> On 14 Jun 2020, at 21:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/14/2020 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 05:43, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/10/2020 9:00 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, June 10, 2020, smitra <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> On 09-06-2020 19:08, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable >>>> implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on >>>> the following idea: >>>> >>>> "How can we know if a robot is conscious?" >>>> >>>> Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact >>>> computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then >>>> let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor >>>> motor control outputs between the two brains. >>>> >>>> Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then >>>> identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, >>>> etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, >>>> and speech. >>>> >>>> If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask >>>> them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. >>>> Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph >>>> describing the pain, will provide identical accounts. >>>> >>>> Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific >>>> objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any >>>> distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to >>>> disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? >>>> >>>> Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind >>>> before it reaches this testing roadblock? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I think it can be tested indirectly, because generic computational >>>> theories of consciousness imply a multiverse. If my consciousness is the >>>> result if a computation then because on the one hand any such computation >>>> necessarily involves a vast number of elementary bits and on he other hand >>>> whatever I'm conscious of is describable using only a handful of bits, the >>>> mapping between computational states and states of consciousness is N to 1 >>>> where N is astronomically large. So, the laws of physics we already know >>>> about must be effective laws where the statistical effects due to a >>>> self-localization uncertainty is already build into it. >>> >>> That doesn't follow. You've implicitly assumed that all those excess >>> computational states exist… >> >> They exist in elementary arithmetic. If you believe in theorem like “there >> is no biggest prime”, then you have to believe in all computations, or you >> need to reject Church’s thesis, and to abandon the computationalist >> hypothesis. The notion of digital machine does not make sense if you believe >> that elementary arithmetic is wrong. > > As I've written many times. The arithmetic is true if it's axioms are.
More precisely: a theorem is true if the axioms are true, and if the rules of inference preserve truth. OK. > But true=/=real. In logic, true always mean “true in a reality”. Truth is a notion relative to a reality (called “model” by logicians). But for arithmetic, we do have a pretty good idea of what is the “standard model of arithmetic” (the structure (N, 0, s, +, *)), and by true (without further precision) we always mean “true in the standard model of arithmetic”. > >> >> >> I hear you! You are saying that the existence of number is like the >> existence of Sherlock Holmes, but that leads to a gigantic multiverse, > > Only via your assumption that arithmetic constitutes universes. I take it as > a reductio. Not at all. I use only the provable and proved fact that the standard model of arithmetic implements and run all computations, with “implement” and “run” defined in computer science (by Turing, without any assumption in physics). If you believe in mechanism, and in Kxy = x + Sxyz = xz(yz), then I can prove that there is an infinity of Brent in arithmetic, having the very conversation that we have here and now. That does not need any other assumption than Digital Mechanism. Even without mechanism, the facts remains that all computations are run in arithmetic. That is why if mechanism is false, the arithmetical reality (the standard model of arithmetic) is full of zombies. > >> with infinitely many Brent having the same conversation with me, here and >> now, and they all become zombie, except one, because some Reality want it >> that way? >> >> >>> which is then begging the question of other worlds. >> >> You are the one adding a metaphysical assumption, to make some people whose >> existence in arithmetic follows from digital mechanism into zombie. > > You're the one asserting that people "exist in arithmetic" whatever that may > mean. It means that there exist a number k such that phi_k(x) = y iff Brent# gives y on x, where x describe some possible input (a giant number to take into account all your senses). As we change ourself all the times, I use “Brent#” to denote you at some precise time. The coding here are huge, but the arithmetical reality count without counting, if I may say. All the relative state of your brain, relative to, say, our cluster of galaxies, are run in arithmetic, in finitely many number relations, and unless you want them to be all zombie, they are all conscious, and belongs to your personal range of first person indeterminacy, although in this case, the measure is plausibly negligible, compared to all solution of DeWitt-Wheeler equation (whose negligibility or not is to be studied). If interested, I can explain once more why the arithmetical reality run all computations, with a highly structured redundancy, which already suggest a non trivial measure on the computations (with and without oracle). Bruno > > Brent > >> >> That is not different than invoking a personal god to claim that someone >> else has no soul, and can be enslaved … perhaps? >> >> That the physical universe is not a “personal god” does not make its >> existence less absurd than to use a personal god to explain everything. >> >> In fact, the very existence of the appearance of a physical universe, >> obeying some mathematics, is a confirmation of Mechanism, which predicts >> that *all* universal machine get that illusion/dream/experience. This >> includes the facts that by looking closely (below the substitution level), >> we find the many "apparent parallel computations" and that the laws of >> physics, which looks computable above that level, looks not entirely >> computable below it. >> >> So, I think that you might be the one begging the question by invoking your >> own ontological commitment, without any evidences I’m afraid. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno has argued on the basis of this to motivate his theory, but this is >>>> a generic feature of any theory that assumes computational theory of >>>> consciousness. In particular, computational theory of consciousness is >>>> incompatible with a single universe theory. So, if you prove that only a >>>> single universe exists, then that disproves the computational theory of >>>> consciousness. The details here then involve that computations are not >>>> well defined if you refer to a single instant of time, you need to at >>>> least appeal to a sequence of states the system over through. >>>> Consciousness cannot then be located at a single instant, in violating >>>> with our own experience. Therefore either single World theories are false >>>> or computational theory of consciousness is false. >>>> >>>> Saibal >>>> >>>> >>>> Hi Saibal, >>>> >>>> I agree indirect mechanisms like looking at the resulting physics may be >>>> the best way to test it. I was curious if there any direct ways to test >>>> it. It seems not, given the lack of any direct tests of consciousness. >>>> >>>> Though most people admit other humans are conscious, many would reject the >>>> idea of a conscious computer. >>>> >>>> Computationalism seems right, but it also seems like something that by >>>> definition can't result in a failed test. So it has the appearance of not >>>> being falsifiable. >>>> >>>> A single universe, or digital physics would be evidence that either >>>> computationalism is false or the ontology is sufficiently small, but a >>>> finite/small ontology is doubtful for many reasons. >>>> >>>> Jason >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjhoAEFXtFkimkNqgvMWkHtASrdHByu5Ah4n%2BZwUGr1uA%40mail.gmail.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjhoAEFXtFkimkNqgvMWkHtASrdHByu5Ah4n%2BZwUGr1uA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06470e19-3af7-0c82-cdcf-0cb0adb7d3a2%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06470e19-3af7-0c82-cdcf-0cb0adb7d3a2%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/39071413-B123-402B-944F-BAE95BC7040E%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/39071413-B123-402B-944F-BAE95BC7040E%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/043c165b-ab2b-d282-c805-eac98d81e12a%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/043c165b-ab2b-d282-c805-eac98d81e12a%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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