On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 10:21 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sun, 9 Feb 2020 at 09:13, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 6:38 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 2/7/2020 11:00 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>> >>> It is an indexical theory. The problem is that in MWI there will always >>> be observers who see the sequences that are improbable according to the >>> Born rule. This is not the case in the single-world theory. There is no >>> random sampling from all possibilities in the single-world theory. >>> >>> >>> ?? There's something deterministic in single-world QM? You seem to have >>> taken the position that MWI is not just an interpretation, but a different >>> theory. >>> >> >> That is a possibility. I do think that MWI has difficulty with >> probability, and with accounting for the results of normal observation. >> >> That some very improbable results cannot occur in SW QM. I think you are >>> mistaken. >>> >> >> I don't know where you got the idea that I might think this. >> >> >> No matter how low a probability the Born rule assigns to a result, that >>> result could occur on the first trial. >>> >> >> >> Yes, but in SW the probability of that is very low: in MWI the >> probability for that is unity. >> >> >> However, we seem to be in danger of going round in circles on this, so it >> might be time to try a new tack. >> >> As I said, I have difficulty understanding how the concept of probability >> can make sense when all results occur in every trial. If you have N >> independent repetitions of an interaction or experiment that has n possible >> outcomes, the result, if every outcome occurs every time, is a set of n^N >> sequences of results. The question is "How does probability fit into such a >> picture?" >> > > Do you have a fundamental problem with probabilities where every outcome > occurs? > I thought I had made it clear that I do not think that any meaningful notion of probability can be defined in that case: such as in Everett's model where there is just one branch for each term in the original superposition -- i.e., all outcomes occur just once on each trial. For example, if you are told you have been copied 999 times at location A > and once at location B, would you not guess that you are most likely one of > the copies at location A? > No. For to make such a guess would be to assume a dualist model of personal identity: viz., that I have an immortal soul that is not duplicated with my body, but assigned at random to one of the duplicates. I do not believe this, nor do I believe that any concept of probability is relevant to your presumed scenario. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSbGpb92orcZ90Tr%2BG-7AeZGrH6uqbR8ORiZJxBpWxy7w%40mail.gmail.com.
