> On 13 Sep 2019, at 20:55, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 2:21 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>
> > See papers by handy, or the book by Odifreddy,
>
> Can the papers by handy or the book by Odifreddy make a calculation? If not
> why not?
Because it is a book, and not a computer.
Even in arithmetic, a book cannot do a computation, but a computer, indeed all
computer can.
>
> > which explains that computer science is basically an abstract theory of
> > localness.
>
> That's fine but...ah,,, Bruno,... it may surprise you but computer science
> involves computers, and they are made of matter that obeys the laws of
> physics.
Only physical computer are made of matter. Arithmetical computer are not made
of atom. The universal Turing machine is not made of anything material, and is
described by a finite set of quadruples.
Here you talk like if you knew that a physical universe exists in some special
sense making them more real than an immaterial computer in arithmetic, but that
is your act of faith, and it cannot be invoked when doing science.
>
> > That is why physical real FTL action at a distance would be a threat to
> > mechanism,
>
> Faster Than Light? Faster? The very concept of speed is meaningless in the
> context of pure numbers because speed is change in distance divided by time
> and we're talking about pure numbers that can't see distance and can't change
> and can't see time.
I use the fact that the violation of Bell’s inequality might emerge from the
arithmetical physics, which is given by the material modes of self-reference
([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t (& p)).
With mechanism, the physical reality does not disappear. It just becomes
secondary. Physics becomes the study of the universal machine’s observable.
>
> > despite some form of physical non-localness are still possible.
>
> The idea of locality depends on distance and if you only have numbers
We much more than the numbers. We have the laws of addition and multiplication,
which makes the numbers able to emulate all universal machine, including all
quantum computers. Indeed the physics will arise from a statistic involving
those infinitely many computations.
> it has been proven that there is NOT a unique way to measure distance, but
> with physics there IS a unique way to measure distance in 4D spacetime. With
> the The p-adic absolute value metric there are infinite ways to measure
> distance and all of them are internally self consistent. With 3-adic for
> example the distance 3 is from zero is 1/3 and the distance 8/45 is from zero
> is 9.
>
> > Eventually “locality” admits an abstract definition,
>
> Definitions don't change reality!
We certainly agree on this. 2+2=4 whatever the definition are chosen.
> And ALL definitions are derivative, when you start demanding definitions of
> the words in the definition eventually you must always come back to an
> example in the physical world. Always.
Because the physical word is your assumption. I assume only elementary
arithmetic, so the definition ends up about agreement with x+0 = x, etc.
> It's the only thing that gives definitions meaning.
In the materialist theory, perhaps, but then it is inconsistent with Mechanism.
>
> > More simply, like in the passage deleted, 7 is changed into 8 relatively to
> > the memory of some Register
>
> Changed? How do you change something made of pure numbers?
What is wrong with the explanation that I gave (but don’t see in the quote)?
May be below.
> In fact how do you build a register or construct anything else from pure
> numbers? Assuming there is more than one pure number register in the
> multiverse how can the number 8 know which register to go into and kick out
> number 7 that is hiding inside?
By following the instructions in the quadruplets. Which, as Gödel shows in all
details, can be encoded in numbers, and the “change” instructions are coded
through primitive recursive relations, all manageable through addition and
multiplication. The only real hard things to do is to represented the
exponential function, but Gödel used the Chinese lemma to do that.
>
> > or Turing machine’s (local) tape.
>
> A Turing Machine is made of matter
Not at all. That is simply wrong, as anyone can verify in any dictionary,
books, etc.
> that obeys the laws of physics and so is the tape, and in pure numbers
> "local" has no unique meaning.
Wrong.
>
> >> All machines change. No polynomial changes. Therefore a polynomial can not
> >> simulate a register machine or any other sort of machine.
>
> > Then GR is false.
>
> That's pretty silly even for you.
GR admits static space time (block universe description). Time is an illusion
in GR, and of course, that is true with Mechanism, where time is a relative
indexical.
>
> > You assume a primary physical time. I do not,
>
> I don't assume I know
That is the problem. You know things. In science, only con artist claims to
know things.
> that time is a dimension and everything physical changes in the 3 spatial
> dimensions as its worldline moves in the time direction, but pure numbers do
> NOT.
