> On 16 Sep 2019, at 21:52, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 11:34 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > that is your act of faith, and [...] > > That is my cue to skip to the next paragraph.
Yet, you invoke your god all the time, and denying it is faith or assumption means that you behave like if you knew the truth, and so act like a con scientist. That is the problem with (strong) atheism. They believe they know the t(fundamental) truth. They can’t doubt, and eventually they lack the minimum of agnosticism at the base of the scientific endeavour. > >> Faster Than Light? Faster? The very concept of speed is meaningless in the > >> context of pure numbers because speed is change in distance divided by > >> time and we're talking about pure numbers that can't see distance and > >> can't change and can't see time. > > >I use the fact that the violation of Bell’s inequality might emerge from the > >arithmetical physics, > > Bell found his inequality by thinking deeply about things like the way > polarized electrons and photons behave as they travel through space and time, > and every one of those things are physical. > > > With mechanism [...] > > What does “mechanism” means [•••]? Saying “yes" to a doctor who propose the digital brain/body transplants. This needs Church thesis to make “digital” mathematically precise, and the Church’s thesis needs itself some amount of acceptance of 2+2=4 & Co. > > >> The idea of locality depends on distance and if you only have numbers > > > We much more than the numbers. We have the laws of addition and > > multiplication, > > No you don't! Without matter and the laws of physics you have no way to add > or subtract anything. In your religion. You see that you invoke your impersonal god all the times. > And because of p-adic distance, which I don't think you've ever heard of, Gratuitous inference, false (actually, all mathematicians know them, and sometimes used them), but that p-adic stuff is only a distraction here. It has nothing to do with the subject. Both p-adic numbers and the real line (+ trigonometry) assumes the natural numbers or anything Turing equivalent. > you don't have one unique self consistent way to measure the distance between > numbers you have a infinite number of different ones. Like you and me and > all children we were taught the intuitive way to measure distance, but there > are infinitely many other ways. And there one reason and one reason only that > the way we were taught to measure things was far more intuitive than the > others, it's the way distance works in the physical world and p-adic distance > is not. I don’t believe in a primary physical world, and with mechanism, that appearance have to be justified. > > p-adic distances between rational numbers is not intuitive > <https://www.sangakoo.com/en/unit/p-adic-distance> > > >> how do you build a register or construct anything else from pure numbers? > >> Assuming there is more than one pure number register in the multiverse how > >> can the number 8 know which register to go into and kick out number 7 that > >> is hiding inside? > > > By following the instructions in the quadruplets. > > Who or what is following those instructions?? Any Turing universal reality will do. Elementary arithmetic for example. The model! Not the theory! > What gives the particular ASCII sequence that makes up that quadruplet the > Godlike ability to change a integer? And how do you instruct the integer 7 to > turn into the integer 8? And after you change it does that now mean 6+1 = 8? > It sure can't equal 7 anymore because 7 no longer exists, you've changed it > to 8. > > >>Time is an illusion in GR, > > BULLSHIT! Time is no more an illusion in General Relativity than space is, > and the distance between 2 events in 4D space time is an invariant. But such time does not flow, except indexically. So it is the same as in the arithmetic, where, of course, time is still an open problem. > > > In Aristotle theology [...] > > And that is my cue to skip to the next paragraph because nothing intelagent > ever follows that. > > > Digital Mechanism is the idea that we can survive with a digital physical > > computer. > > But that definition is inconsistent with nearly every paragraph of yours that > starts with the words "With Mechanism", and there are a lot of such > paragraphs. Show the inconsistency, if you believe there is one. But as you seem to ignore that a computation is apuely arithmetical notion, I know you will just invoke your god Matter. > > >>> By using the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, you can store information > >>> in the exponent of a product of prime numbers. It is the most standard > >>> way, used by Gödel in its 1931 paper. > > >> That's Godel numbering. > > > Yes, that is the name of how to represent programs, formula and digital > > machines in arithmetic. > > I agree, and just as a representation of a cow can't give milk a > representation of a digital machine can't compute You are right. It is not the representation of a computation in arithmetic which computes, it is the truth of the statements represented which counts. That confusion is made by many. > or *do* anything else, that's why I didn't go to the Apple store and just > take a picture of an iMac, the picture is not a machine so I had to buy the > actual machine. > > >> Assign every digit, letter, punctuation mark, blank space, and > >> mathematical symbol a unique number. To encode y1,y2,y3,y4,... which could > >> be a number or a equation or a function or a algorithm or a poem or > >> anything, do it this way with prime numbers in order. > (2^y1)*(3^y2)*(5^y3)*(7^y4)*(11^y5)*(13^y6)... > You can factor the number and get the original sequence y1,y2,y3,y4,... out > of it; the first prime number 2 occurred Y1 times so whatever symbol you > arbitrarily assigned for Y1 is the first character in the number or equation > or function or algorithm or a poem or whatever. For example, if I assign 6 to > the symbol "0" and 5 to the symbol "=" then the Godel number of the formula > "0=0" is (2^6)*(3^5)*(5^6) = 243,000,000. > Godel numbers are super useful because if you give me a infinitely long list > of algorithms that you claim will allow you to get arbitrarily close to every > number on the Real Number Line I can turn all your algorithms into numbers > then I can use Cantor's diagonal argument to show you a Real number that is > NOT paired up with one of the Godel numbers that represents one of your > algorithms. So some real numbers are not computable, in fact nearly all of > them are not computable. They can not even be approximated as can be done for > transcendental numbers like pi or e, so most Real numbers can not have a > name. This is all great stuff, but it all depends on your brain > > > No. It depends on the universal number you tap to. > > You can't tap into anything without a physical brain. Sure, but that does not mean that the physical brain is primary. With mechanism, physical brain arise from the interference between the computations in arithmetic. > > >> which is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics ARBITRARILY > >> assigning a ASCII character to the number of prime factors, so in the > >> above example 243,000,000 *can* mean "0=0" if we want it to but it could > >> mean something else you wanted it to, so 243,000,000 has no unique meaning > >> intrinsic to itself. > > > Nor any configuration of any machine. It is as much relative in a physical > > reality than in the arithmetical reality. > > With a physical machine 243,000,000 might not mean 0=0, it might mean > actually *do* something, like turn on an electrical circuit. Yes. Like in the arithmetical reality. No problem with this. > > > You need to explain what in the physics is not Turing emulable, > > No idea what on earth you're talking about,... unless it's that the expanding > acceleration universe is incapable of performing an arbitrarily large number > of calculations, and nobody even knows if that's true. You are the one invoking a god (in the original greek sense, that is a reality or a truth) to select the computation in arithmetic to make them more “real”, or more capable of sustaining consciousness, but you never say how it does that. And the point is that if it does that in a Turing emulable way, it is already done an infinity of times in arithmetic, and if it does it by using something non Turing emulable, then you can no more say “yes” to the doctor. > > > but then you have already abandoned the “yes doctor idea”. > > I have spent $80,000 to fully express the “yes doctor idea”! Yes, you are a Mechanist. But then, when you will grasp the step 3 of the UDA, you will understand that you can no more invoke your magic Matter to select some computations among all relative one accessible in arithmetic (by the first person indeterminacy). I think I should wait 'till you grasp the step 3. > > >> I assessed step 3 a long time ago and a decade of your "clarifications" > >> has not changed my opinion of it. Judging from the fact that the "proof" > >> has not revolutionized philosophy leads me to believe others have opinions > >> of it that are similar to mine. > > > False, > > Are you claiming your "proof" has revolutionized philosophy? It asks only to come back to Plato’s conception of reality, or, actually Pythagorus. > > > and anyway, that is argument per authority. > > But you're the one who has been telling me nearly every other day for years > that I haven't convinced anybody on the list so I must be wrong. Yes. To convince other is the only way to avoid argument by authority. It is science. > > > Then nobody knows if your laptop is Turing universal, > > My laptop is not Turing universal. False. > Unlike the Busy Beaver Function the Ackermann Function IS computable and we > know for a fact it will eventually halt, although it does get very big very > fast. Because it's computable if my laptop is Turing universal it should be > able to calculate the decimal expansion of A(6,4), but it can’t. Of course it can. > It doesn't have enough memory. That is not relevant for Turing universality. The universal Turing machine has a finite tape, (see Davis). It ca just explained it when needed. A universal machine is a g-finite set of code, and can compute all computable function in a finite time and space, but arbitrarily expandable. Dont’t invoke things like physical universe in this setting, because that is just changing the subject. I don’t assume a physical universe which would be the real thing. > It doesn't have enough battery life. And there isn't nearly enough room in > the observable universe to store a paper printout of the output number. > > >>>> Please define "define". But when you do define "define" obviously you > >>>> can't use any words in the definition that themselves have definitions > >>>> because if you do you'd just end up with a tautology, and don't use > >>>> examples that involve "primary matter" either because you don't believe > >>>> in that. > > >>> I will say that something is defined when you can express it in some > >>> first order formula, > > >> Define "express”. Put the symbol one after