On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 8:40:57 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: > > On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 4:22 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > *This Halloween will mark 6 years since you agreed with Step 3,* > > > *BULLSHIT! * > > This is the entire post and even though 6 years has passed I stand by > every word and wouldn't change anything: > > On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > *> A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and >> 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball >> changing color* > > > Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until > there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a > red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they > fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the > simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls > that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision > made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, > that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure > out what that decision would be. > > *> B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number >> generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether >> the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI >> (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred >> first.* > > > Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it > is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are > not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that > in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but > as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of > itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original > or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. > > So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A > was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no > difference. > > *> I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, >> and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from >> all the views, the conclusion is the same.* > > > Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound > conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's > grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as > dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big > buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. > > John K Clark > > >> >> important it's crystal clear exactly what the correct prediction would >>> have turned out to be. >>> >> >> > I did a few days ago, but you didn't respond. I'll post it again: >> > >> >> >> >> >> *First, consider this experiment:Imagine there is a conscious AI (or >> uploaded mind) inside a virtual environment (an open field)Inside that >> virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the >> ball is a note which reads:"At noon (when the virtual sun is directly >> overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing >> this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the >> ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue >> in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical >> copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after >> the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 >> times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end."Now, >> with the understanding of that experiment, consider the following:If the AI >> (or all of them) went through two tests, test A, and test B* > > *A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and >> 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball >> changing color* > > *B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number >> generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether >> the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times* > > *Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test >> B occurred first.* > > *Do you agree that it is impossible for any entity within the simulation >> to determine whether test A was executed first, or whether test B was >> executed first, with higher than a 50% probability?* > > > Yes of course I agree with that, but that doesn't mean Bruno's "question > isn't gibberish as is his "proof"! Unlike Bruno's thought experiment you > did not use any personal pronouns and I congratulate you for that, although > why you made it so convoluted is a mystery to me. And unlike Bruno you > didn't demand predictions of events where the veracity of the predictions > could never be judged, not even long after the events in question were > over. Because of Quantum Indeterminacy you can't say for certain if a atom > of Uranium will decay tomorrow but at least the day after tomorrow you'll > know, but with Bruno's "first person indeterminacy" no one and no thing > will ever have any way of knowing or even know what he was suposed to know, > and yet he still talks about probability as if it has meaning in that > context. > > You could have used personal pronouns in case B but not for case A because > in that case there is no such thing as *THE *first person, there are lots > of them, and as a result although your thought experiment didn't teach us > anything we didn't already know at least it didn't produce gibberish. > > There is one other point, for case A, the one that has relevance for Many > Worlds, you say "*after the fork, the color of the ball will change*" > however, and Carroll specifically mentions this in his book, a mind (not to > be confused with a brain) does not fork until AFTER a change is detected by > it. So in Bruno's thought experiment a mind is not duplicated and then > there is some sort of halfass metaphysical mystery as to how one of them is > chosen to see Washington and the other is chosen to see Moscow, instead the > very act of seeing Washington is what has turned the Helsinki Man into the > Washington Man. So there is no "first person indeterminacy" and the answer > to the grand question "Why am I the Washington Man?" has a mundane answer > that is nevertheless 100% correct, because you saw Washington. > > *> All I ask is whether or not any entity at any time has access to >> information that can distinguish between iterated forking or randomized >> switching. * > > > No, and that is why it's so hard to get experimental proof that Many > Worlds is correct or proof it is incorrect, and the same is true for every > other quantum interpretation. > > >> >>The difference is in the Many Worlds case, after the universe splits, >>> if I asked *you* today what the correct answer *you* should have given >>> yesterday was: >>> >>> 1) It would be obvious who the question was directed to. >>> 2) It would obvious what would have been the correct answer. >>> >>> Neither of these things is true for Bruno's "question". >>> >> >> > What's so special about duplicating universes? >> > > Well, for one thing in your thought exparament there is someone outside of > the simulation observing it, but by the definition of the multiverse there > is nobody and nothing outside of it to observe a universe splitting. And > that's pretty special. > > And for another thing in the Many Worlds case, after the universe splits, > if I asked *you* today what the correct answer *you* should have given > yesterday was: > > 1) It would be obvious who the question was directed to. > 2) It would be obvious what would have been the correct answer. > > Neither of these things is true for Bruno's "question". > > >> * > Perhaps you can explain why one leads to apparent randomness but the >> other does not lead to randomness * > > > One leads to apparent randomness, but Bruno's "question" does not lead to > randomness > or non-randomness, it leads to gibberish. > > >> > *Is anything I said about Carroll wrong? * >> > > Yes obviously, you said he would agree with Bruno. > > >> > *What do you hope I will learn from reading Caroll's book?* >> > > You might learn what Many Worlds is saying, and just as important what it > is not saying. > > John K Clark >
It's a bit like a Twilight Zone: A Many Worlds defender is against Arithmetic Reality. @hilipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/dcb27fe0-2c4d-4e49-add0-bd80d14123b0%40googlegroups.com.
