Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

```> On 9 Feb 2020, at 03:42, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 10:21 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com
> <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Sun, 9 Feb 2020 at 09:13, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com
> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 9, 2020 at 6:38 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:
> On 2/7/2020 11:00 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> It is an indexical theory. The problem is that in MWI there will always be
>> observers who see the sequences that are improbable according to the Born
>> rule. This is not the case in the single-world theory. There is no random
>> sampling from all possibilities in the single-world theory.
>
> ?? There's something deterministic in single-world QM?  You seem to have
> taken the position that MWI is not just an interpretation, but a different
> theory.
>
> That is a possibility. I do think that MWI has difficulty with probability,
> and with accounting for the results of normal observation.
>
> That some very improbable results cannot occur in SW QM.  I think you are
> mistaken.
>
> I don't know where you got the idea that I might think this.
>
>
>   No matter how low a probability the Born rule assigns to a result, that
> result could occur on the first trial.
>
>
> Yes, but in SW the probability of that is very low: in MWI the probability
> for that is unity.
>
>
> However, we seem to be in danger of going round in circles on this, so it
> might be time to try a new tack.
>
> As I said, I have difficulty understanding how the concept of probability can
> make sense when all results occur in every trial. If you have N independent
> repetitions of an interaction or experiment that has n possible outcomes, the
> result, if every outcome occurs every time, is a set of n^N sequences of
> results. The question is "How does probability fit into such a picture?"
>
> Do you have a fundamental problem with probabilities where every outcome
> occurs?
>
> I thought I had made it clear that I do not think that any meaningful notion
> of probability can be defined in that case: such as in Everett's model where
> there is just one branch for each term in the original superposition -- i.e.,
> all outcomes occur just once on each trial.
>
> For example, if you are told you have been copied 999 times at location A and
> once at location B, would you not guess that you are most likely one of the
> copies at location A?
>
> No. For to make such a guess would be to assume a dualist model of personal
> identity: viz., that I have an immortal soul that is not duplicated with my
> body, but assigned at random to one of the duplicates. I do not believe this,
> nor do I believe that any concept of probability is relevant to your presumed
> scenario.```
```

You need only to put your shoes in an arbitrary copies.

Bruno

>
> Bruce
>
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