the other. All that can be define in arithmetic, notice. > > > Put in the shape of a grammatically correct sequence of symbols among {->, > > f, E, A, (, ), 0, s, +, and *} > > Define "symbol”. Element of an alphabet. Now you will ask “define alphabet”. Just a finite set. > > > Digital Mechanism is logically incompatible with Physicalism > > Why is the physical world incompatible with a system of parts working > together in a machine? Sorry but you need to grasp the step 3 for this. I will proceed only at that moment. > Note: I'm using the English meaning of "Mechanism" because I don't know what > the word means in Brunospeak today. You have a poor memory as, I recall, it is “saying “yes” to the digitalist surgeon. > > >> In this context "primary" is not synonymous with "important”. > > > Indeed. By primary I have always meant “ontological not reducible to > > something else. > > Biology is not primary, it can be reduced to chemistry and chemistry can be > reduced to physics. So what? That doesn't mean Biology can't produce > consciousness because I know of at least one instance where it most certainly > did. So why is it relevant whether matter is primary or not? Because of UDA or similar reasoning. But you need not just step 3, also step 7, which suppose that you understand that the notion of computation is arithmetical. You need also to grasp what arithmetical means, which might be a problem if you don’t understand expression like “express”, alphabet, symbol, etc. Buy a book on logic, perhaps. > > >> I think you would agree that whatever you think of physics it's more > >> primary than biology, > > > Than carbon based biology, yes. > > At least we can agree on one thing. > > > that becomes very clear with Kleene’s second recursion theorem, which is > > what I used to defined in a precise way all the third person and first > > person pronouns. > > When you ask the question "what one and only one city will you see tomorrow > after you have been duplicated and visit two different cities" it is NEVER > made "very clear" who exactly Mr.You is. That has not been made clear, but you have agree with it many times already. “You” are both in the 3p sense, and obviously, you can be only one of them after the experience, when taken in the 1p sense. There is no problem, just an indeterminacy. > And even the day after tomorrow you NEVER make it "very clear" what the > correct answer should have been 2 days ago. > > >> so does that mean you think life is not worth living? When deciding what > >> to say to the doctor the question of the primacy of matter need never come > >> up, it has nothing to do with it. > > > It has nothing to do with your practical matter, > > I don't know if it's true today but at least on some days "mechanism" means > saying yes to the digital doctor, It has been “yes doctor” since day one, like in all my papers. I add the redundant axiom of Church-Turing thesis just to be able to use Turing or other mathematical definition of a computation. > and that decision is about as personal and practical as things get. And I > have not only said yes to the digital doctor I've put my money where my mouth > is. > > > If mechanism is correct, you will survive with the digital brain (assuming > > the doctor is competent, also), and I wish you success. > > Thank you. > > > May be after one thousand year of reflexion, you will eventually gars step > > 3, > > I think it will take longer than that. As a teacher, I know that if a student convince himself (herself) that he/she will never understand, then that does not help. > > >> Can Gödel’s 1931 paper or Davis’s book make a calculation? If not why not, > >> my brain can make calculations why can't books? > > >Because your brain is an implementation of a universal machine/number. A > >book does not implement any machine, or computation. > > Exactly correct. Good. > Turing told us in his paper how to organize matter in such a way that it can > perform calculations, For pedagogical purpose. Read Church to understand that this was just a way for Turing to make the notion of computation looking more concrete. It helps, but in metaphysics it is clearly misleading. > but Turing's paper, which consisted of dried wood pulp and ink, was not > organized in that way. Indeed. > And neither are pure numbers. Pure numbers? Yes you are right. But pure numbers + the laws of addition and multiplication *is* a Turing universal reality. That is what you seem to miss. That was already in Gödel’s 1931 paper. Gödel himself missed it, only because he did not believe that is “[]” was general enough to get all computable function, which will make sense only after Turing & Co. > > > Why do you come with that absurd idea each time I refer to a book. > > Obviously it's utterly absurd to believe a book can make a calculation, but > it's not nearly as absurd as believing pure numbers can make a calculation. Sure numbers + addition and multiplication, or more simply: the basic arithmetical reality (taught in primary school) can do all computations, and generate the illusion of a physical universe. > At least a book can *do* something, in some circumstances anyway, such as > fall in a gravitational field or burn in an oxygen environment; by contrast > pure numbers can't *do* anything in any circumstances. 