Pure numbers + addition and multiplication do.
> Therefore pure numbers can't be responsible for time, it must be physics.
>
> >> And how exactly does a pure number add 1 to a register, or add 1 to
> >> anything, how does a pure number *do* anything at all?
>
> > Good question!
> You have to represent the register itself by a number. Logicians represent a
> “register” (R1, R2, R3) , like (4, 4, 6) in arithmetic by
> 2^(4+1) * 3^(4+1) * 5^(6+1)
>
> Well good for Logicians and good for the way they talk about computer
> registers in the language of mathematics, but you can't put one pure number
> inside registers made of pure numbers,
Why? I just described how to do it. See Davis for all details.
> but you can put an electron inside a register made of silicon.
>
> > That computation will be represented by a number,
>
> OK that's fine, and I can represent a cow by the English word "cow" but I
> can't get milk from the English word "cow" ; and I can represent a
> calculation in the language of mathematics with a number, but I can't make a
> calculation from a representation of a calculation.
No, but the arithmetical reality, which does not depend on the representation
can. That’s the whole, certainly astonishing in the 1930s, point.
>
> >> if its a machine then other parts of the machine need to detect that a
> >> change has been made, so how can the integer 9 tell if the integer 7 is in
> >> the “register"
>
> > Simple programs can do that,
>
> No simple program can do that. No complex program can do that. No program can
> *do* anything at all unless it's running on a computer that obeys the laws of
> physics.
In Aristotle theology, which is, that is the point, untenable once you bet on
Mechanism.
You have failed to explain how that matter select the computations realised by
the arithmetical truth, and you do seem to confuse, a computation and a
description of a computation. In arithmetic, those are different objects.
> If it is running on a computer then its simple to tell that all registers
> are not the same because some are electrically charged and some are not.
In arithmetic, it will be not different than with a physicalist block universe
view.
>
> > With digital mechanism [...]
>
> I wish you'd stop using the word "mechanism" because I can't get a coherent
> explanation of what you mean by it, all I know is it has nothing to do with
> the English meaning.
Digital Mechanism is the idea that we can survive with a digital physical
computer.
The reasoning shows that if that is the case, then we survive with the digital
arithmetical computer too, and indeed, that the physical computers are emerging
pattern in the mind of all arithmetical computers.
>
> > By using the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, you can store information
> > in the exponent of a product of prime numbers. It is the most standard way,
> > used by Gödel in its 1931 paper.
>
> That's Godel numbering.
Yes, that is the name of how to represent programs, formula and digital
machines in arithmetic.
> Assign every digit, letter, punctuation mark, blank space, and mathematical
> symbol a unique number. To encode y1,y2,y3,y4,... which could be a number or
> a equation or a function or a algorithm or a poem or anything, do it this way
> with prime numbers in order.
>
> (2^y1)*(3^y2)*(5^y3)*(7^y4)*(11^y5)*(13^y6)...
>
> You can factor the number and get the original sequence y1,y2,y3,y4,... out
> of it; the first prime number 2 occurred Y1 times so whatever symbol you
> arbitrarily assigned for Y1 is the first character in the number or equation
> or function or algorithm or a poem or whatever. For example, if I assign 6 to
> the symbol "0" and 5 to the symbol "=" then the Godel number of the formula
> "0=0" is (2^6)*(3^5)*(5^6) = 243,000,000.
>
> Godel numbers are super useful because if you give me a infinitely long list
> of algorithms that you claim will allow you to get arbitrarily close to every
> number on the Real Number Line I can turn all your algorithms into numbers
> then I can use Cantor's diagonal argument to show you a Real number that is
> NOT paired up with one of the Godel numbers that represents one of your
> algorithms. So some real numbers are not computable, in fact nearly all of
> them are not computable. They can not even be approximated as can be done for
> transcendental numbers like pi or e, so most Real numbers can not have a
> name.
>
> This is all great stuff, but it all depends on your brain
>
No. It depends on the universal number you tap to.
> which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics ARBITRARILY assigning
> a ASCII character to the number of prime factors, so in the above example
> 243,000,000 *can* mean "0=0" if we want it to but it could mean something
> else you wanted it to, so243,000,000 has no unique meaning intrinsic to
> itself.
