> On 27 Nov 2020, at 15:00, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> 
> wrote:
> 
> This is a part of what I said earlier. Think of this with Bayesian statistics 
> with P(A∩B ) = p(A|B)p(B) = p(B|A)p(A).


What are A and B. What is the probability space? (OMEGA). I am not sure what 
are your assumption. It seems that you assume some probability theory.




> With an excluded middle with  A∩B = Ø we can only conclude that p(A|B) = 
> p(B|A) = 0 and so these correspond to situation with absolutely zero prior or 
> posterior probabilities. So if some state of affairs is contradictory, then 
> they have zero probability.

With Mechanism, we assume much less than a probability theory, and eventually, 
we derive a probability calculus, but this happens only in the derivation of 
the physical structure/logic/law from elementary arithmetic, as we need to do 
when we assume that consciousness is invariant for a functional substitution at 
some level (of description of the body/brain).





> In quantum logic we can think of this according to destructive interference, 
> so there are physical states that cannot exist by destructive interference.

That seems interesting, but the quantum structure has to be explained by the 
statistics on *all* computations (a very solid concept when we assume the 
Church-Turing thesis, which is a very strong hypothesis in math and 
philosophy/theology/metaphysics.

With mechanism, we explain the appearance of a physical reality by a measure on 
all computations as seen from inside, which has been the hard thing to define 
until I realised that the greeks not only get the solutions, but actually got 
the unique set of solutions provided by the universal+ Turing machine 
(universal+ = Gödel-Löbian = “believing in enough induction axioms (like PA)” = 
"universal and knowing it”.

The mechanist explanation requires us to NOT invoke any ontological commitment 
(neither a personal god, but also no impersonal god or ontology, except what is 
needed to define a universal machine, which is only elementary arithmetic, or 
Turing equivalent (what I called often “universal machinery”, which are the 
enumeration of programs in some universal programming language, or just the 
numbers with assiteion and multiplication.

The advantage is that this gives a theory of qualia and quanta, and thanks to 
the quanta, we can compare it with Nature, and thus refute (or just confirm) 
Mechanism. We find a quantum structure, and up to now, it fits with 
observation, unless we speculate on some wave reduction in nature.

When we do physics, we can assume, or not, some physical universe. When doing 
metaphysics with the scientific method, at some point we have to be very clear 
about what is assumed, and what is not assumed and instead derived. With 
Mechanism, elementary arithmetic is all what is assumed, beside the 
consciousness invariance at the meta-level. 

Bruno



> 
> LC
> 
> On Friday, November 27, 2020 at 4:14:05 AM UTC-6 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 26 Nov 2020, at 18:57, Mindey I. <[email protected] 
>> <applewebdata://627E8A92-ACB5-4345-A590-7A168A9FDCCA>> wrote:
>> 
>> Curiously, I found the Everything List, because I wanted to to create a "A 
>> Universe Where Everything Can Exist" ( https://mindey.com/world.pdf 
>> <https://mindey.com/world.pdf> ), which the Google search of 2007 returned 
>> me to my search query "How to create a universe, where everything can exist?”
> 
> What do you mean? 
> 
> In such a universe there would be circle with four sides?
> 
> The word" thing” needs a presentation or representation in some theory of  
> “thing".
> 
> I urge people to study a bit of mathematical logic which explains all this.
> 
> 
>> 
>> So, suppose that we create a universe, where everything exists, -- would 
>> that universe be a superset of all possible universes, or, just the same set?
> 
> 
> ”everything” is too much ambiguous without a theory of the things which are 
> assumed. 
> 
> All notions of whole, are limited when made precise enough, or are 
> inconsistent. The term “universe” is as bad as the term “god” when used out 
> of an hypothetical frame. 
> 
> Today, we can approximate string notion of everything is classical set 
> theory, but like in arithmetic, you will always miss the big whole. The 
> collection of all set cannot be a set. The number of numbers cannot be a 
> number, the whole physical reality cannot be a physical object … Now, this 
> can be doubted if you use a special set theory allowing universal object, 
> like Quine's New Foundation, but this does not prevent other type of 
> limitations.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
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