> On 8 Sep 2019, at 12:51, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 8, 2019 at 5:40:55 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > On 7 Sep 2019, at 07:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> > <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 9/6/2019 9:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> >> 
> >> I would put "Horganism" another way. 
> >> 
> >> Science tells stories/theories, and some are successful in their 
> >> application. But we don't know if any of the stories are the final ones to 
> >> be told, or even close to being final. (They probably are not.) There is 
> >> no settled story of gravity yet, much less consciousness. One reads about 
> >> a new story of gravity in science news every week, it seems. 
> >> 
> >> David Chalmers' conclusion is ... 
> >> 
> >> "I think that the Hegelian [dialectical] argument gives good reason to 
> >> take both panpsychism and panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can find 
> >> a reasonable solution to the combination problem for either, this view 
> >> would immediately become the most promising solution to the mind–body 
> >> problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and sustained 
> >> attention." 
> >> - http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf 
> >> <http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf> 
> > 
> > Zero predictive power and it's not clear that it's consistent with the rest 
> > of neurophysics. 
> 
> + zero explanation power at all, also. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But panpsychism more explanatory than consciousness from numbers. 


“Pan” is not well defined. The proposition  "my cup of tea is conscious” is not 
well defined for me.

What is the panpsychist theory of consciousness? If everything is conscious, 
“consciousness seems trivialised”.

With the number, and their + and * laws, we can define the universal digital 
machine, and study what they can prove about themselves, including what they 
cannot prove, but still guess, and incompleteness makes the standard definition 
of the greeks making sense. The universal machine has already an interesting 
discourse about, not just his body, but its souls, its physics, etc.  

It is coherent with both AI, and the theory of evolution (which is already used 
on mechanism).

Consciousness also get a role, as it provides semantic which accelerate the 
computation relatively to the universal machine which run the subject, allowing 
a greater number of degree of freedom.

A very interesting video on the Limbic system, and its relation with emotion is 
here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAOnSbDSaOw

Panpsychism assumes matter, making it inconsistent with digital mechanism (that 
is not obvious, ask for explanation if interested). 
But even without that still a bit ignored fact, panpsychism makes the 
functioning of the brain quite mysterious. With mechanism, consciousness is a 
mathematical semantic fixed point, related to the neural loops, whose 
importance is well illustrated in that video.

Panpsychism has not yet a testable theory, which might change tomorrow, but 
again, it speculates on very strong axioms, which cannot be used to invalidate 
a much simpler theory, not yet contradicted by any facts.

Bruno




> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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