> On 10 Sep 2019, at 20:54, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 7:06 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >>> Numbers can change all the time. > > >> you can't answer the simplest questions concerning that. If 7 changes to > 8 does that mean the number 7 no longer exists? > > > Indeed, locally, > > We're only talking about integers here, so what on earth does "locally" mean > in that context?
The explanation was in my post, but ou deleted it. See papers by handy, or the book by Odifreddy, which explains that computer science is basically an abstract theory of localness. That is why physical real FTL action at a distance would be a threat to mechanism, despite some form of physical non-localness are still possible. Eventually “locality” admits an abstract definition, which has different phenomenological instantiation in each mode of self-reference. The arithmetical Quantum locality is given by the “non-orthogonality” of the information available “currently”. For example, in the WM duplication experience, in the formalism of the material hypostases, W and M are local to H, but Vienna is orthogonal to both of them. You can express this using the special modal logic of the []p & <>t hypostase. More simply, like in the passage deleted, 7 is changed into 8 relatively to the memory of some Register or Turing machine’s (local) tape. > > > When a diophantine polynomial simulates a register machine > > All machines change. No polynomial changes. Therefore a polynomial can not > simulate a register machine or any other sort of machine. Then GR is false. You assume a primary physical time. I do not, and can explain all the discourse of the average universal machine in arithmetic about time, change, including the locally first person plural sharable time, and the personal subjective time. But, here, like Einstein said in his GR context, "time is an illusion, albeit a persistent one". Lol. > > > in the arithmetical reality, and add 1 to a register containing 7, 7 is no > > more in that register, but 8 is. > > And how exactly does a pure number add 1 to a register, or add 1 to anything, > how does a pure number *do* anything at all? Good question! You have to represent the register itself by a number. Logicians represent a “register” (R1, R2, R3) , like (4, 4, 6) in arithmetic by 2^(4+1) * 3^(4+1) * 5^(6+1) 2, 3, 5, … are the prime numbers. The “+1” is used to be able to put 0 in a register, without destroying it! A computation could be described, here, by a sequence of register, with the result placed in the first entry of the register. That computation will be represented by a number, obtained by reapllying the same idea, like 2^(2^(4+1) * 3^(4+1) * 5^(6+1)) * 3^(2^(5+1) * 3^(4+1) * 5^(6+1)) * 5^(2^(6+1) * 3^(4+1) * 5^(6+1)) * 7^(2^(0+1) * 3^(4+1) * 5^(6+1)) You can see the changes (!) in the register R1 (4 ==> 5 ==> 6 ==> 0). The actual real computation will be in the arithmetical truth concerning such numbers, involved in more complex relation with respect to the both the arithmetical reality and the way they “incarnate” itself in the arithmetical reality (assumed at the start). It is of the upmost importance to NOT confuse the arithmetical reality with *any* theory of the arithmetical reality. It is then a fact that the arithmetical reality implements all computations, in a block-universe way. The rest will come to the partially computable (and thus partially not computable) first person indeterminacies singular and plural. > And even if it has somehow actually done something if its a machine then > other parts of the machine need to detect that a change has been made, so how > can the integer 9 tell if the integer 7 is in the “register" Simple programs can do that, relatively to the universal number you want. You claim that there is a sort of winning universal number U. I understand the incredible discourse of the physicists: U = GR + QFT. One problem: it is inconsistent. Second problem: how it selects the computations in arithmetic (as it should if Mechanism is correct). With digital mechanism, we get a many histories interpretation of arithmetic, obtained by those machines in arithmetic. > (whatever the hell a register made of pure numbers is) or not? And for the > integer 9 to detect a change in the pure number register it must have > information on the contents of that pure number register before the change > was made, where and how was that information stored? By using the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, you can store information in the exponent of a product of prime numbers. It is the most standard way, used by Gödel in its 1931 paper. Like illustrated above. > > > What you miss is that the arithmetical reality is Turing universal. It is > > easy to structure a Model M (a Reality) satisfying the Peano axiom into a > > combinatory algebra. > ab = c > Is defined by > M satisfied "phi_a(b) = c”. > > That's one of your major problems right there, whenever you say "Is defined > by" you seem to think that a human definition somehow changes objective > reality. No. It is mathematics. Mathematical logic. It makes it possible to prove that all Models of Peano arithmetic are Combinatorial Algebra. Reality is what I am searching, and the day you got the guts to assess “step 3”, you might reach the point to be address the difference between a mathematical reality (semantic) and a mathematical theory (syntaxe). The point is that the neither the physical reality, nor the psychological realty will or can depend on the choice of any special U. Some special universal number like ‘QM' or ‘GR', might play a role, but to get the quanta with the qualia, we must extract them from the psychology/theology of the sound u in general (with u a universal number, that is a number u such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). I hope you remember what the phi_i are, but don’t hesitate (anybody) to ask a reminder. > And that's what I meant when I said you can follow the individual steps in a > proof but when you get to the end you don't understand what you've just > proven. > > >> After both you and me have made our assumptions then we both need to work > >> out the consequences of those assumptions, so eventually we'll both come > >> to physics, and then chemistry, and then biology, and then humans making > >> physical Turing Machines. Regardless of if we start with numbers or the > >> quark gluon plasma of the Big Bang it doesn't matter because neither are > >> conducive with intelligence or consciousness, although the consequences of > >> those things may be after 13.8 billion years. > > > If we start with gluons, it will be hard, and very confusing, to explain > > that the illusion of gluons does not depend on which universal machinery is > > assumed, > > What is confusing is what you just said. The physical reality is Turing universal. OK? Most physical theories are indeed provably Turing universal. For example, Newton theory + 3 bodies is Turing Universal. Some gas in some volume are Turing universal, the DNA is Turing universal, and of course, the transistors, well organised, implement easily the Turing universal boolean graph. Mechanism proves constructively that physics and psychology must be derived from arithmetic, in fact from any universal number u. That gives a way to test mechanism. Take a theory (a u) very different from physics, and if you find GR+QM, or better their consistent marriage, mechanism is confirmed, and you get some indirect evidence for the qualia theory associated with it (by the variant of G*). But now, string theory is Turing universal, or “QM+GR” (or its consistent correction we all hope for), so we could derive QM+GR successfully, from QM+GR, but it will be confusing for understanding that this confirms mechanism. > > > To explain the origin of the physical laws, it is simpler to not take a too > > much physically inspired reality. > > I don't know what that means either, I hope that what I ay above has clarified. Mechanism enforces that physics, and thus the physical fundamental theory is a theorem find by all u looking inward. To verify mechanism, we must compare what any u finds there with the empirical physical reality. If we use a u which looks to much to the physical reality, it will be extremely confusing to explain that e derive u from *any* u, as Mechanism demands (to anyone able to move from step 3 to step 4, of course). > but it doesn't matter because it's irrelevant. We're not talking about the > origin of physical laws we're talking about the origin of intelligent > behavior and consciousness With Mechanism things are like that: NUMBER ==> CONSCIOUSNESS And then we can test the theory because things continues like this, constructively: CONSCIOUSNESS ===> PHYSICAL REALITY So by comparing the physical reality extracted from the theory of the consciousness of the universal machine, which is the mathematics of G* and its variants (see the paper by Gödel, Löb, and Solovay). > and the fact that physical processes are needed for both. That is simply false. That would be true if they were some intrinsically physical definition of computation capable of violating CT, but there are no evidence for that, and the notion of computation used in Digital Mechanism is *typically* arithmetical. Gödel is the one proving this, for what he thought could not provide a definition of computation, even with the Mu operator. But, as he acknowledged later, he just missed the Church-Turing thesis. He missed the universal machine/number/word... > In the same way I don't need to explain the origin of life to know that > biology is needed for humans to be intelligent. > > > Can you define the number 1 using only physics? > > I know you love definitions but all of them are derivative, with physics I > can give you something far more fundamental than a mere definition. A > definition is made of words, and the definition of the words in the > definition are also made of words that can be found in a dictionary, and > those words also have definitions that are also made of words and they are > also in the dictionary and…. Lol > > The only thing that can give a definition meaning and allow us to break out > of this endless cycle of words chasing after words is EXAMPLES. I think that you are not aware of the existence of Mathematical Logic, and its very deep relation with computer science. Computer science is sometimes called, by logicians, intensional number theory. Here, your critics of the definition is just like child who does not want to do his homework. > Physics allows me to say I am pointing with my finger at ONE tree right now, > not two not three just one. That is dream-able. You can refute a theory, but you can’t use a theory to prove the existence of anything. Still less a personal experience. > > > I will just wait for you to understand UDA step 3. > > I will just wait for you to fix your silly blunder in step 3 that renders the > entire thing utterly ridiculous, I believe I'll will be waiting for a very > long time. And I do wish you'd remember IHA. You have not yet succeeded in cnvicng anyone to explain the blunder. I don’t think there is a blunder at all, or at least not one of your finding. If some one want to show a blunder in a manner more convincing that John, he is welcomed. If you want to call the first person indeterminacy differently, like the first person ambiguity, choose your term, but then move to step 4, 5, … and you ill see that physics has to be derived by a calculus of *ambiguity*. Because, beyond just there forgetting that the stat have to be confirmed by all copies (in the finite duplication) and almost all copies (in the infinite case), you have until now just play with words. No problem for your IHA (which to help the others means “I hate acronym”. Of course I will use UDA for “Universal Dovetailer Argument”, in reference to the step 3, like in the presentation of it in http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > >> If 3 pounds of Carbon Hydrogen Oxygen and Nitrogen grey goo is an > >> "infinite machine of some sort" (whatever the hell that means) then why > >> can't 3 pounds of Silicon? > > > You have to explain how that silicon would make some computation more real > > than others. > > When 3 pounds of Silicon or 3 pounds of Carbon Hydrogen Oxygen and Nitrogen > grey goo make a calculation something changes, when pure numbers make a > "calculation" absolutely positively NOTHING changes. > > > Of course you need step 3 to get the proof that this is just logically > > impossible. > > Of course you need to fix the ridiculous error made in step 3. > > >>> “physical law” is not defined. > > >> It's