> On 9 Dec 2020, at 20:31, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Tuesday, December 8, 2020 at 8:01:30 AM UTC-6 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 27 Nov 2020, at 15:00, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] >> <applewebdata://6C687B17-974B-4E33-9651-361FE2E6DC33>> wrote: >> >> This is a part of what I said earlier. Think of this with Bayesian >> statistics with P(A∩B ) = p(A|B)p(B) = p(B|A)p(A). > > > What are A and B. What is the probability space? (OMEGA). I am not sure what > are your assumption. It seems that you assume some probability theory. > > > > A and B just stand for events or outcomes.
But what is the space of probability? What is Kolmogorov OMEGA? > > Bayes theorem is really similar to Boolean logic, Assuming Mechanism, none of the modes of self-reference can justify a classical logic. It works only for the ontology, which is “event free”. My feeling is that you are assuming a physical universe, which does not work (if you are aware of my arguments, I have given references). There is no way we can save an ontological physical universe when we assume mechanism. What would it be? And how could it be able to select a (relative) computation among all computations? The usual answer to this is that the “physical reality” makes some computation more real than others, but then, what in matter is needed and is not Turing emulable, and how to still answer “yes” to the digitalist doctor, who will not care of that “matter” per definition of Digital Mechanism? A Universe still assume some magic, and we can speculate that it exists, and that mechanism is false, of course. Yet, there a no evidences at all, when on the contrary, Mechanism got many evidences, from the direct one, like with genetics, molecular biology, etc, and indirect, like the many-worlds (or better: the many histories) interpretation of quantum mechanics, and its formalism, which are quickly retrieved from Mechanism, where physicists are still unable to provide a comprehensible interpretation. > but where instead of 0 and 1 there are probabilities with a measure in > between these two Boolean limits. It really is a generalization of standard > logic, and as such embeds the theorems that apply to such. That is a bold > unproven statement on my behalf, but it at least makes sense. May be, but it cannot work with the Mechanist Assumption. It presupposes somehow an alethic modal metaphysics (à-la Leibniz, using the modal logic S5, if you know Modal Logic). But with mechanism, we cannot choose the Modal Logic we want: they are imposed by incompleteness and its variate self-reference logics. It is like with Jesus. If it was true that Jesus made water into wine, it would still be better to invoke prestidigitation as the most reasonable explanation, given the human credulity and the existence of prestidigitation. Same for a Universe, given the credulity of the universal number, and their tremendous power of prestidigitation. Universal number and brains can make a person believe almost anything… What many people miss is that the concept of computation is a purely mathematical, even arithmetical notion. You can define what a computation is, and prove the existence of all of them, in very simple, but Turing-complete theory, like those I have given very often here. I believe, like everybody, that there is a physical reality, and indeed, we observe it all the time. But I don’t have to assume its existence. It follows from some of the self-reference modes of the numbers in arithmetic (or Turing equivalent). With Mechanism, physics is “ultimately” a branch of machine biology, psychology, metaphysics and/or theology, all being branches of elementary arithmetic, once we assume (Digital) Mechanism. Physics is the bet tool for making predictions, but it fails to relate those prediction with our first person experiences. It needs a strong identity relation between brain and experiences, which is untenable when we assume that our consciousness is preserved through artificial digital implant, where we are obliged to derive those prediction from the “natural” (canonical) statistics inherent to the many-computations reality of any Turing Universal Machinery. Bruno > > LC > > > >> With an excluded middle with A∩B = Ø we can only conclude that p(A|B) = >> p(B|A) = 0 and so these correspond to situation with absolutely zero prior >> or posterior probabilities. So if some state of affairs is contradictory, >> then they have zero probability. > > With Mechanism, we assume much less than a probability theory, and > eventually, we derive a probability calculus, but this happens only in the > derivation of the physical structure/logic/law from elementary arithmetic, as > we need to do when we assume that consciousness is invariant for a functional > substitution at some level (of description of the body/brain). > > > > > >> In quantum logic we can think of this according to destructive interference, >> so there are physical states that cannot exist by destructive interference. > > That seems interesting, but the quantum structure has to be explained by the > statistics on *all* computations (a very solid concept when we assume the > Church-Turing thesis, which is a very strong hypothesis in math and > philosophy/theology/metaphysics. > > With mechanism, we explain the appearance of a physical reality by a measure > on all computations as seen from inside, which has been the hard thing to > define until I realised that the greeks not only get the solutions, but > actually got the unique set of solutions provided by the universal+ Turing > machine (universal+ = Gödel-Löbian = “believing in enough induction axioms > (like PA)” = "universal and knowing it”. > > The mechanist explanation requires us to NOT invoke any ontological > commitment (neither a personal god, but also no impersonal god or ontology, > except what is needed to define a universal machine, which is only elementary > arithmetic, or Turing equivalent (what I called often “universal machinery”, > which are the enumeration of programs in some universal programming language, > or just the numbers with assiteion and multiplication. > > The advantage is that this gives a theory of qualia and quanta, and thanks to > the quanta, we can compare it with Nature, and thus refute (or just confirm) > Mechanism. We find a quantum structure, and up to now, it fits with > observation, unless we speculate on some wave reduction in nature. > > When we do physics, we can assume, or not, some physical universe. When doing > metaphysics with the scientific method, at some point we have to be very > clear about what is assumed, and what is not assumed and instead derived. > With Mechanism, elementary arithmetic is all what is assumed, beside the > consciousness invariance at the meta-level. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> LC >> >> On Friday, November 27, 2020 at 4:14:05 AM UTC-6 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 26 Nov 2020, at 18:57, Mindey I. <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> Curiously, I found the Everything List, because I wanted to to create a "A >>> Universe Where Everything Can Exist" ( https://mindey.com/world.pdf >>> <https://mindey.com/world.pdf> ), which the Google search of 2007 returned >>> me to my search query "How to create a universe, where everything can >>> exist?” >> >> What do you mean? >> >> In such a universe there would be circle with four sides? >> >> The word" thing” needs a presentation or representation in some theory of >> “thing". >> >> I urge people to study a bit of mathematical logic which explains all this. >> >> >>> >>> So, suppose that we create a universe, where everything exists, -- would >>> that universe be a superset of all possible universes, or, just the same >>> set? >> >> >> ”everything” is too much ambiguous without a theory of the things which are >> assumed. >> >> All notions of whole, are limited when made precise enough, or are >> inconsistent. The term “universe” is as bad as the term “god” when used out >> of an hypothetical frame. >> >> Today, we can approximate string notion of everything is classical set >> theory, but like in arithmetic, you will always miss the big whole. The >> collection of all set cannot be a set. The number of numbers cannot be a >> number, the whole physical reality cannot be a physical object … Now, this >> can be doubted if you use a special set theory allowing universal object, >> like Quine's New Foundation, but this does not prevent other type of >> limitations. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6f78bf49-bc21-41fa-8934-77a60f8f455en%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6f78bf49-bc21-41fa-8934-77a60f8f455en%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <applewebdata://6C687B17-974B-4E33-9651-361FE2E6DC33>. > >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4ec78c54-3c22-49b0-9094-ea2c3324d7fdn%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4ec78c54-3c22-49b0-9094-ea2c3324d7fdn%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/793f578e-e2ab-4000-a72f-9b51c4648905n%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/793f578e-e2ab-4000-a72f-9b51c4648905n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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