On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:02:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 10 Sep 2019, at 21:28, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
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>
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> On Tuesday, September 10, 2019 at 12:09:19 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
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>> On 8 Sep 2019, at 12:51, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
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>>
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>> On Sunday, September 8, 2019 at 5:40:55 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 7 Sep 2019, at 07:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> [email protected]> wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On 9/6/2019 9:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >> I would put "Horganism" another way. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Science tells stories/theories, and some are successful in their 
>>> application. But we don't know if any of the stories are the final ones to 
>>> be told, or even close to being final. (They probably are not.) There is no 
>>> settled story of gravity yet, much less consciousness. One reads about a 
>>> new story of gravity in science news every week, it seems. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> David Chalmers' conclusion is ... 
>>> >> 
>>> >> "I think that the Hegelian [dialectical] argument gives good reason 
>>> to take both panpsychism and panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can 
>>> find a reasonable solution to the combination problem for either, this view 
>>> would immediately become the most promising solution to the mind–body 
>>> problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and sustained 
>>> attention." 
>>> >> - http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf 
>>> > 
>>> > Zero predictive power and it's not clear that it's consistent with the 
>>> rest of neurophysics. 
>>>
>>> + zero explanation power at all, also. 
>>>
>>> Bruno 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> But panpsychism more explanatory than consciousness from numbers. 
>>
>>
>>
>> “Pan” is not well defined. The proposition  "my cup of tea is conscious” 
>> is not well defined for me.
>>
>> What is the panpsychist theory of consciousness? If everything is 
>> conscious, “consciousness seems trivialised”.
>>
>> With the number, and their + and * laws, we can define the universal 
>> digital machine, and study what they can prove about themselves, including 
>> what they cannot prove, but still guess, and incompleteness makes the 
>> standard definition of the greeks making sense. The universal machine has 
>> already an interesting discourse about, not just his body, but its souls, 
>> its physics, etc.  
>>
>> It is coherent with both AI, and the theory of evolution (which is 
>> already used on mechanism).
>>
>> Consciousness also get a role, as it provides semantic which accelerate 
>> the computation relatively to the universal machine which run the subject, 
>> allowing a greater number of degree of freedom.
>>
>> A very interesting video on the Limbic system, and its relation with 
>> emotion is here:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAOnSbDSaOw
>>
>> Panpsychism assumes matter, making it inconsistent with digital mechanism 
>> (that is not obvious, ask for explanation if interested). 
>> But even without that still a bit ignored fact, panpsychism makes the 
>> functioning of the brain quite mysterious. With mechanism, consciousness is 
>> a mathematical semantic fixed point, related to the neural loops, whose 
>> importance is well illustrated in that video.
>>
>> Panpsychism has not yet a testable theory, which might change tomorrow, 
>> but again, it speculates on very strong axioms, which cannot be used to 
>> invalidate a much simpler theory, not yet contradicted by any facts.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>   consciousness is a mathematical semantic fixed point, related to the 
> neural loops
>
> It depends on what the meaning of "is" is.
>
> "is" could be a descriptive relationship, like a program of a tornado is 
> not a tornado.
>
>
> No problem with this.
>
>
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> But if tornados are just mental creations, 
>
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> Mechanism does not implies this. Tornados are not ontologically real, but 
> they are phenomenologically real, and their existence depends in fine on 
> natural number relations, which are not mental creation, at least not human 
> mental creations.
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>
>
>
> where everything mental is a numerical fixed point, then all reality *is* 
> numerical simulation.
>
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> Consciousness and other semantical notion are fixed point of partially 
> computable functional. But most of arithmetic are not, unless you intent 
> them, but them it relies on fixed point of transformation in your brain, 
> which, as a phenomenological object, will be a fixed point at a different 
> level. It is hard to describe this without getting a bit more technical. I 
> might have some opportunity to explain more on this later.
>
> Bruno
>
>


It seems though that while I was referencing a material pan[propto]psychism 
- where elementary constituents of matter that ends up in an integrated 
brain have proto-experientiality - what you have is a *numerical 
pan[proto[psychism*, where there are elementary numeral constituents in 
things that are not brains that possess a proto-consciousness. (Even rocks 
of certain types have been shown to be a kind of signal processors.) If 
fact, a numerical reality reveals a panpsychism of a numerical nature even 
more explicitly than a material one.

@philipthrift



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