On 09-06-2020 19:08, Jason Resch wrote:
For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable
implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on
the following idea:
"How can we know if a robot is conscious?"
Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact
computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then
let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor
motor control outputs between the two brains.
Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then
identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations,
etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions,
and speech.
If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask
them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences.
Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph
describing the pain, will provide identical accounts.
Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific
objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any
distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to
disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind?
Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind
before it reaches this testing roadblock?
I think it can be tested indirectly, because generic computational
theories of consciousness imply a multiverse. If my consciousness is the
result if a computation then because on the one hand any such
computation necessarily involves a vast number of elementary bits and on
he other hand whatever I'm conscious of is describable using only a
handful of bits, the mapping between computational states and states of
consciousness is N to 1 where N is astronomically large. So, the laws of
physics we already know about must be effective laws where the
statistical effects due to a self-localization uncertainty is already
build into it.
Bruno has argued on the basis of this to motivate his theory, but this
is a generic feature of any theory that assumes computational theory of
consciousness. In particular, computational theory of consciousness is
incompatible with a single universe theory. So, if you prove that only a
single universe exists, then that disproves the computational theory of
consciousness. The details here then involve that computations are not
well defined if you refer to a single instant of time, you need to at
least appeal to a sequence of states the system over through.
Consciousness cannot then be located at a single instant, in violating
with our own experience. Therefore either single World theories are
false or computational theory of consciousness is false.
Saibal
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