>
>
Nor any configuration of any machine. It is as much relative in a physical
reality than in the arithmetical reality.
You need to explain what in the physics is not Turing emulable, but then you
have already abandoned the “yes doctor idea”.
> > Reality is what I am searching, and the day you got the guts to assess
> > “step 3”,
>
> I assessed step 3 a long time ago and a decade of your "clarifications" has
> not changed my opinion of it. Judging from the fact that the "proof" has not
> revolutionized philosophy leads me to believe others have opinions of it that
> are similar to mine.
False, and anyway, that is argument per authority. But all scientists that I
know who have read the thesis have no problem. Everyone serious here knows that
the mind-body problem is not solved, and that contemporary physics leads to
many difficulties concerning the very notion of matter.
>
> > I hope you remember what the phi_i are, but don’t hesitate (anybody) to ask
> > a reminder.
>
> All that means is that a brain made of matter that obeys the laws of physics
> has decided that out of the infinite number of things the ASCII sequence
> "Phi_i(xk)" could have stood for it will stand for the (i,k) element of the
> matrix PHI. The decision to have it mean that in the language of mathematics
> is just a matter of notation, no different from deciding to call a particular
> type of animal a "cow" in the language of English.
“Cow” is not a name in the sense of mathematical logic. Try again with the
doctor’s description of the cow hardware and software, with the hardware
truncated at some substitution level, then look at its relation with the number
in arithmetic, and … et voilà: the arithmetical cows lives his life in the same
sense as the physical cows, and only if you give a role to some non Turing
emulable matter (and non first person indeterminacy recoverable) can your
proposition make sense, but that require you to say “No” to the doctor.
>
> > The physical reality is Turing universal. OK?
>
> Nobody knows if physical reality is Turing Universal or not because nobody
> knows if it will continue to expand and accelerate forever and so nobody
> knows if physical reality has the capacity for infinite calculations.
Then nobody knows if your laptop is Turing universal, and that makes non sense.
Turing universal has nothing to do with some axiom of infinity. PA proves that
some number are Turing universal, without using the axiom of the infinite. A
universal Turing machine is a a finite being. The tape is good pedagogy for
engineering, but very bad for metaphysics.
>
> >> and the fact that physical processes are needed for both [consciousness
> >> and intelligence]
>
> >That is simply false. That would be true if they were some intrinsically
> >physical definition of computation capable of violating CT, but there are no
> >evidence for that,
>
> All the Church–Turing Thesis says is a function of the natural numbers can be
> calculated
calculable
> if and only if it can be calculated
can be calculated
> on a Turing Machine. In other words if a Turing Machine can't calculate
> something, like the Busy Beaver function, then nothing else can either. I see
> no reason to think the Church–Turing Thesis is false and I see no reason to
> think that means matter is not needed for intelligence or consciousness.
Only because you stop ate step 3, and claim falsities (like a Turing machine is
made of matter) around step 7.
> And by the way, I'm assuming when you say "CT" you mean the Church–Turing
> Thesis and its not another of your silly homemade acronyms meaning who knows
> what.
>
> >> Please define "define". But when you do define "define" obviously you
> >> can't use any words in the definition that themselves have definitions
> >> because if you do you'd just end up with a tautology, and don't use
> >> examples that involve "primary matter" either because you don't believe in
> >> that.
>
> > I will say that something is defined when you can express it in some first
> > order formula,
>
> Define "express”.
Put in the shape of a grammatically correct sequence of symbols among {->, f,
E, A, (, ), 0, s, +, and *}
>
> >> Huh? If I don't assume "primary matter" why should I say no to the digital
> >> doctor
>
> > The contrary, if you don’t assume “primary matter”, then it makes sense to
> > say yes.
>
> I don't think its relevant
Of course the relevance comes from step 3, step 7, etc., and computer science
(branch of arithmetic).
> but you do for some reason and you don't assume “primary matter”, so why
> don't you say "yes" to the doctor, why aren't you signed up with Alcor like
> me?
It is my way to avoid infinite conversation. I like to refresh my memory every
century. Also, I consider that when we do science, it is better to not invoke
any personal opinion. Just precise axioms/theories, and means of verification.
Now, I have no problem with people saying their opinion and taste, but not if
they refer to them in a reasoning.
