> On 9 Feb 2020, at 08:11, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 5:48 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Sun, 9 Feb 2020 at 15:43, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 3:26 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On 9 Feb 2020, at 13:42, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> No. For to make such a guess would be to assume a dualist model of personal >> identity: viz., that I have an immortal soul that is not duplicated with my >> body, but assigned at random to one of the duplicates. I do not believe >> this, nor do I believe that any concept of probability is relevant to your >> presumed scenario. > > Strange that you should say that, since in the philosophical literature (eg. > Derek Parfit) the position you describe as dualist is called “reductionist”, > assuming there is no soul and the mind is duplicated along with the body. > Anyway, you would not do well if you assumed this in a world where > duplication occurred commonly. If you were rewarded if you bet correctly and > punished if you bet incorrectly, the world would come to be dominated by > people who assume in the above scenario they have a 99.9% chance of finding > themselves at A. > > > They may end up dominating -- but possibly that is only because, by > construction, there are more going to A. As with Bruno's W/M duplication, > there is an unresolved question of personal identity at stake here, and your > solution is not necessarily correct. > > Basically there are two theories if personal identity: the magical soul > theory, which holds that your soul only goes into one body, and the > reductionist theory, which holds that your mind is copied along with your > body and each copy has equal claim to being a continuation of the original. > > There is also Nozick's closest continuer theory, in which new persons are > created in such duplication scenarios. The issue is unlikely to be resolved > until we have actual experience of body-mind duplication. And that is a long > way off……
Which makes no sense when you assume mechanism, and without mechanism it requires some non computable magic to get a notion of closer coherent with the known physics, but with mechanism, we get directly the many-histoires, and its mathematics is quantum as needed. So why add a metaphysical assumption like the SWI (one world) when the 0-world explains the appearance and role of the many histories already in arithmetic, and solidly determined thanks to the Church-Turing thesis? Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQmUaU%2BOGrj382GhD9_F9CzrgyUaUbwvD3nFS6mdyrSfg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQmUaU%2BOGrj382GhD9_F9CzrgyUaUbwvD3nFS6mdyrSfg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06268FB0-46E3-481B-AF02-CD058E4A94E4%40ulb.ac.be.
