> On 8 Feb 2020, at 07:39, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 2/7/2020 9:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> On Sat, Feb 8, 2020 at 4:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> On 2/7/2020 8:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> On Sat, Feb 8, 2020 at 1:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> On 2/7/2020 5:57 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>>> There is nothing that picks out one particular set of paths as preferred >>>> in the many-worlds situation. >>> >>> Sure you can. For example you can pick out the set of paths whose >>> statistics are within some bounds of the mean. >>> >>> Assuming you know what the 'mean' is absent any experiment. >> >> The mean is estimated by the average of the experimental values. >> >> >> In other words, you use the data to infer probabilities. But the same data >> occur whatever the probabilities, so your backward inference to the >> probabilities is meaningless. >>> Otherwise you are just cherry picking data to support your arbitrary theory. >>>> One can only get that in a stochastic one-world model. >>> >>> All paths occur in a stochastic one-world model too. >>> >>> No they don't. They are possible, perhaps, but they do not necessarily >>> occur. >> >> They don't necessarily occur. But they probabilistic occur. > > It means they occur with high probability given enough instances of the > experiment. So I don't see why you attach great significance to all > possibilities occurring in MWI. > >> >> What on earth does that mean? >> >> If the probability is very low, then the improbable sequences of results >> need not occur even if you repeat the experiment 'till the heat death of the >> universe. In MWI the low weight sequences necessarily occur in every run of >> the experiments. Do you not see the difference? > > But the improbable sequences will occur in the same proportion in both > scenarios.
Exactly. > >> >> Otherwise it wouldn't be a stochastic model. So it seems that all you >> objections to MWI apply equally. >> >> >> Get a grip, Brent. >> >>> The only difference is that some probability measure is assumed as part >>> of the model. >>> >>> And this gives one a principled reason for ignoring the paths that are not >>> observed. >> >> Why not ignore them because they are not observed? That's a principled >> reason. >> >> That is a one-world theory. And I agree that that is the way to go. >> >>> Low probability has an independent meaning in the one-world case, so one is >>> unlikely to observe a low probability set of results. >> >> One is unlikely to observe a result that is realized in only a small >> fraction of the MW branches. >> >> Why? One does not choose one's results at random from the set of all >> possible results. > > The theory is that which experience "you" have is determined by making a copy > of you for each result and one of them, at random, is the "you" who has the > experience. So it is effectively a random sample from the possible results. That’s the point. > >> In MWI there is always an observer who gets every possible set of results. >> Why ignore those unfortunates who get rest inconsistent with your pet theory? > > Because they are relatively few in number and hence unlikely to be the "you" > who gets the result. > >> >> I agree that MWI fails to derive the Born rule. But I don't agree that it >> is inconsistent with it, given the version of MWI that postulates many >> branches...not just one per possible outcome. >> >> The point is that MWI is inconsistent with experience. There will always be >> observers who get results inconsistent with the Born rule. > > Why do you think you can't get a result inconsistent with the Born rule in > one world. What do you mean by "inconsistent". The results are > probabilistic so they will have degrees of consistency and inconsistency with > the Born rule...just as there is a spread of results in MWI. > >> And we cannot ensure that we are not such observers. So how can we claim >> that our theory is confirmed by the data? The data are consistent with all >> possible theories -- or none at all. > > But it's not all or nothing. It's statistics. OK. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Bruce >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRhE9H0N4fvJybhSg5%3Du3A2K-XSztzRerkU09ceSLYP_w%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRhE9H0N4fvJybhSg5%3Du3A2K-XSztzRerkU09ceSLYP_w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6efd8147-7262-17cd-2115-3037546e2f1a%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6efd8147-7262-17cd-2115-3037546e2f1a%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B06CAF86-C44D-468E-ABA7-FB9E0BF5C4B8%40ulb.ac.be.