And then, my point is double:
- 1) Digital Mechanism is logically incompatible with Physicalism
- 2) the evidence favours Digital Mechanism (but not prove it, as we cannot
*prove* anything about Reality, nor even that there is one beyond “my”
consciousness here and now).
>
> > If you assume primary matter, mechanism is false.
>
> So then I should say "no" to the doctor??
Indeed, or abandon your faith in a matter which could not be explained by
simple, but non material, ideas, like with mathematics.
> In this context "primary" is not synonymous with "important”.
Indeed. By primary I have always meant “ontological not reducible to something
else.
> I think you would agree that whatever you think of physics it's more primary
> than biology,
Than carbon based biology, yes. But, as I have explained in my paper “Amoeba,
Planaria and Dreaming Machine”, there is also an abstract arithmetical biology.
In fact, study mathematics only because I discovered (reading Gödel) that every
which fascinated me in biology (reproduction, self-regeneration) is implemented
in arithmetic. Later, that becomes very clear with Kleene’s second recursion
theorem, which is what I used to defined in a precise way all the third person
and first person pronouns.
> so does that mean you think life is not worth living? When deciding what to
> say to the doctor the question of the primacy of matter need never come up,
> it has nothing to do with it.
It has nothing to do with your practical matter, for the same reason nobody
needs to understand thermodynamics to drive a car.
If mechanism is correct, you will survive with the digital brain (assuming the
doctor is competent, also), and I wish you success. May be after one thousand
year of reflexion, you will eventually gars step 3, and eventually understand
that the material reality is not primary real, but emerge through a purely
arithmetical phenomenon. May be it is the “music of the primes” which
mathematics looks more and more like theoretical physics. But with the
interview of the universal machine, we get not just the quanta, but also an
explanation of the qualia.
The question addressed here is everything but practical. The goal is to explain
the appearance of matter, and this without eliminating consciousness like the
serious materialist have to do, but they have also to abandon Mechanism, which
some does, and some does not. Those later are shown to be inconsistent.
>
> > read Gödel’s 1931, or Davis’s book,
>
> Can Gödel’s 1931 paper or Davis’s book make a calculation? If not why not, my
> brain can make calculations why can't books?
Because your brain is an implementation of a universal machine/number.
A book does not implement any machine, or computation.
As an object, a book is also not well defined. You can described it by a
quantum field, but then what is a quantum field? You can represent (faithfully)
a quantum field in set theory, but that assumes much, and that will still not
be a representation of a computer.
Why do you come with that absurd idea each time I refer to a book.
>
> > >> In arithmetic, computations does not require primitive physical
> > >> energy.
>
> >> That's not the only thing that does not require "primitive physical
> >> energy", doing NOTHING doesn't need it either, and your phantom fairy tail
> >> calculations are doing exactly that, NOTHING.
You confuse NOTHING with NOTHING PHYSICAL, which is again an invocation to your
deity MATTER.
The number 2 does many things. It divides 24, to give an example. It
participates to complex relation, and some relation are sigma_1 complete, i.e.
Turing universal.
>
> > You mean nothing physical,
>
> No I mean NOTHING period!
Then the fact that 2 dives 24 gives a counter-example.
> All you've got in your toolbox are integers, not registers not matrixes not
> algorithms not equations, just integers ; and integers never change so you
> can't build a machine out of them.
Integers change all the time. They smaller then divides by number greater than
1. They get bigger when I is added to them, etc.
Keep in mind that I am never talking about just numbers, or about just
combinators, I am talking about such things in company to some laws to which
they obey.
Take the following theory (by Robinson), build on the top of predicate calculus:
1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y))
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
That theory can be proved to be Turing-complete (but NOT Löbian), yet, if you
withdraw any one of those seven axioms, you get a theory which is no more
Turing universal.
Being a number, or any thing, is not enough. The Turing universality requires
laws operating on those objects. The Turing universality is in the laws and
relations available, not in object devoid of any laws, or on not enough laws.
If you withdraw the first axiom, you get an amazing theory in which there is
both addition and multiplication, but despite this, the laws are too weak to
get Turing universality: you need those seven axioms.
