> On 9 Feb 2020, at 05:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 3:26 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 9 Feb 2020, at 13:42, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> No. For to make such a guess would be to assume a dualist model of personal >> identity: viz., that I have an immortal soul that is not duplicated with my >> body, but assigned at random to one of the duplicates. I do not believe >> this, nor do I believe that any concept of probability is relevant to your >> presumed scenario. > > Strange that you should say that, since in the philosophical literature (eg. > Derek Parfit) the position you describe as dualist is called “reductionist”, > assuming there is no soul and the mind is duplicated along with the body. > Anyway, you would not do well if you assumed this in a world where > duplication occurred commonly. If you were rewarded if you bet correctly and > punished if you bet incorrectly, the world would come to be dominated by > people who assume in the above scenario they have a 99.9% chance of finding > themselves at A. > > > They may end up dominating -- but possibly that is only because, by > construction, there are more going to A. As with Bruno's W/M duplication, > there is an unresolved question of personal identity at stake here,
Which one. In those finite self-duplication experience, we can use very simple identity criteria, like being the guy we remember the personal memories. I am not sure to which problem you are alluding too. > and your solution is not necessarily correct. Stathis could have made clear that the 999 guy have different experience, and are no more “fusable” without introducing amnesia (which personal identity more counter-intuitive as this leads to Open Individualism: we are already all the same person, but in different context. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQ%2B68FeagEQJQduieCYjH3azFMyzKO68Oupxorh7e%3DhWQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQ%2B68FeagEQJQduieCYjH3azFMyzKO68Oupxorh7e%3DhWQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7799162F-2396-4982-9337-8BB387B702AC%40ulb.ac.be.
