On Wednesday, June 10, 2020, smitra <[email protected]> wrote: > On 09-06-2020 19:08, Jason Resch wrote: > >> For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable >> implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on >> the following idea: >> >> "How can we know if a robot is conscious?" >> >> Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact >> computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then >> let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor >> motor control outputs between the two brains. >> >> Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then >> identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, >> etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, >> and speech. >> >> If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask >> them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. >> Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph >> describing the pain, will provide identical accounts. >> >> Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific >> objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any >> distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to >> disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? >> >> Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind >> before it reaches this testing roadblock? >> >> > > I think it can be tested indirectly, because generic computational > theories of consciousness imply a multiverse. If my consciousness is the > result if a computation then because on the one hand any such computation > necessarily involves a vast number of elementary bits and on he other hand > whatever I'm conscious of is describable using only a handful of bits, the > mapping between computational states and states of consciousness is N to 1 > where N is astronomically large. So, the laws of physics we already know > about must be effective laws where the statistical effects due to a > self-localization uncertainty is already build into it. > > Bruno has argued on the basis of this to motivate his theory, but this is > a generic feature of any theory that assumes computational theory of > consciousness. In particular, computational theory of consciousness is > incompatible with a single universe theory. So, if you prove that only a > single universe exists, then that disproves the computational theory of > consciousness. The details here then involve that computations are not well > defined if you refer to a single instant of time, you need to at least > appeal to a sequence of states the system over through. Consciousness > cannot then be located at a single instant, in violating with our own > experience. Therefore either single World theories are false or > computational theory of consciousness is false. > > Saibal > > Hi Saibal,
I agree indirect mechanisms like looking at the resulting physics may be the best way to test it. I was curious if there any direct ways to test it. It seems not, given the lack of any direct tests of consciousness. Though most people admit other humans are conscious, many would reject the idea of a conscious computer. Computationalism seems right, but it also seems like something that by definition can't result in a failed test. So it has the appearance of not being falsifiable. A single universe, or digital physics would be evidence that either computationalism is false or the ontology is sufficiently small, but a finite/small ontology is doubtful for many reasons. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjhoAEFXtFkimkNqgvMWkHtASrdHByu5Ah4n%2BZwUGr1uA%40mail.gmail.com.
