> On 5 Mar 2020, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thu, 5 Mar 2020 at 09:46, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 9:31 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Thu, 5 Mar 2020 at 08:54, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Wed, Mar 4, 2020 at 11:01 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Fri, 28 Feb 2020 at 08:40, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Fri, Feb 28, 2020 at 4:21 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: > On 2/27/2020 3:45 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> That is probably what all this argument is actually about -- the maths show >> that there are no probabilities. Because there are no unique probabilities >> in the classical duplication case, the concept of probability has been shown >> to be inadmissible in the deterministic (Everettian) quantum case. The >> appeal by people like Deutsch and Wallace to betting quotients, or quantum >> credibility measures, are just ways of forcing a probabilistic >> interpretation on to quantum mechanics by hand -- they are not derivations >> of probability from within the deterministic theory. There are no >> probabilities in the deterministic theory, even from the 1p perspective, >> because the data are consistent with any prior assignment of a probability >> measure. > > The probability enters from the self-location uncertainty; which is other > terms is saying: Assume each branch has the same probability (or some > weighting) for you being in that branch. Then that is the probability that > you have observed the sequence of events that define that branch. > > I think that is Sean Carroll's approach. I am uncertain as to whether this > really works or not. The concept of a 'weight' or 'thickness' for each branch > is difficult to reconcile with the first-person experience of probability: > which is obtained within the branch, so is independent of any overall > 'weight'. But that aside, self-locating uncertainty is just another idea > imposed on quantum mechanics and, like decision-theoretic ideas, it is > without theoretical foundation -- it is just imposed by fiat on a > deterministic theory. It makes probability a subjective notion imposed on a > theory that is supposedly objective: there is an objective probability that a > radioactive nucleus will decay in a certain time period -- independent of our > subjective impressions, or self-location. (I can develop this thought > further, if required, but I think it shows Sean's approach to fail.) > > Probability derived from self-locating uncertainty is an idea independent of > any particular physics. It is also independent of any theory of > consciousness, since we can imagine a non-conscious observer reasoning in the > same way. To some people it seems trivially obvious, to others it seems very > strange. I don’t know if which group one falls into correlates with any other > beliefs or attitudes. > > As I said, self-locating uncertainty is just another idea imposed on the > quantum formalism without any real theoretical foundation -- "it is just > imposed by fiat on a deterministic theory." If nothing else, this shows that > Carroll's claim that Everett is just "plain-vanilla" quantum mechanics, > without any additional assumptions, is a load of self-deluded hogwash. > > And as I said, probabilities derived from self-locating uncertainty is, for > many people, trivially obvious, just a special case of frequentist inference. > > That is not a particularly solid basis on which to base a scientific theory. > The trivially obvious is seldom useful..... > > The greater problem is that any idea of probability founders when all > outcomes occur for any measurement. Or have you not followed the arguments I > have been making that shows this to be the case? > > I think it worth noting that to some people it is obvious that if an entity > is to be duplicated in two places it should have a 1/2 expectation of finding > itself in one or other place while to other people it is obvious that there > should be no such expectation.
It is not just obvious. It is derivable from the simplest definition of “first person” and “third person”. All arguments presented against the 1p-indeterminacy have always been refuted, and almost all time by pointing on a confusion between first person and third person. The first person id defined by the owner of the personal memory taken with them in the box, and the third person is described by the personal memory of those outside the box. > This seems to be an immediate judgement on considering the question, with > attempts at rational justification perhaps following but not being the > primary determinant of belief. A parallel is Newcomb’s paradox: on learning > of it some people immediately feel it is obvious you should choose one box > and others immediately feel you should choose both boxes. I think that the Newcomb situation is far more complex, or that the self-duplication is far more easy, at least for anyone who admits even weak form of Mechanism. To believe that there is no indeterminacy is like believing that all amoebas have telepathic power. The only reason I can see to refuse the first person indeterminacy is the comprehension that it leads to the end of physicalism, that is a long lasting comfortable habit of thought. People tend to hate change of paradigm. Bruno > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypVFwQfMzaf3kRo-RHpg%3D6YrteqLmpJFDAVtOARy4o2gOA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypVFwQfMzaf3kRo-RHpg%3D6YrteqLmpJFDAVtOARy4o2gOA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B5EA9BF3-D339-4C3C-A901-3E64B7C5A9CA%40ulb.ac.be.