If you look back at my proof that the combaniators are Turing universal, you
will see the proof of all those seven axioms in the following “simpler”
(indeed, not requiring predicate calculus) theory:
1) If x = y and x = z, then y = z
2) If x = y then xz = yz
3) If x = y then zx = zy
4) Kxy = x
5) Sxyz = xz(yz)
Everything I say is a theorem in his theory, except for the Mechanist
hypothesis itself, which needs the assumption that consciousness is invariant
for some substitution, and which is represented in the restriction to the
sigma_ 1 (partially computable) propositions.
>
> > with the assumption that the physical is primary.
>
> To hell with physical is primary! It's irrelevant.
It is not relevant to say “yes” or “no” in a practical implementation of
Mechanism, but the point is that with Mechanism, the primary matter continue to
be apparent, but is no more primary: it is explained by the “many-world”
interpretation of arithmetic, made by the average universal machine in
arithmetic.
We discuss this since the beginning. You cannot say in the middle of the
conversation that therein point under discussion is not relevant.
>
> > But I do not assume anything like that, and eventually, you can assume
> > this, and then see my proof as a refutation of mechanism,
>
> Is that the proof where you assume the thing you're trying to prove
I never do that, so may be you could tell me where you have that feeling. I
have no clue what you are talking about here.
> or the one where you use personal pronouns with no clear referent
With indeterminate referents, only. That is the point: we cannot determine with
probability one some of our future first person reference, and all you need to
do to understand this is to see why the first person discourse have the all
taken into account, and then the indeterminacy is what almost all machine drive
from their personal experience, except a “minority” (which we know to be wrong
with mechanism, which put the same amount of trust in *all* experiences).
> to cover up logical plot holes in your thought experiment?
You have convinced nobody.
>
> > you have to explain the role of the physical reality in its ability to
> > select a computation in arithmetic.
>
> Well that doesn't sound very hard, when I was 6 I added 5+2 I did not
> subtract 5-2 because my first grade teacher told me to add and not to
> subtract.
That does not explain the magic of your matter when selecting a computation in
arithmetic, but you need first to study a bit of computer science to understand
that the computation are realised in arithmetic. The fashion today in the field
is to get only total computable functions in some reasonable restriction of the
arithmetical reality, like with working in the weaker intuitionist logic.
>
> > “Word salad” is a very common memes among atheists, I ahem discovered.
>
> Then it must be very common among Christians too because you said atheism is
> just a minor variation of Christianity.
A minor variation of radical christianity. I mean people who talk like if they
knew the truth.
The problem my work has is not with scientist, only with materialist believer.
They are continental philosopher, and usually are against science, bot just
computer science and quantum mechanics.
>
> >>> But then Mechanism is false.
>
> >> Just tell me why I should say no to the digital doctor.
To remain consistent. Now study (seriously for a change) the papers where I
show that Mechanism and Materialism, when taken together, leads to
inconsistency.
There is no practical problem with this. Inconsistency is not a fatal disease,
and PA already know that if she is consistent, then it is consistent that she
is inconsistent (<>t -> <>[]f).
>
> > Because if mechanism is false, there is no substitution level in which you
> > can survive.
>
> According to you and nobody else on planet Earth "mechanism" means you should
> say yes to the digital doctor,
?
That is a weak version of mechanism, implied by all the others. Only people
defending analogical form of “mechanism” can imagine mechanism true, and still
say to the doctor. What you say here is weird.
> so if "mechanism" is false then by you're very definition you should say "no"
> to the digital doctor.
Of course. If you believe that you have a soul in the catholic sense, you
cannot say “yes” to the doctor, where your soul can survive some digital
back-up.
> But none of this involves any logical reasoning,
You don’t need logical reasoning to make an axiom. Only to derive proposition
from axioms.
> you've just dreamed up new definitions for common words.
It gives an operational meaning, allowing easy thought experience, to explain
to a general public what eventually needs Gödel, Löb and Solovay to get
precise, and get the physics sufficiently precise so that we can compare with
nature.
And it is irrelevant here, given that you say yes to the doctor, and thus
defend the digital Mechanist thesis, and so, unless you find a real flaw in the
reasoning, must accept that the mind-bod problem is transformed into the search
of a derivation of the physical laws from arithmetic, which is what is done in
the more mathematically involved part of the papers.
Bruno
>
> John K Clark
>
>
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