> On 5 Mar 2020, at 01:40, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 10:39 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Thu, 5 Mar 2020 at 09:46, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > The greater problem is that any idea of probability founders when all > outcomes occur for any measurement. Or have you not followed the arguments I > have been making that shows this to be the case? > > I think it worth noting that to some people it is obvious that if an entity > is to be duplicated in two places it should have a 1/2 expectation of finding > itself in one or other place while to other people it is obvious that there > should be no such expectation. > > > Hence my point that intuition is usually faulty in such cases -- the > straightforward testing of any intuition with repeated trials shows the > unreliability of such intuitions.
It did not. You were confusing the first person account with the third person account. QM predicts that all measurement outcome are obtained, and by linearity, that all observers obtained could not have predicted it, for the same reason nobody can predict the outcome in the WM self)duplication experience. Those who claim the contrary have to say at some point that the Helsinki guy has died, but then Mechanism is refuted. Bruno > > This seems to be an immediate judgement on considering the question, with > attempts at rational justification perhaps following but not being the > primary determinant of belief. A parallel is Newcomb’s paradox: on learning > of it some people immediately feel it is obvious you should choose one box > and others immediately feel you should choose both boxes. > > > Newcomb's 'paradox' seems to be just another illustration of the > unreliability of intuition in these situations. Except that Newcomb's paradox > relies on the unrealistic assumption of a perfect predictor. No such problems > beset the argument against intuition in the case of classical duplication, or > the case of binary quantum measurements. (See my simple outline of the > arguments in my reply to Russell.) > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTtH%2B96zApvgW3qtE-%3DNTPDrrztH81e61uQ96ay95R4vw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTtH%2B96zApvgW3qtE-%3DNTPDrrztH81e61uQ96ay95R4vw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/14166D34-3B73-4A29-822D-39AF164DBDF4%40ulb.ac.be.