EXACTLY as well defined as "defined" is defined, no more no less. > > > Then again you assume primary matter. > > Please define "define". But when you do define "define" obviously you can't > use any words in the definition that themselves have definitions because if > you do you'd just end up with a tautology, and don't use examples that > involve "primary matter" either because you don't believe in that. I will say that something is defined when you can express it in some first order formula, or theory, or when you can represent what you try to talk about in some first order theory. All concept in physics are easily definable in a tiny segment of set theory. In fact most are already definable in arithmetic. Each time you invoke your primary matter, perhaps unconsciously?, you assumes something in metaphysics, which cannot be done when doing metaphysics with a bit of scientific attitude (admittedly rare in this domain). > > > But the point is that this assumption is incompatible with mechanism. > > Huh? If I don't assume "primary matter" why should I say no to the digital > doctor The contrary, if you don’t assume “primary matter”, then it makes sense to say yes. If you assume primary matter, mechanism is false. If you assume mechanism, primary matter is false or non sensical. You can’t have both Mechanism and Weak Materialism (the belief in physicalism). That is why with mechanism we must explain the *appearance* of the physical reality from a theory of of consciousness. Materaility is the effect of consciousness differentiating in some trees of computations in the arithmetical reality. > and cancel my plans to get frozen after I die? Cancel your plan only if you think that physicalisme is true. > > > We know that elementary arithmetic is Turing universal since the 1930s. > > No! We have known that Turing Machines are Turing universal since the 1930s > and we've known that numbers are not machines since antiquity. See above for the beginning of the correction, read Gödel’s 1931, or Davis’s book, for more detail. You are just showing ignorance. It is a well know fact for *all* logicians and mathematicians knowing a bit of mathematical logic. > > > I can explain > > No you can't explain because you clearly don't understand what Turing did. > >> your "computation" requires no energy because you have not erased > >> information, or written information, or read information, or done anything > >> at all. > > > In arithmetic, computations does not require primitive physical energy. > > That's not the only thing that does not require "primitive physical energy", > doing NOTHING doesn't need it either, and your phantom fairy tail > calculations are doing exactly that, NOTHING. You mean nothing physical, with the assumption that the physical is primary. But I do not assume anything like that, and eventually, you can assume this, and then see my proof as a refutation of mechanism, but then revise your contract. > > >> It pains me that I have to spell this out but a computer needs to be able > >> to compute, and by itself a LISP interpreter can't compute, by itself it > >> can't *do* anything, it never changes, it just sits there. > > > That is just so false, and shows that you have no idea what a universal > > machine is. > > I know that all machines, universal or otherwise, need to be able to *do* > something, and pure numbers can't . See above. > > > If you say that a computation require matter, > > I do. > > > then you put in that computation something which is neither Turing > > emulable, nor recoverable from the first person indeterminacy on all > > relative computations. > > If you put a gun to my head I couldn't say what that word salad means. It means that you have to explain the role of the physical reality in its ability to select a computation in arithmetic. Then see my previous post, which explains what follows from this, or ask again, but the explanation is in more than one recent posts. I will have to go, so I have not much time right now. “Word salad” is a very common memes among atheists, I ahem discovered. Insullting tone defeats your point. > > > But then Mechanism is false. > > Just tell me why I should say no to the digital doctor. Because if mechanism is false, there is no substitution level in which you can survive. The doctor would have to copy you at a level governed by real number and would involved non computable physical relations. > > >> regardless of if it's primary or not there is no logical reason for me to > >> say anything other than "yes" to the digital doctor given that I > >> personally like existence more than nonexistence. > > >The point is logical. No need to invoke our personal opinion. > > Yes there is. Personal opinion is important because of YOUR definition of > "mechanism”; It is the weakest form of Digital Mechanism. It is implies by all the other. Of course, the materialist computationalist theory implies it, but are inconsistent. Mechanism is just the “yes doctor”, made precise through the level of substitution existence. Many neuroscientists takes for granted high level of substitution. The reasoning follows from that assumption, and, that should be obvious, a bit of computer science, which necessitates no assumption in physics, especially when you grasp step … 7. > whether it's logical to say yes to the digital doctor or not depends on the > goal you seek and that depends on if you prefer existence or nonexistence. Of course. Although if you do grasp well the Digitalist Hypothesis, a case can be make that existence is a bit or prison in arithmetic. Even saying No to the doctor does not garantie that you will “die” in *all* your consistent extension. For a Mechanist who got the point, and who would, for some reason, believe in Mechanism, technological immortality looks like complacency with the Samsara, and a procrastination of the Nirvana. Now, even with Everett QM, I am not sure we can die, but with mechanism much more can be said, although it asks for a lot of work (like studying Boolos 1993 to begin with). Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2DqsZPAqq%3DdRBD1zY1qV7cYPDMGF9w6bkNd5z5b5dPww%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2DqsZPAqq%3DdRBD1zY1qV7cYPDMGF9w6bkNd5z5b5dPww%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0AF0A7FB-D03A-4B5C-AE64-F7A4697D9A72%40ulb.ac.be.