2 divides 4, in *all* circumstances. A the universal number u do the computations, on all its inputs, in, similarly, all circumstances. > > > You confuse NOTHING with NOTHING PHYSICAL, > > You confuse doing something in your airy fairy phantom world with actually > doing SOMETHING. Assuming primary matter, which is Aristotle theology. It happens that Mechanism has been shown inconsistent in that theology. We have to come back to Plato. > > > your deity MATTER [...] > > And that is my cue to skip to the next paragraph. > > > The number 2 does many things. It divides 24, > > Does? The number 2 can't divide or *do* anything else without the help of a > Turing Machine made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. False. 2 divides 4 just means that Ex(2 * x = 4), and that is true independently of the existence of a physical universal, or show the theory, and your proof of dependency. You invoke your ontological matter at a place where it is not valid. You need to be agnostic to proceed in this domain, or you are doing just a religious sermon. > > > Integers change all the time. > > If that were true then it would be impossible to teach children elementary > arithmetic because it would be changing all the time. Many number theorists > say the reason they like numbers is that they are eternal universal and > unchanging. Yes, like the computation or even life in a block universe. Time, space and the whole physicalness becomes relative in the mechanist picture. They are number hallucinations brought by their Turing universal relations. > > > It is not relevant to say “yes” or “no” in a practical implementation of > > Mechanism, > > And so the meaning of the word "Mechanism" has changed yet again in > Brunospeak, although nobody knows what it has been changed to. Nope. What change? The fact that someone can say yes even if mechanism is false, or that someone can say no even if mechanism is true, is irrelevant with the facts that mechanism is true or not. “Saying yes” is, as explained in my papers and here, just an abbreviation that your survive when saying yes, which provides an operational definition of mechanism useful in the thought experiment. In the math part, it is translated in the restriction of the statistics to the universal dovetailer, or to the sigma_1 sentence. You play with word and know perfectly well what I mean by “yes doctor” and “mechanism”. We do theoretical reasoning here. > > >> Is that the proof where you assume the thing you're trying to prove > > > I never do that, so may be you could tell me where you have that feeling. I > > have no clue what you are talking about here. > > The entire point of your "proof" and accompanied thought experiments is to > make words like "I" and "you" and "he" crystal clear. In our normal everyday > world such words have little ambiguity; but in a world where matter > duplicating machines exist (and the only reason we don't have such machines > already is engineering difficulties not scientific difficulties) such words > have a LOT of ambiguity. Nevertheless from the very beginning you assume even > after the duplication everything has already been cleared up and personal > pronouns, despite the use of personal pronoun duplicating machines, still > refer to one and only one individual. So you say stuff like "you will see > this" and "he will predict that". It is not allowed to assume what you're > trying to prove. No, you have agreed that the two copies are digne successor of the original, so we have no problem at all with personal identity, in the settings presented (step 3). Then, as both copies are the original, we need to interview both of them, to get the statistic on the 1p you, and as they can’t have both experience (seeing M) and (seeing W) present in their memory, we get the two experiences with a or, and we get the first person indeterminacy. I teach this every year, and have never add any problem with this. I have got many scientific jury on this (thesis, the prize), and no scientist have ever get any problem with this. If someone else in this list would grasp your point, he/she would have already try to convince me and the others, but that does not happen: nobody get your point, and everybody sees that there are none. > > > You have convinced nobody. > > A classic argument from authority! Not at all. The exact contrary. When a paper is peer reviewed, if it convinces nobody it is rejected, not by argument of authority, but by lack of genuine argument in the paper, or errors. It is the contrary of an argument of authority to demand for an explanation to someone, when nobody understand a paper or an argument. Now, you constant invocation of your personal ontological commitment is an argument by authority. > > > If you believe that you have a soul in the catholic sense, you cannot say > > “yes” to the doctor, where your soul can survive some digital back-up. > > I don't believe in the soul You know that I sue that term for the “first person”. > but even if I did I'd still say "yes" to the doctor. I don't see why liquid > nitrogen would destroy a soul nor can I see why a soul can survive inside 3 > pounds of grey goo made of hydrogen carbon and oxygen but can't survive > inside 3 pounds of silicon. What's so special about goo? You lost me here. What is “goo”? Look, eventually we see that all the problem comes from your absence of grasping the very easy step 3, so it is not useful to proceed until you get it right, or, as you did shown you get it right from times to times, you just need to be able top acknowledge you get the point and move toward step 4. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3B1qP0BAV5xfQ%3Da2wDOSFZ2PRh4ACGWaQ3AEW%3DJb6x5w%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3B1qP0BAV5xfQ%3Da2wDOSFZ2PRh4ACGWaQ3AEW%3DJb6x5w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4AB5A7FA-6537-4E5C-B9E3-2E9A5B6222DF%40ulb.ac.be.
