> On 9 Feb 2020, at 08:11, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 5:48 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, 9 Feb 2020 at 15:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 3:26 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 9 Feb 2020, at 13:42, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> No. For to make such a guess would be to assume a dualist model of personal >> identity: viz., that I have an immortal soul that is not duplicated with my >> body, but assigned at random to one of the duplicates. I do not believe >> this, nor do I believe that any concept of probability is relevant to your >> presumed scenario. > > Strange that you should say that, since in the philosophical literature (eg. > Derek Parfit) the position you describe as dualist is called “reductionist”, > assuming there is no soul and the mind is duplicated along with the body. > Anyway, you would not do well if you assumed this in a world where > duplication occurred commonly. If you were rewarded if you bet correctly and > punished if you bet incorrectly, the world would come to be dominated by > people who assume in the above scenario they have a 99.9% chance of finding > themselves at A. > > > They may end up dominating -- but possibly that is only because, by > construction, there are more going to A. As with Bruno's W/M duplication, > there is an unresolved question of personal identity at stake here, and your > solution is not necessarily correct. > > Basically there are two theories if personal identity: the magical soul > theory, which holds that your soul only goes into one body, and the > reductionist theory, which holds that your mind is copied along with your > body and each copy has equal claim to being a continuation of the original. > > There is also Nozick's closest continuer theory, in which new persons are > created in such duplication scenarios. The issue is unlikely to be resolved > until we have actual experience of body-mind duplication. And that is a long > way off……
Which makes no sense when you assume mechanism, and without mechanism it requires some non computable magic to get a notion of closer coherent with the known physics, but with mechanism, we get directly the many-histoires, and its mathematics is quantum as needed. So why add a metaphysical assumption like the SWI (one world) when the 0-world explains the appearance and role of the many histories already in arithmetic, and solidly determined thanks to the Church-Turing thesis? Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQmUaU%2BOGrj382GhD9_F9CzrgyUaUbwvD3nFS6mdyrSfg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQmUaU%2BOGrj382GhD9_F9CzrgyUaUbwvD3nFS6mdyrSfg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06268FB0-46E3-481B-AF02-CD058E4A94E4%40ulb.ac.be.
