Big Bang it doesn't matter because neither are 
> conducive with intelligence or consciousness, although the consequences of 
> those things may be after 13.8 billion years.   

If we start with gluons, it will be hard, and very confusing, to explain that 
the illusion of gluons does not depend on which universal machinery is assumed, 
which is needed with Mechanism.

To explain the origin of the physical laws, it is simpler to not take a too 
much physically inspired reality.

> > Which is what you do to say that not all odd numbers + 1 are divisible by 2,
> I said that would be true IF the computational capacity of the expanding 
> accelerating universe is finite, and I don't know if it is or isn't. 

That makes my point. You need a physical notion of computation, but that does 
not really exist if we don’t have the natural numbers or combinators. All 
physical theory, which can give sense to the notion of universe, requires to 
assume a minimal amount of arithmetic.

What is different with assuming elementary Arithmetic or with assuming a 
universal machinery is that it can be prove that with less of this, we cannot 
recover the notion of computation at all.

Can you define the number 1 using only physics? What would that mean?

> > you confuse the mathematical reality with the physical reality, which is 
> > basically Aristotle Metaphysics.
> And that is my cue to skip to the next paragraph because nothing intelagent 
> ever follows.
> >> Assuming you like existence more than non-existence (and if you don't 
> >> that's fine, there is no disputing matters of taste) please explain why 
> >> saying "yes" to the digital doctor is inconsistent with ANYTHING.
> > “Saying “yes” to the doctor is an abbreviation of the assumption that we 
> > survive with an artificial brain when it is copied at some level. 
> If you change "assumption" with "belief in the possibility" then I would 
> agree. But if saying “yes” to the doctor is an abbreviation then what is 
> "mechanism" in Brunospeak, an abbreviation of an abbreviation? And I still 
> don't know what inconsistency you claim to see in saying "yes" to the doctor 
> under any circumstances. 
> >It is inconsistent, obviously, with the assumption that we die, whatever 
> >level of description we choose. It is inconsistent with the assumption that 
> >we are infinite machine (of some kind, though).
> That is most certainly NOT obviously inconsistent to me!  If 3 pounds of 
> Carbon Hydrogen Oxygen and Nitrogen grey goo is an "infinite machine of some 
> sort" (whatever the hell that means) then why can't 3 pounds of Silicon?

You have to explain how that silicon would make some computation more real than 

Of course you need step 3 to get the proof that this is just logically 

> > And it is inconstant with the idea that a God, or [...]
> And that is my cue to skip to the next paragraph because nothing intelagent 
> ever follows.
> >> I'm not even sure what you mean by "physical universe", but I'll tell you 
> >> what I mean by it, everything that obeys physical law.
> > I am OK with that definition,
> Good.
> > although “physical law” is not defined.
> It's EXACTLY as well defined as "defined" is defined, no more no less.

Then again you assume primary matter. But the point is that this assumption is 
incompatible with mechanism.

>From now, I will just wait for you to understand UDA step 3. You just miss the 
>whole thing.

> > With Mechanism (YD + CT),
> I thought, with Mechanism (saying "yes" to the digital doctor). And you keep 
> forgetting IHA.
> >> Computation by its very nature involves change and Integers can't change, 
> >> but physical things can.
> > That is why all the “John Clark” already say in the arithmetical reality. 
> > Are they zombie? 
> Yes, all the John Clark's in "arithmetical reality" are zombies, but they 
> don't say that, they don't say anything, they don't behave intelligently and 
> none of them can *do* anything at all because none of then can change. 

That means you have no idea of what computer science is all about. We know that 
elementary arithmetic is Turing universal since the 1930s. I can explain, but 
you don’t seem interested in understanding, only in defending your inconsistent 
theory that assert the existence of a primary universe.

> > I will answer in your way: how could an physical equation or a book in 
> > physics change anything?
> Reading a physics textbook can change the arrangement of atoms inside the 
> brain of the person reading the book and it can change nothing else;

Yes. I ask you to do exactly that. Read some book so that you get the point, 
and that needs obviously some change in your brain, including the understanding 
that all John Clark in arithmetic CANNOT be zombie, once you bet on Digital 
Mechanism, or you give to your primary matter some magical (non Turing 
emulable) abilities.

> and exactly precisely the same thing would be true if it was a book on the 
> theory of computation or any other area of mathematics.
> >>>The successor function, which sends n on n+1 [...]
> >> Stop right there! Sends? How  does the function "send" anything anywhere, 
> >> how exactly does it *do* that? Does the function need energy to *do" it? 
> >> Is it instantaneous or does it take time? And after the function turns 5 
> >> into 6 does that mean the integer 5 no longer exists? And what happened to 
> >> the old #6 after the new guy moved in?
> > That is elementary mathematics, or you are playing with the words.
> Playing with words, that's your standard goto argument whenever I've backed 
> you into a logical corner because you can't think of anything better to say.

Then that was elementary arithmetic, if you are not playing with words. You 
make my point again.

> Every one of those questions are perfectly valid and you need to answer them 
> all if you wish to defend your theory. Good luck with that.

I have never created any theory. I have just put some precision for Mechanism, 
by making it into a belief in some substitution level. Then I show that 
Mechanism makes physics into a branch of arithmetical reference. And then, when 
the math is done, we get QM (without collapse), and this without putting 
consciousness and qualia under the rug.

> > And, no, computations, even physical does not require energy, except for 
> > the read and the write. Only erasing information requires energy, and we 
> > can compute without ever erasing information.
> And your "computation" requires no energy because you have not erased 
> information, or written information, or read information, or done anything at 
> all.

In arithmetic, computations does not require primitive physical energy. That is 
true even for the computation erasing memory. But is false in the physical 
phenomenology, where energy appears actually.

You are dangerously conflating two level of description here.

That is the main problem. You have no theory. Just Mechanism, + an inconsistent 
belief that only “physical computation” are “real”. Even if fuzzy, it can’t 
make sense with Digital Mechanism.

> > A LISP interpreter is a computer, in the sense of a universal “Turing” 
> > machine.
> It pains me that I have to spell this out but a computer needs to be able to 
> compute, and by itself a LISP interpreter can't compute, by itself it can't 
> *do* anything, it never changes, it just sits there.

That is just so false, and shows that you have no idea what a universal machine 
is. A lisp interpreter is just a universal number like any other. It makes no 
sense to choose one universal number among all, and say that one is the true 

> > You can run it on *any* universal system.
> Sure, but ALL universal systems require matter that obeys the laws of physics.

No. Hey only need a universal machinery, and each universal number provide one. 
Then, the physical one are an illusion arising from the relative (indexical) 
statistics on all computations going through our actual state. 

If you say that a computation require matter, then you put in that computation 
something which is neither Turing emulable, nor recoverable from the first 
person indeterminacy on all relative computations. But then Mechanism is false.

> >> The definition of "Mechanism" in English is "a system of parts working 
> >> together in a machine",  but that's not what it means in Brunospeak, last 
> >> week it meant "saying yes to the digital doctor”,
> >It has always meant that.
> Then stop babbling that if matter is not "primary" then Mechanism is untrue


I say the contrary. I say that we cannot have both Mechanism and weak 
materialism (the belief in some ontological matter).

> because regardless of if it's primary or not there is no logical reason for 
> me to say anything other than "yes" to the digital doctor given that I 
> personally like existence more than nonexistence.

The point is logical. No need to invoke our personal opinion. 


> John K Clark
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