> On 5 Mar 2020, at 11:54, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 9:39 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 5 Mar 2020, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> I think it worth noting that to some people it is obvious that if an entity >> is to be duplicated in two places it should have a 1/2 expectation of >> finding itself in one or other place while to other people it is obvious >> that there should be no such expectation. > > It is not just obvious. It is derivable from the simplest definition of > “first person” and “third person”. > > This is simply false. It cannot be derived from anything. The truth is that > testing any such notion about the probability by repeating the trial shows > that no single value of the probability is appropriate. Alternatively, for > most 1p observers, any particular theory about the probability will be > disconfirmed.
The P(W or M) = 1 is confirmed by all copies. P(W and M) = 1 is refuted by all copies. > The first person data is the particular bit string recorded by an individual. Yes, but seen from that individual’s point of view. > From the 3p perspective, Note that the question is about the 1p perspective …. > there are 2^N different 1p bit strings after N trials. In Helsinki you know in advance that you will get only one of the result among the 2^N different bit strings. Bruno > > Bruce > > > All arguments presented against the 1p-indeterminacy have always been > refuted, and almost all time by pointing on a confusion between first person > and third person. The first person id defined by the owner of the personal > memory taken with them in the box, and the third person is described by the > personal memory of those outside the box. > > > > >> This seems to be an immediate judgement on considering the question, with >> attempts at rational justification perhaps following but not being the >> primary determinant of belief. A parallel is Newcomb’s paradox: on learning >> of it some people immediately feel it is obvious you should choose one box >> and others immediately feel you should choose both boxes. > > > I think that the Newcomb situation is far more complex, or that the > self-duplication is far more easy, at least for anyone who admits even weak > form of Mechanism. To believe that there is no indeterminacy is like > believing that all amoebas have telepathic power. > > The only reason I can see to refuse the first person indeterminacy is the > comprehension that it leads to the end of physicalism, that is a long lasting > comfortable habit of thought. People tend to hate change of paradigm. > > Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQ_9TuO2n8ggPP4UggctLLtQJKHpvJqkD7vUnPrg-%2B6hA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQ_9TuO2n8ggPP4UggctLLtQJKHpvJqkD7vUnPrg-%2B6hA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F2A36980-F0B6-44B3-867A-D607B6C84351%40ulb.ac.be.
