> On 9 Feb 2020, at 03:42, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 10:21 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, 9 Feb 2020 at 09:13, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 6:38 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: > On 2/7/2020 11:00 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> It is an indexical theory. The problem is that in MWI there will always be >> observers who see the sequences that are improbable according to the Born >> rule. This is not the case in the single-world theory. There is no random >> sampling from all possibilities in the single-world theory. > > ?? There's something deterministic in single-world QM? You seem to have > taken the position that MWI is not just an interpretation, but a different > theory. > > That is a possibility. I do think that MWI has difficulty with probability, > and with accounting for the results of normal observation. > > That some very improbable results cannot occur in SW QM. I think you are > mistaken. > > I don't know where you got the idea that I might think this. > > > No matter how low a probability the Born rule assigns to a result, that > result could occur on the first trial. > > > Yes, but in SW the probability of that is very low: in MWI the probability > for that is unity. > > > However, we seem to be in danger of going round in circles on this, so it > might be time to try a new tack. > > As I said, I have difficulty understanding how the concept of probability can > make sense when all results occur in every trial. If you have N independent > repetitions of an interaction or experiment that has n possible outcomes, the > result, if every outcome occurs every time, is a set of n^N sequences of > results. The question is "How does probability fit into such a picture?" > > Do you have a fundamental problem with probabilities where every outcome > occurs? > > I thought I had made it clear that I do not think that any meaningful notion > of probability can be defined in that case: such as in Everett's model where > there is just one branch for each term in the original superposition -- i.e., > all outcomes occur just once on each trial. > > For example, if you are told you have been copied 999 times at location A and > once at location B, would you not guess that you are most likely one of the > copies at location A? > > No. For to make such a guess would be to assume a dualist model of personal > identity: viz., that I have an immortal soul that is not duplicated with my > body, but assigned at random to one of the duplicates. I do not believe this, > nor do I believe that any concept of probability is relevant to your presumed > scenario.
You need only to put your shoes in an arbitrary copies. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSbGpb92orcZ90Tr%2BG-7AeZGrH6uqbR8ORiZJxBpWxy7w%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSbGpb92orcZ90Tr%2BG-7AeZGrH6uqbR8ORiZJxBpWxy7w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B810156D-B2A6-4145-9690-4ED49ADD1AC7%40ulb.ac.be.
