> On 5 Mar 2020, at 11:59, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 9:46 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 5 Mar 2020, at 01:40, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 10:39 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Thu, 5 Mar 2020 at 09:46, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> The greater problem is that any idea of probability founders when all >> outcomes occur for any measurement. Or have you not followed the arguments I >> have been making that shows this to be the case? >> >> I think it worth noting that to some people it is obvious that if an entity >> is to be duplicated in two places it should have a 1/2 expectation of >> finding itself in one or other place while to other people it is obvious >> that there should be no such expectation. >> >> >> Hence my point that intuition is usually faulty in such cases -- the >> straightforward testing of any intuition with repeated trials shows the >> unreliability of such intuitions. > > It did not. You were confusing the first person account with the third person > account. > > Bullshit. There is no such confusion. You are just using a rhetorical > flourish to avoid facing the real issues. > > > QM predicts that all measurement outcome are obtained, and by linearity, that > all observers obtained could not have predicted it, for the same reason > nobody can predict the outcome in the WM self)duplication experience. Those > who claim the contrary have to say at some point that the Helsinki guy has > died, but then Mechanism is refuted. > > > Of course no one can predict the outcome of a quantum spin measurement on a > random spin-half particle. Just as no one can predict the his 1p outcome in > WM-duplication.
OK. That was my point. That’s the very point John Clark disagree with. If you agree that we cannot predict that 1p outcome, you agree with what I call the 1p-indeterminacy. > That is the point I have been making -- there is no useful notion of > probability available in either case. Once you agree that there is an 1p indeterminacy, it is reasonable to ask oneself if there I no probability or uncertainty calculus, and in the ideal cases of the though experiment, the binomial distribution makes sense. But this is used only to illustrate the 1p indeterminacy. The mathematics here suggest a quantum credibility, who “certainly” case, or “yes-no experience” is described by the modal logic of self-reference. That is for later. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLT1V8Pbe%2BCkHQbNKdDy005rk0B%2BxeoC_Tizd%3Dsw7YchFQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLT1V8Pbe%2BCkHQbNKdDy005rk0B%2BxeoC_Tizd%3Dsw7YchFQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4CCED817-90F2-43B6-BC7A-7067268CE212%40ulb.ac.be.
