> On 15 Jun 2020, at 20:39, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/15/2020 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 21:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/14/2020 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 05:43, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/10/2020 9:00 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wednesday, June 10, 2020, smitra <[email protected] >>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>> On 09-06-2020 19:08, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable >>>>>> implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on >>>>>> the following idea: >>>>>> >>>>>> "How can we know if a robot is conscious?" >>>>>> >>>>>> Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact >>>>>> computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then >>>>>> let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor >>>>>> motor control outputs between the two brains. >>>>>> >>>>>> Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then >>>>>> identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, >>>>>> etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, >>>>>> and speech. >>>>>> >>>>>> If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask >>>>>> them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. >>>>>> Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph >>>>>> describing the pain, will provide identical accounts. >>>>>> >>>>>> Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific >>>>>> objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any >>>>>> distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to >>>>>> disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? >>>>>> >>>>>> Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind >>>>>> before it reaches this testing roadblock? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I think it can be tested indirectly, because generic computational >>>>>> theories of consciousness imply a multiverse. If my consciousness is the >>>>>> result if a computation then because on the one hand any such >>>>>> computation necessarily involves a vast number of elementary bits and on >>>>>> he other hand whatever I'm conscious of is describable using only a >>>>>> handful of bits, the mapping between computational states and states of >>>>>> consciousness is N to 1 where N is astronomically large. So, the laws of >>>>>> physics we already know about must be effective laws where the >>>>>> statistical effects due to a self-localization uncertainty is already >>>>>> build into it. >>>>> >>>>> That doesn't follow. You've implicitly assumed that all those excess >>>>> computational states exist… >>>> >>>> They exist in elementary arithmetic. If you believe in theorem like “there >>>> is no biggest prime”, then you have to believe in all computations, or you >>>> need to reject Church’s thesis, and to abandon the computationalist >>>> hypothesis. The notion of digital machine does not make sense if you >>>> believe that elementary arithmetic is wrong. >>> >>> As I've written many times. The arithmetic is true if it's axioms are. >> >> More precisely: a theorem is true if the axioms are true, and if the rules >> of inference preserve truth. OK. >> >> >> >>> But true=/=real. >> >> In logic, true always mean “true in a reality”. Truth is a notion relative >> to a reality (called “model” by logicians). > > So all those theorems about real analysis and Cantorian infinities are just > as real as arithmetic. If you don't practice free logic.
It is more … “If you don’t assume Mechanism”. Mechanism is a finitism. The axiom of infinity is not assumed at the ontological (3p) level, as this would generate an inflation of histories (and the “white rabbit would be back). > > Truth is a property of propositions relative to observations for a scientist. That is the definition of the physical reality, which is derived in the phenomenology of the (finite) universal numbers. The only notion of truth which is available for the computationalists is the arithmetical truth: the satisfaction by the (standard) model of arithmetic. In the non standard model, addition and multiplication is not computable. > >> >> But for arithmetic, we do have a pretty good idea of what is the “standard >> model of arithmetic” (the structure (N, 0, s, +, *)), and by true (without >> further precision) we always mean “true in the standard model of arithmetic”. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I hear you! You are saying that the existence of number is like the >>>> existence of Sherlock Holmes, but that leads to a gigantic multiverse, >>> >>> Only via your assumption that arithmetic constitutes universes. I take it >>> as a reductio. >> >> Not at all. I use only the provable and proved fact that the standard model >> of arithmetic implements and run all computations, with “implement” and >> “run” defined in computer science (by Turing, without any assumption in >> physics). >> >> If you believe in mechanism, and in Kxy = x + Sxyz = xz(yz), then I can >> prove that there is an infinity of Brent in arithmetic, having the very >> conversation that we have here and now. > > It needs the assumption that you can apply operators arbitrarily many times. That is at the meta-level. That would lead to an infinite regression > >> That does not need any other assumption than Digital Mechanism. Even without >> mechanism, the facts remains that all computations are run in arithmetic. >> That is why if mechanism is false, the arithmetical reality (the standard >> model of arithmetic) is full of zombies. >> >> >> >>> >>>> with infinitely many Brent having the same conversation with me, here and >>>> now, and they all become zombie, except one, > > If they are having the same conversation in the same way then they are the > same persons/events per Leibniz identity of indiscernibles. Absolutely so, but that is the reason why their expectations have to rely on their infinitely many occurence in the arithmetical reality. We cannot invoke some God or Matter ontological commitment to filtrate the computations, as this would add something non Turing emulable to get you mind-state. > >>>> because some Reality want it that way? >>>> >>>> >>>>> which is then begging the question of other worlds. >>>> >>>> You are the one adding a metaphysical assumption, to make some people >>>> whose existence in arithmetic follows from digital mechanism into zombie. >>> >>> You're the one asserting that people "exist in arithmetic" whatever that >>> may mean. >> >> It means that there exist a number k such that phi_k(x) = y iff Brent# gives >> y on x, where x describe some possible input (a giant number to take into >> account all your senses). >> As we change ourself all the times, I use “Brent#” to denote you at some >> precise time. The coding here are huge, but the arithmetical reality count >> without counting, if I may say. All the relative state of your brain, >> relative to, say, our cluster of galaxies, are run in arithmetic, in >> finitely many number relations, and unless you want them to be all zombie, >> they are all conscious, and belongs to your personal range of first person >> indeterminacy, although in this case, the measure is plausibly negligible, >> compared to all solution of DeWitt-Wheeler equation (whose negligibility or >> not is to be studied). >> >> If interested, I can explain once more why the arithmetical reality run all >> computations, with a highly structured redundancy, > > Yes, I understand the theory of infinite computations. The key point is in their execution made only in virtue of the (sigma_1) number relations. > >> which already suggest a non trivial measure on the computations (with and >> without oracle). > > So what is that measure, and how can it be compared to some observation? It is a sort of Lebesgue measure on the sigma_1(a) proposition, with a being a real number or an oracle. The logic of the maximal measure (one) is given by the S4Grz1, and Z1* and X1* logic, which gives each a quantum logic, and it is a matter of work to find if one of those verify some criterion (due to von Neumann) so that we can get a “Gleason theorem” and get from it the complete probability calculus. The Kripke counter-examples of those theories provide the configurations of the finite set of Stern-Gerlach devices (or polarisation filters) making it possible to test them. And indeed, the tractable part of those logics corresponds to what has been found in Nature, up to now. Unfortunately, the simplest version of Bell’s inequality is intractable, and we still don’t know for sure that the “arithmetical” physics violate or not the inequality, although, intuitively, it should be a miracle that they don’t. To verify this will take an infinite time, like all verification in physics. It is just a new field of investigation, and what I gave is a way of measuring our degree of Non-Mechanism. Up to now; that degree is 0, by default.Now, we get three different quantum logics, so it would be interesting to see which one does not match nature. That would provide a lot of information on the origin of the physical laws. Anyway, if we are interested in both consciousness and the physical laws and their relation, mechanism does not offer any options here. It provides a testable solution of the mind-body problem, so let us continue the testing. Bruno > > Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/17918197-A0A8-42A5-972B-2C049204B779%40ulb.ac.be.
