> On 15 Sep 2019, at 14:51, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 7:02:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 13 Sep 2019, at 13:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> It seems though that while I was referencing a material pan[propto]psychism >>> - where elementary constituents of matter that ends up in an integrated >>> brain have proto-experientiality - what you have is a numerical >>> pan[proto[psychism, where there are elementary numeral constituents in >>> things that are not brains that possess a proto-consciousness. (Even rocks >>> of certain types have been shown to be a kind of signal processors.) If >>> fact, a numerical reality reveals a panpsychism of a numerical nature even >>> more explicitly than a material one. >> >> Mechanism assumes only the natural numbers with their laws of addition and >> multiplication (or Turing equivalent like S and K + the application laws). >> >> There is no consciousness in numbers. Consciousness relies on complex Turing >> universal number relations, which can be proved to exist (in elementary >> arithmetic), and which describes a non trivial discourse on the par of the >> machine, including the physical discourse, making Mechanism refutable (but >> confirmed up to now). >> >> Rock simply do not exist per se. They belong to appearances emerging from >> long computational histories and their first person statistics. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Consciousness relies on complex Turing universal number relations, which can >> be proved to exist (in elementary arithmetic), and which describes a non >> trivial discourse on the par of the machine, including the physical >> discourse, making Mechanism refutable (but confirmed up to now). >> >> >> This universality of this consciousness in this "arithmetical reality" >> (whatever it's called) is on a par with panpsychism in a material reality. >> (It just appears to me.) > > I am not sure. An arithmetical version of panpsychism would assert that all > numbers think, when actually, the thinking is only in sufficiently complex > number relations. Then materialism makes this worst, if I can say, by > introducing some “inert substance” as matter is called sometimes, and endow > it with thinking, which seems mysterious (how could “inert matter” think?). > And Mechanism aggravates the position of materialism by throwing some doubt > about the primary ontological nature of matter. > > Thinking is essentially dynamical and relational, even for the part requiring > consciousness, despite this one is related to both the dynamics (captured by > the provability predicate) and truth (which is admittedly statical). > > There are interesting argument that bacteria and plant are already thinking > and perhaps conscious. Like there are interesting argument that machines can > think. Once we accept Panpsychism, those arguments do no more make sense, as > everything is thinking. That gives a situation where we can believe that > machine are thinking, and still say no to the doctor, because the machine > might be able to think just because it is made of matter, which is completely > changed with an artificial digital brain. > > If I change the blade of my knife, and then the handle, did my knife survived? > > If everything is thinking/conscious, what is the difference between someone > alive and a corpse? > > Bruno > > > > > The claim of panprotopsychism* is not that simple material (or in this case, > arithmetical) entities think, but they manifest the (proto-thinking) > ingredients that when combined into more complex entities think.
That looks like Mechanism to me. Then you can say that numbers are protopsychic, but is that vocabulary necessary. As I told you already, it is the “pan” of panpsychism, or panprotopsychism which is the non-sensical thing when we postulate Mechanism. There is no “simple” material. Matter is an excessively complex reality, with infinities appearing all the times, with with mechanism and with the inference from the observation. In a sense, QM has made obvious that whatever we think of matter, it is not an obvious notion. Bruno > > * Basically all the current proponents of panpsychism are of the "proto" > variety, and all reject the accusation that they are saying everything > thinks. (And I guess some on the anti-panpsychism side would say that dogs or > cats, which could be true, don't think, or that human thinking is an > illusion.) But no matter how many (Goff, Strawson, Morch, ...) say this, no > critic listens. > > @philipthrift > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0e8d07f0-58a7-462d-8d12-055db9951ccf%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0e8d07f0-58a7-462d-8d12-055db9951ccf%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9C34A6B7-F7CF-46EA-9493-18948D486EF3%40ulb.ac.be.
